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THE 




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LE OF SEVEN PINES. 



BY 






GijsTAvus W. Smith:, 



Formerly Major-General, Confederate States Army. 









New York : 
c. g. crawford, printer and stationer, 

Nos. 49 AND 51 Pauk Place. 



1891. 






COPTBIGHTED 1891, BT GUSTAVUS W. SMITH. 



PREFACE, 



Many of the published accounts of the battle of Seven Pines 
are about as dark and confusing as were the tangled woods and 
swamps in which most of the close and bloody fighting took 
place. The following quotations will illustrate the conflict of 
statements on this subject. Federal writers say : " It is hardly 
denied by the most passionate of McClellan's partisans that the 
way was open before him to Richmond on the afternoon of the 
first day ; that being McClellan's greatest opportunity." " The 
Confederates had thrown almost their whole force against 
McClellan's left wing (Keyes and Heintzelman), and on the sec- 
ond day were streaming back to Richmond in discouragement 
and disorder." "We now know the state of disorganization and 
dismay in which the rebel army retreated." On the Confederate 
side it is stated : " The way to Richmond was not open to 
McClellan." " The first day the Confederates attacked McClel- 
lan's left wing with but five brigades." " So far from streaming 
back to Richmond in discouragement and disorder, they [the 
attacking party] remained in possession of the captured works on 
the Williamsburg road, nearly twenty-four hours after the fighting 
ended ; and, on the Nine-miles road the Confederates closely 
confronted Sumner's corps at Fair Oaks for several days there- 
after." 

The above quotations are from the Century Magazine for Jan- 
uary, 1889, page 4:77. They are referred to here as constituting one 
of " a thousand " instances of conflicting opinions in regard to the 
principal features of this battle — which seem to call for the pub- 
lication of an accurate account of the main facts and the proofs. 
While endeavoring to prepare such an account I have felt con- 
strained — at the risk of being tedious — to comment upon erro- 
neous " assertions " of " high authorities ; " and to give, in some 
detail, important evidence contained in the recently published 
oSicial reports of regimental, brigade and division commanders, 
on both sides. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE. 



Preliniiiiaiy chapter ..... 7 

Cliapter II. — Fighting on the Williamsburg road, May 3J . oi 
Chapter III. — Alleged " slow movements '' of Iluger's 

division Gi 

Chapter IV. — Contest north of Fair Oaks Station. 83 

Chapter V.— The fighting, Jnne 1 105 

ChajDter VI.— Longstreet in the field, Jnne 1. — D. H. 
Hill's official report. — Withdrawal of the Confeder- 
ates from the captured vrorks, June 2 127 

Chapter YII. — Summary and comments ... 144 

Fac-similes of letters 174 

Memoranda in reference to maps 188 

Preliminary map 189 

Map of battle-field 191 

Index 193 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



PRELIMINAEY CHAPTER 



In the latter part of May, 1862, tlie Army of Northern 
Yirginia, about 50,000 strong, under General J. E. Johnston, 
reached the vicinity of Richmond from the defensive lines near 
Yorktown, and was followed by the army of the Potomac, 
nearly 100,000 strong, under General G. B. McClellan. There 
was a collision between the rear of the Confederates and the 
Federal advanced troops at Williamsburg, and a slight affair near 
the head of York river. Otherwise the withdrawal was not 
interfered with. 

In retiring from Williamsburg, General J. E. Johnston's 
army was organized in two grand divisions, known as the First 
and Second Corps. The latter was commanded by Major-General 
James Longstreet and consisted of his own division and that of 
Major-General D. H. Hill. I commanded the First Corps, 
which was composed of the forces that were under Major-General 
J. B. Magruder, at YorktoAvn, before Johnston's army arrived 
there, and five other brigades ; three of which, viz., Whiting's, 
Hood's and Hampton's, constituted a division under Brigadier- 
General Whiting ; and the brigades of Pettigrew and Hatton, 
each of which reported direct to the headquarters of the First 
Corps. On the 28th of May, under authority from General 
Johnston, the following order was issued by my direction : 

" The division now commanded by Brigadier- General Whit- 
ing and the brigades of Brigadier-General Pettigrew and Briga- 
dier-General Hatton will, until further orders, constitute one 
division under command of Brigadier-General Whiting." 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

On the same day General Magruder was ordered to report 
direct to the headquarters of the army, and was thus transferred 
from my command. A. P. Hill's division was placed under miy 
control, and the army was organized in three grand divisions. 
The " right wing," commanded by General Longstreet, was com'- 
posed of his own division and that of D. H. Hill. The " centre," 
commanded by General Magruder, was composed of McLaws's 
division and that of D. R. Jones ; and the " left wing," com- 
manded by General G. "W. Smith, was composed of my division, 
tinder Whiting, and A. P. Hill's division. 

Such was the organization of the Confederate Army, near 
Richmond, when the following letter was written by General 
Johnston to General Whiting : 

* " Headquarters, Harrison's, ) 
" May 29th, 1862. j 
" 3Iy Dear General : 

" I have just received the note you wrote in regard to your 
camp. I will give precise orders not to let it be interfered with. 

1 received a message from Huger to the effect that his troops had 
not arrived at 6 hours 30 minutes this morning — no cars having 
been sent for them. The Quartermaster who had charge of the 
matter reported to me at sunset that the trains were ready and 
would be off at 9 o'clock. Lee ordered John G. Walker's bri- 
gade to Petersburg, and Holmes ordered it back. 

" For any purpose but that contemplated yesterday the present 
disposition of our troops is not good — too strong on the extreme 
left. If nothing is heard of McDowell we must bring you back 
to a more central place. 

" D. H. Hill reported an hour ago that one of his advanced 
brigadiers had sent forward 200 skirmishers, who very soon met 
a brigade of the enemy with cavalry and artillery. Who knows 
but that in tlie course of the morning Longstreet's scheme may 
accomplish itself. 

" If we get into a fight here you'll have to hurry to help us. 

"I think it will be best for A. P. H.'s troops to watch the 

* A. facsimile of that letter is given on pages 174-5. 



PRELIMINAEY CHAPTER. 9 

bridges and for yours to be well in this direction — ready to act 

anywhere. Tell G. W. * 

" Yours truly, 

" J. E. Johnston. 
" Brig.-Genl. Whiting." 

In this connection the following extracts from ex-President 
Davis's writings are of interest. In a work entitled " The Rise 
and Fall of the Confederate Government," Yol. II., p. 120, he 
says : '" Seeing no preparation to keep the eneni}'' at a distance, 
and kept in ignorance of any plan for such purpose, I sent for 
General R. E. Lee, then at Richmond, in general charge of army 
operations, and told him why and how I was dissatisfied with 
the condition of affairs. . . . He then said : ' General 
Johnston should, of course, advise you of what he expects or 
proposes to do. Let me go and see him and defer this discussion 
until I return.' When General Lee came back, he told me that 
General Johnston proposed, on the next Thursday [May 29th], 
to move against the enemy as follows : General A. P. Hill was 
to move down on the right flank and rear of the enemy. General 
G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to cross the 
Chickahominy f at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in 
flank, and by the conjunction of the two it was expected to 
double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechan- 
icsville Bridge and attack him in front. . . . On 
the morning of the day proposed I hastily dispatched my office 
business and rode out toward the Meadow Bridge to see the 
action commence." 

Before giving Mr. Davis's account of the ride he makes 
" historic ; " it may be well to call attention to the fact that — 
whatever may have been at one time General Johnston's con- 
templated purpose — on the morning of the 29tli he certainly did 
not intend to attack the enemy that day. From this it follows 
that when Mr. Davis " rode out " that morning it was not likely 
he would " see the action commence." 

* General G. W. Smith. 

f That stream, at ordinary stages of water, is from forty to sixty feet wide 
and from two to three feet deep ; in time of freshet it rises rapidly, overflows 
the low lands to a deptli of several feet, and becomes a very serious military ob- 
stacle, passable only at the bridges. 



10 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



In describing this remarkable ride lie says : " On the road 1 found 
Smith's division halted and the men dispersed in the woods. 
. . . I finally saw General Hood, and asked him the mean- 
ing of what I saw. He told me he did not know anything more 
than that they had been halted. I asked him where General 
Smith was ; he said he believed he had gone to a farm-house in 
the rear, adding that he tliought he was ill. Kiding on to the 
bluff which overlooks the Meadow Bridge, 1 asked Colonel [G. 
T.] Anderson, posted there in observation, whether he had seen 
anything of the enemy in his front. He said that he had seen 
only two mounted men across the bridge, and a small party of 
infantry on the other side of the river, some distance below, 
both of whom, he said, he could show me if I would go with 
him into the garden back of the house. There, by the use of a 
powerful glass, were distinctly visible two cavalry vedettes at the 
farther end of the bridge, and a squad of infantry lower down 
the river, who had covered themselves with a screen of m-een 
boughs. The Colonel informed me that he had not heard Hill's 
guns ; it was, therefore, supposed he had not advanced. I then 
rode down the bank of the river, followed by a cavalcade of 
sightseers, who, I suppose, had been attracted by the expectation 
of a battle. The little squad of infantry, about fifteen in num- 
ber, as we approached, lied over the bridge, and were lost to 
sight. Near to the Mechanicsville Bridge I found General 
Howell Cobb. ... He pointed out to me on the opposite 
side of the river the only enemy he had seen, and which was 
evidently a light battery. Eiding on to the main road, which 
led to the Mechanicsville Bridge, I found General Longstreet, 
walking to and fro in an impatient, it might be said, fretful 
manner. Before speaking to him, he said his division had been 
under arms all day waiting for orders to advance, and that the 
day was now so far spent that he did not know what was the 
matter. I afterward learned fi-om General Smith that he had 
received information from a citizen that the Beaver Dam creek 
presented an impassable barrier, and that he had thus fortunately 
been saved from disaster. Thus ended the offensive defensive 
progrannne from which Lee expected much and of which I was 
hopeful.'' I 



\i 



PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. il 



The proper '' front of the enemy," on the north side of the 
€hickahominy, was parallel to that stream, and extended from 
the vicinity of the railroad bridge on the left to Beaver Dam 
creek. But the right of their main line extended some distance 
along the east side of this creek, nearly at right angles to the 
Chickahominy. Thus, in order to move down on the rear of 
the enemy, as stated by Mr. Davis, A. P. Hill would have been 
compelled to make a wide detour to the north. Whilst G. W. 
Smith, according to Mr. Davis's account, would have struck the 
front of the line along Beaver Dam creek, and not as he says, 
" attackino- the enemy in flankr By crossing " on the Me- 
chanicsvilfe Bridge " Longstreet-from Mr. Davis's description- 
would have been in rear of G. W. Smith. From that position 
he could not well have attacked the front of the Federal main 
line. General Johnston, as will presently be shown, did not 
propose to make the movements described by Mr. Davis. 

Without commenting on his efforts to find out " where 
General Suiith was "-and not doubting that Mr. Davis went 
"back of the house "—and without calling in question his state- 
ment that he, " followed by a cavalcade of sightseers," frightened 
a " little squad of infantrv, about fifteen in number "—and finally 
found General Longstreet, who said ^' he did not know what 
was the matter "-f feel constrained to say that Mr, Davis never 
learned from me that I had received information from a citizen 
that the Beaver Dam creek presented an impassable barrier and 
that I " had thus fortunately been saved from disaster." 

His account of the ride he took out on the Meadow Bridge 
road, after dispatching his office business on the morning of May 
29 1862, can only be fairly appreciated when viewed m the 
Hght of events as they occurred during the time of which he 
writes. Keference to those events will now be made. 

On the 2-J:th of May, Brigadier-General Hatton reported to 
me from Seven Pines : ^ " I will retire my command to-night to a 
point on the Seven-miles [Williamsburg Old Stage] road, one and 
a half miles from this. The enemy are in considerable force m my 
immediate front. In my skirmish to-day I lost but three men. 

* The junction of the Williamsburg and the Nine-miles roads. 



12 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



The same niglit it was reported to me that the bridges over 
the Chickahomiiij, including the Meadow Bridges, were in the 
hands of the enemy. 

At that time D. H. Hill's division was on the Charles City 
road, three or four miles from Kichmond ; and Longstreet's divi- 
sion, on the extreme right, was at a little greater distance from 
the city, on the road leading to the James river defenses. 
Magruder's forces were on the Chickahominy blnffs, extending 
from the Meadow Bridge road to the New Bridge road, and 
along the latter to its junction with the Nine-miles road. The 
three brigades under Whiting, and the brigade of Pettigrew, 
were two or three miles from liichmond, between the left of D. 
H. Hill's division and tlie right of Magruder's forces. Hatton's 
brigade was farther out, watching the approach of the Federals 
on the Williamsburg road. There was no material change in 
the position of the Confederates until the 27th of May. That 
morning General McLaws reported that the Federal skirmishers 
were pressing ours on the Nine-miles road, just east of the New 
Bridge fork. 

From the time the Federal advance first crossed the Chicka- 
hominy, at Bottom's Bridge, General Johnston had closely 
observed their movements, and was only waiting their approach 
within easy reach of his army, in order to strike them an effec- 
tive blow. The report received from McLaws on the morning 
of the 2Tth gave strong indication that the enemy would soon be 
near enough, in large force, on either the Nine-miles road or the 
Williamsburg road, or on both, to bring them within good 
striking distance of Johnston's army. 

But, attention was quickly called to McClellan's right flank, 
north of Richmond, across the Chickahominy, in the neighbor- 
hood of Mechanicsville. About 1 p. m. that day I received the 
following note from General Johnston : 

* " Harrison's, ) 

" Gustavus : " ^% 27th, 1862. f 

" We must get ready to fight. Anderson reports (Junction, 
11 A. M.) that his vedettes have informed him that McDowell i& 



A facsimile of this note is given on p. 176. 

I 



PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. 



13 



advancing ' in force,' his pickets at Guinea's. The army reported 
six miles this side of Fredericksburg^. 

"His main, force at Half Sink, three regiments, under 
Hamilton, at the Junction. We must get ready for this. 

" Yours ever, 

" J. E. Johnston. 
" Major-Genl. Smith." 

Within fifteen minutes after I received the above note I was 
at General Johnston's headquarters. He directed me to order 
the five brigades from the Williamsburg road to the vicinity of 
Meadow Bridge ; bring in A. P. Hill's division from the vicinity 
of Ashland ; and make preparations for an attack upon the right 
of the Federal forces, on the left bank of the Chickahominy, as 
soon as possible. He told me that D. H. Hill's division would 
replace my troops on the AVilliamsburg road ; and that Long. 
street's division would be ordered to take position on the north 
and east of Eichmond, ready to act in either direction. At my 
request I was relieved from the duty of commanding General 
Magruder and his forces ; but the two brigades that formed D. R. 
Jones's division— the left of Magruder's line— on the Mechanics- 
ville and Meadow Bridge roads, were left under my control, in the 
contemplated attack. At the same time it was arranged that 
Whiting should l)e placed in temporary command of the brigades 
of Pettrgrew and Hatton in addition to the three brigades that 
had previously constituted his division. 

In less than an hour from the time of my arrival at Ge-jieral 
Johnston's head(inarters I left him for the purpose of making 
the requisite preparation to carry his instructions into effect. I 
returned about sunset, May 28th, and reported to him that A. P. 
Hill's division would be close in front of the Federal intrenched 
outpost at Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy, 
before midnight, with orders to attack that place at dawn on 
the 29th ; and that as soon as A. P. Hill's attack commenced, 
the division under Whiting, and D. E. Jones's division, would 
cross the Meadow and Mechanicsville bridges ; and these three 
divisions, constituting the new left wing, under my command, 
would make a prompt and combined attack against the right of 



•^^ BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

the Federal army, strongly posted on the eastern crest of Beaver 
Dam creek. 

During the time that General Johnston's arnij was halted 
between the Pamnnkej and Chickahominj rivers, a close recon- 
naissance of that ground, to include Beaver Dam creek, had been 
made by tlie Chief-Engineer of the Armj, Major Stevens and 
the Chief of my StaflF, Major Whiting; and these two officers 
had made to me a detailed report of their observations. I had, 
therefore, no occasion to listen to any citizen in regard to the 
character of tlie ground along Beaver Dam creek. I knew the 
difficulties we wonld have to encounter in a direct attack on that 
position. But, I adyised that it should be attacked in front ;. 
because, in order "to turn it," we would have to make a wide 
movement far to the north, which would consume more time 
than we could afford, in our attempt to beat MeClellan before 
McDowell could arrive. 

_ The advantage that would accrue to us in turning the position 
—instead of attacking it in front— was clear to all ; and suo-o-es- 
tions were freely offered to the effect that, if Jackson's forces 
could be brought into position to turn the Federal line on Beaver 
Dam creek, and thus enable us to carry it witliout attacking in 
front, the matter would be much easier. 

In short, I reported to Genei-al Johnston that I was satisfied 
the three divisions could carry the works at Beaver Dam creek 
by open assault in front ; but, it would be a bloody business, called 
for, however, by the necessity for prompt action if we expected 
to beat MeClellan before he was joined by McDowell. 

After receiving my report General' Johnston said that his 
latest information showed McDowell's army had returned to 
Fredericksburg ; and it was believed he was moving north from 
that place. In this state of affairs there seemed to be no lono-er 
a pressing necessity for crossing the Chickahominy— all of whose 
bridges and fords were in the hands of the enemy— in order to 
attack the three Federal corps on the north side of that stream • 
first moving against the very strong position at Beaver Dam' 
creek ; while there were but two Federal corps on our side, and 
these were gradually coming within good striking distance, where 
the natural features of the ground were not against us. 



PRELIMINARY CHAPTEK. 15- 

But, General Longstreet urgently insisted that the contem- 
plated attack should be made. Finally, General Johnston ordered 
that the attack should be susj)ended, and directed me to with- 
draw A. P. Hill's division, bring it to our side of the Chicka- 
hominy ; and place it on the exti-erae left of the main Confed- 
erate Army. General Longstreet then proposed that an attack 
should be made early on the morning of the 29th, against the 
Federals, on our side of the river, in the vicinity of Seven Pines. 
General Johnston said it was not quite certain that McDowell 
Lad moved north from Fredericksburg ; that the disposition of 
our troops, made whilst it was supposed McDowell was coming, 
was too strong on the left to admit of immediate and advanta- 
geous attack in the direction of Seven Pmes ; that Iluger's divi- 
sion from Norfolk was expected to join us very soon ; and that 
he was not yet fully assured the enemy east of us had approached 
near enough, in force worth crashing, to justify the engagement 
of the mass of our army in the swamps around Seven Pines, 
whilst the Federals were in position threatening the city upon 
the north side. No orders were given by General Johnston to 
attack on the 29th, but it was distinctly understood he would re- 
vert to his former intention, and endeavor to strike a sudden, 
and, if possible, crushing blow against the Federals in the 
vicinity of Seven Pines, if McDowell did not promptly come on. 

I left General Johnston's headquarters about midnight on the 
28th and remained at Colonel G. T. Anderson's position, near the 
Meadow Bridge, until I learned, early on the morning of the 29th, 
that A. P. Hill had received my order in time to enable him to with- 
draw, from close contact with the enemy at Mechanicsville, without 
his presence there having been discovered. The only crossing 
of the Chickahominy available for A. P. Flill's troops was the 
bridge on the road from Pichmond to Ashland. I met him at. 
that bridge and placed his command in position, on the left of 
the Confederate Arm}^, as ordered l)y General Johnston. 

Whilst I was thus enffaered, it seems that President Davis was 
ridintr out on the Meadow Bridge road " to see the action com- 
mence ; " and General Johnston was writing to D. 11. Hill, on the 
Williamsburg road : " Tell your advanced brigades to find out 
the strength of the enemy before them, if possible. It may be- 



16 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



come necessary to attack." And later, on tlie same day, General 
Johnston wrote to General Wliiting : " For any purpose but that 
contemplated yesterday, the present disposition of our troops is 
not good— too strong on the extreme left. ... I think it 
will be best for A. P. H.'s troops to watch the bridges, and for 
yours to be well in this direction, ready to act anywhere." 

In view of the plain facts, it is not 'necessary to say any- 
thing farther in regard to Mr. Davis's account of the ride he 
took, on the 29th of May, to see the action commence on the 
north side of the Chickahominy. 

On the 30th, in compliance with the suggestions contained in 
General Johnston's letter of the 29th to General Whiting, I 
ordered the latter to take position nearer Eichmond, and directed 
A. P. Hill to place his troops within easy supporting distance of 
those guarding the roads leading to the Meadow and Mechanics- 
ville bridges. Huger's division, three brigades, from Norfolk, had 
arrived and was placed on the banks of Gilliss creek, near 
the eastern suburb of Eichmond. D. H. Hill's division was still 
on the Williamsburg road, two or three miles from Eichmond, 
with one brigade on the Charles City road farther out. Three 
brigades of Longstreet's division were a little north of the city, 
between the Mechanicsville and the Nine-miles roads, and the 
other three brigades of this division were three and one-half 
miles out on the latter road. After the divisions of A. P. Hill 
and Huger joined the Confederate forces near Eichmond, Gen- 
eral Johnston's army was between 60,000 and 70,000 strong. 

Attention will now be called to a " programme " from which 
General Johnston " expected much," and of which, in the begin- 
ning, he was very " hopeful" On the 19th of December, 1867, 
he wrote to me : " The accounts of Federal officers of our 
operations in 1862 have revived an intention that I formed 
at the close of the war to make a military report. To assist 
me in doing so I ask your evidence on two points in which 
you are no less interested than myself." 

The first point referred to by him was the conference held at 
Eichmond, in April, 1862. The second was in reference to Seven 
Pines. On the 23d of the same month I replied, giving in sub- 
stance, as requested, a description of what occurred on the Con- 



PEELIMINAEY CHAPTER. 17 

federate side, nortli of Fair Oaks, late in the afternoon of tlie 31st 
of May, 1862, and gave liini my recollections in regard to the 
Richmond conference. I added : " There is a good deal yet to be 
told before the world will understand what occurred at Seven 
Pines or Fair Oaks. Have you ever seen the ' History of the 
Army of the Potomac' (Federal) by Swinton? He attributes to 
my slowness — or worse — the faihire of your plans; and leaves 
the im^jression that his narrative of events, on the Confederate 
side, was obtained from yourself and General Longstreet. When 
you requested me to omit certain facts, stated in my hurried 
official report to you, because, in your o])inion, they did not con- 
cern me or my command, I acceded to the earnest request of a 
friend, and directed the paragraphs indicated, in pencil, by you, 
to be omitted. And ' History ' now says (see Swinton's * Army 
of the Potomac, ' p. 135) : ' Meantime, though the divisions of 
Longstreet and Hill had thus for three hours been vigorously 
pushing forward on the Williamsburg road, the column of 
G. W. Smith, to which had been intrusted the important flanking 
operation already indicated in Johnston's original plan, had not 
yet moved.' And a good deal more of the same sort of ' History' 
about the battle of Seven Pines. ... I have always re- 
gretted that the serious attack of illness which I suffered from on 
the 2d of June (the day after Lee relieved me — and from which 
I have never fully recovered) prevented my requiring all subor- 
dinates to make full reports to me of what transpired during the 
eighteen hours I commanded on that battle field. ... I 
am ' interested,' and I want all the facts known." 

On the 16th of January, 1868, General Johnston replied : " I 
thank you for your explanation of the incident in the battle of 
Fair Oaks, which is so magnified by General Sumner and Mr. 
Swinton. I regard the passage of Mr. Swinton's book which you 
quote, and the next passage, as representing me (and truly) as 
fixing the time when your troops were put in motion, i thnik 
that examination of the two passages in connection will bring 
you to the same conclusion." 

I replied on the 19tli of the same month : " The question in 
reference to Swinton's account of the battle of Seven Pines, 
quoted in my letter of the 23d ult., is not as to whether you put 



18 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

my troops in motion at a given time, but in reference to slowness 
of G. W. Smith in carrying out your ' original plan.' " 

General Johnston replied on the 21st of the same month, but 
confined his remarks exclusively to the first of the two points 
referred to in his letter of tlie 19th of December. He made no 
allusion to his " original plan," to Swinton's History, or to the 
battle of Seven Pines. 

On page 133 of that " History " Mr. Swinton says : " Huger's 
duty was to strike the left flank of the Union force which Hill 
and Longstreet should engage in front." " G. W. Smith, with 
his division, was to advance on the right flank of the Union force 
which Hill and Longstreet should engage in front." 

This is the alleged " original plan " to which, in a corre- 
spondence initiated by himself, I pointedly called General John- 
ston's attention, and which he studiously ignored. It is not pro- 
posed, in this connection, to discuss that part of the so-called 
" original plan " which refers to " Huger's duty." 

The division which bore my name was not ordered " to ad- 
vance on the right flank of the Union force which Hill and 
Longstreet should engage in front." The following is a copy of 
the order on this subject which was sent by General Johnston 
to General Whiting direct, although that order was at the same 
time sent to me. It is dated " May 30, 18G2, 9.15 p. m." : " Gen- 
eral — If notliing prevents, we will fall upon the enemy in front 
of Major-General [D. IL] Hill, who occupies the position on the 
AVilliamsburg road from which your troops moved to the neigh- 
borhood of Meadow Bridges, early in the morning, as early as 
practicable. The Chickahominy will be high — and passable only 
at the bridges — a great advantage to us. Please be ready to move 
by the Nine-miles road, coming as early as possible to the point 
at which the road to New Bridge turns off. Should there be 
cause of haste. General McLaws, on your approach, will be or- 
dered to leave his ground for you, that he may reinforce General 
Longstreet." 

It is now proposed to show what General Johnston's plan was, 
so far as concerned the movements of Longstreet's division and 
those of the division under Whiting. The head of the latter di- 
vision, whilst moving to the Nine-miles road, very early on the 



PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. 19 

morning of May 31, was obstructed in its progress by troops of 
Longstreet's division across its line of march. Becoming impa- 
tient at the continued delay, in liis reaching the point at which 
the Nine-miles road leaves the suburb of the city. General Whit- 
ing addressed a note to General Johnston on that subject. The 
following is a copy of the reply he received from an Assistant 
Adjutant-General on Johnston's staff : 

" General Johnston directs me to say, in answer to yours of 
this date, that Longstreet will precede you. What he said about 
McLaws [in the order for battle sent to Whiting] was merely in 
case of emergency. He has given no orders to Magruder.'' * 

General Johnston intended that Longstreet's division should 
move along the Nine-miles road. Of this fact there is ample proof 
in the following letter written by General Johnston to me, within 
less than one month after the occurrence of these events : 

f " Richmond, 

"June 28, 1862. 
•' My Dear Gustavus : 

" I inclose herewith the first three sheets of your report, to 
ask a modification, or omission, rather. They contain two subjects 
which I never intended to make generally known, which I have 
mentioned to no one but yourself, and mentioned to you as I have 
been in the habit of doing everything of interest in the military 
way. 1 refer to the mention of the misunderstanding between 
Longstreet and myself in regard to the direction of his division, 
and that of his note to me, received about 4 o'clock, complaining 
of my slowness, which note I showed you. 

" As it seems to me that both of these matters concern Long- 
street and myself alone, I have no hesitation in asking you to 
strike them out of your report, as they in no manner concern your 
operations. 

" I received information of L.'s misunderstanding (which may 
be my fault, as I told j^ou at the time), while his troops were 
moving to the Williamsburg road and sent to L. to send three 

* Official Records, Vol. XI., Part III., p. 564. ' 

t Al facsimile of that portion of this letter, which refers to operations at 
Seven Pines, is given on pages 177, 178. 



20 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

brigades by the Nine-miles road, if tliey had not marched so far 
as to make the change involve a serious loss of time. This after 
telling you of the misunderstanding. 

" Your march from Gen'l Semmes' headquarters was not in 
consequence of the letter from L. [Major] Whiting had gone at my 
request and with your permission to ascertain the state of things 
with L. Just before 4 o'clock we heard musketry for the first time, 
and [General] Whiting was ordered to advance. Just then Major 
W. rode up and reported from L. and a moment after the note 
was brought me, which, after reading it, I showed to you. . . .'' 

In those portions of this letter which are not quoted General 
Johnston makes no mention of oj^erations connected with the 
battle of Seven Pines. 

Tlie following is a co])y of the first three sheets of my oflicial 
report, which was addressed to the Adjutant-General of the 
Department of Northern Virginia. Those portions that are in 
italics, included in brackets, were omitted, as requested by General 
Johnston : 

" Richmond, Ya., ) 

" June 23, 1862. f 
" 31aJor : 

" On the 2Sth of May, by direction of General Johnston, I 
assumed command of the left wing of the army, and on the same 
day placed my own division temporarily under command of the 
Senior Brigadier-General, W. H. C. Whiting. At half-past 12 
o'clock on the morning of the 31st of May, at my headquarters 
on the Brook turnpike, I received a note from General Johnston 
directing that my division should take position as soon as practi- 
cable upon the Nine-miles road, near the New Bridge fork, ready 
to support, if necessary, the divisions upon the right in an attack 
upon the enemy, which was to be made early in the morning. I 
was informed that, in case my division did not arrive in time, a 
portion of the troops composing the centre would be moved for- 
ward, and I was directed in that event to replace the troops, thus 
moved, by my division. [On arriving at the headquarters of 
General Johnston, about sun7'ise, I learned from him that his in- 
tention was that General Longstreefs division should move by the 
Nine-miles road, that of General D. H. Hill by the Williamsburg 



PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. 21 

Stage road, and General Hager''s by the Charles Citij road. The 
enemy, it was understood, had already upon this side of the 
Ghickahominy river a force variously estimated at from 20,000 to 
40,000 men. The recent rains had materially increaned the 
dijficidty of crossing that stream; and notiuithstanding the 
very had condition of the roads over luhich loe had to pass, and 
the boggy, swampy condition of the fields and woods through ivhich 
our troops ivoidd have to operate, it icas believed., that an energetic 
attack, early in the morning, properly supported and followed, up, 
would result in defeat to that portion of the enemy already upon 
this side, before the other portion of their army could cross the 
su'ollen river ; either to reinforce their troo2Js,or to attack the city 
in our rear. About 8 o'clock I directed Captain Beckham., 
Aide-de-Canip, to see General Longstrcet on the Nine-miles road, 
and learn from him the state of a fairs, and communicate to me cdl 
the information he could obtain in regard to the probable move- 
ments of the troops under General Longstreet, inorder that I might 
imder standingly give instructions to General Whiting, ivho had 
arrived with the head of the division near General Johnstons 
headquarters, having been for some time waiting for General Long- 
street's troops to pass. In about an hour I learned by note from 
Captain Beckham that neither General Longstreet nor any por- 
tion of his command ivere on the Nine-miles road. This noteivas 
immediately shoivn to Geneord Johnston, who dispatched his Aide- 
de-Camp, Lieutenant Washington, to General Longstreet with 
directions to turn his division into the Nine-miles road, provided 
it could be done without matericd loss of time. This message did 
not reach General Longstreet. General Johnston's intentions, as 
then explained to me, ivere that ivhilst Genercd D. H. Hill's di- 
vision was attacking the enemy' s advanced position on the Will- 
iamsburg Stage road in front. General Huger's division, from the 
Chtarles City road, icould attack the leftfrud', a7id General Long- 
street's division ivould engage the enemy on Hill's left. An hour 
later Captain Beckham reported, that he had found Longstreet' s 
division on the Williamsburg road, halted., for the purpose of al- 
lowing General D. H. HilVs troops to file by; and soon after 
returned with informatioyi thcd General Hill's troops 
had p>assed, and that Genercd Longstreet ivas making cdt 



"^ BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



his chspos^hons to attack the enemy in conjunction idth 
General RdCs division on the WilUamsburg road, his own 
division heing held in reserve on that road.] I then di 
rected General Whiting to move three brigades, viz., his own 
Hood s and Pettigrew's, near to the fork of \he Nine-miles and 
N ew Bridge roads ; and placed the other two-Hatton's and Hamp- 
ton 8-m reserve near Mrs. Christian's farm. About 1 o'clock 
1 rejomed General Johnston at the head of the three brigades 
m position upon the Nine-miles road, and found him anxiously 
awaiting the development of affairs upon our right. As tlie day 
wore on and nothing decisive was heard from General Long- 
street's attack, except occasional firing of cannon, and, for some 
two or three hours, but little musketi^, it seemed that no real 
attack was likely to be made that day, at least. [But hetiveen 4 
(md o clock a note was received from General Longstreet stating 
that he had attacked ami hecUen the enemy after several honrs 
severe fghting ; that he had been disappointed in not receiving 
assistance upon his left, and, although it was now nearly too late 
that an attack by the Mne-miles road upon the right /lank and 
rear of the enemy zv o id d probably yet enable him to drive them 
tnto the Chickahominy before dark.'"] 

The omissions indicated by General Johnston were made as 
shown in the preceding italics within brackets. I now have the 
trst three slieets of my re]>ort as they were returned to me by 
him. He made a mistake in stating that he mentioned to no one 
but myself the misunderstanding between himself and Lono- 
street in regard to the direction in which the division of the latter 
was to move. He is mistaken, too, in supposing tliat this matter 
concerned himself and Longstreet alone, and that it " in no man- 
ner concerned the operations of the division under Whitino- 

The note he received at 4 p. m., complaining of his " slowness » 
gave him good reason to believe that, up to that time, the 
30,00 men of the right wing had met with more resistance 
than their united efforts coukl well overcome; and the conse- 
quence was, that General Johnston, in person, led the division 
under Whitmg m a rapid movement directed against "the right 
flank of Longstreet's adversaries;" without further regard to 
i^ederal reinforcements that would, in all probability, be sent 



PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. 23 

from the north bank of the Chickahominy as soon as possible 
after Longstreet's attack commenced. 

It was about 4.30 a. m., May 31, when 1 reached General 
Johnston's headquarters. I reported to him that before I left my 
own headquarters, five or six miles distant, General Whiting had 
informed me that in compliance with orders received direct fron 
General Johnston, he would start with the head of the division as 
soon as it was light enough to see the road ; and that he would be 
on time. I informed General Johnston that I had turned over 
the command of the left wing of the army temporarily to A. P. 
Hill ; and although 1 purposed l^eing on the held, I did not pro- 
pose to relieve General Whiting from the command of my 
division, to wliicli he had recently been assigned. 

General Johnston approved of w^hat I had done and proposed 
to do, and informed me of his intentions as stated in my report, 
including the portions tliat were omitted at his request. He told 
me that he would, in person, be on the Nine-miles road, from 
which he could better observe the movements of the Federals on 
the north side of the river ; and stated that if they attempted to 
cross anywhere above New Bridge he would place me in com- 
mand of all om- troops on that side, and that I must repel any 
attack they might make on Eichmond, whilst the mass of our 
army was engaged with McClellan's left wing. 

At that time. General Johnston confidently expected an effec- 
tive blow would be struck against the Federals in the vicinity of 
Seven Pines— before 8 a.m.— by D. H. Hill's division on the 
AVuliamsburg road, moving against their front, closely sup- 
ported by Longstreet's division, on the Nine-miles road, going 
promptly into action on D. H. Hill's left. 

But, Mr. Swinton says : " Johnston's original plan," was that 
" G. W. Smith, with his division, was to advance on the right 
flank of the Union force which Hill and Longstreet should en- 
gage in front "—and adds : " Meantime, though the divisions of 
Loiigstreet and Hill had thus for three hours been vigorously 
pushing forward on the Williamsburg road ; the column of G. 
W. Smith, to wdiich had been intrusted the important flanking 
operation already indicated in Johnston's original plan had not 
yet moved." This view has been so persistently insisted upon 



^^ BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



that some additional testimony bearin^c^on tlie question of " Johns- 
ton 8 orjgmal plan " will now be given. 

In a letter to me, Februarj 7^ 1S63, Major R. R Beckham 
who was my aide at the time of this battle, says : " I was directed 
to carry an order [message] to General Lon^street urging him to 
push forward with his division so that the road might be cleared 
to enable yonr division [under Whiting] to take up the march. 
. . . I then asked General Johnston if he could give me any 
Idea of General Longstreet's whereabouts. His reply was that he 
did not know, but that he ought to be on the march on the Nine- 
miles road. With instructions to find him, if possible, I started 
off; but could learn nothing of him on the route indicated by 
General Johnston. After having gone as far as was necessary to 
satisfy me that General Longstreet's division was not on the mne- 
miles road, I sent, by courier, a note to you stating this fact ; and 
I also remember to have said in it that I would go over to 
the Williamsburg, or old stage road, and see if General Long- 
8 reet could be found there. I found his headquarters at a houfe 
on the side of the road, belonging, I think, to a J\Ir. Poor, and 
tnere delivered to him the order [message] given me. Kemper's 
brigade, which formed a part of General Longstreet's division 
was at a halt on the road when I got to General Longstreet's 
headquarters, and, what surprised me most, was accompanied bv 
wagons loaded with baggage and camp equipage. You will ve- 
member that I mentioned this thing to you when I came back to 
General Johnston s headquarters. I do not remember at what 
hour I reached General Longstreet. Judging from the time of 
my joining you at General Johnston's, and the time which must 
have elapsed before the order [to deliver a message to General 
Longstreet] was given me, I would suppose it to hrive been about 
10 o clock when I reached Poor's house." 

The following extracts are from a letter to me l)y Major S 
B French, who was Chief Commissary of my command. This 
letter was written soon after the publication of Mr. Swinton's 
History of the Army of the Potomac. 

';ln compliance with your request, I have the pleasure of 
furnishing you, to the best of my recollection, with incidents 
and tacts associated with movements made on the 31st of May 



PKELnillsARY CHAPTER. 25 

1862— the battle of Seven Pines. On the morning of that day, 
under your orders, I, with other members of your staff, followed 
you to the headquarters of General Johnston, known as the 
Stubbs House, and there learned, as an officer of your staff, par- 
ticulars of movements preparatory to an attack upon the enemy's 
forces on the sauth side of the Chickahominy. General Longstreet 
had been ordered to move his own division on the ISTine-miles 
road ; General I). II. Hill on the Williamsburg, and General 
Huger on the Charles City— three divisions, forming the right 
wing of the army, under the command of General Longstreet. 
General Whiting, commanding your own proper division, had 
been ordered by General Johnston to move at an early hour to 
the Kine-miles road and act as a support to General Longstreet, 
who had been directed to engage the enemy. General Whiting, 
with his command, within a short distance of General Johnston's 
headcpiarters, reported that his march was impeded by the move- 
ment of General Longstreet' s troops across his line of march, and 
in the direction of the Williamsburg road. With this informa- 
tion, you ordered Colonel Beckham, then Lieutenant and Aide- 
de-Camp, to go to General Longstreet and hnd out his exact 
position, and report to him the delay— in the movement of 
Whiting's command, caused by Longstreet's division crossing 
Whiting's line of march — and have it remedied. In about an 
hour after that a courier arrived from Lieutenant Beckham, stating 
that he could not find General Longstreet or his command, and 
was fully satisfied that neitlier he nor his division was on 
the Nine-miles road. General Johnston, on 'receipt of this 
information, and being satisfied that Beckham must be mis- 
taken, dispatched his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Washing- 
ton, in search of General Longstreet on the Nine-miles road, 
which resulted in the captr.re of Washington. Colonel Beck- 
ham, on his return to headquarters, reported that General 
Longstreet was on the Williauisburg road, and the troops he saw 
had halted, having with them their baggage wagons, etc. Some 
time after Beckham returned, you, wnth a selection of officers 
of your staff, moved, under orders from General Johnston, to a 
point and with an object not known to me, leaving myself 
and a number of vour officers to accompany General Johnston 



^^ BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



on the ISlne-miles road, which we did, and remained with 
him until jou rejoined us about half a mile this side of the junc- 
tion of the J^ew Bridge and Nine-miles roads. At the house 
selected for headquarters much anxiety was manifested because 
of the unaccountable delay of General Longstreet in striking the 
enemy. General Johnston requested me to listen for musketry 
and when I reported tliat I could not hear any, he said that he 
wished the troops were back in their camps. Subsequently in- 
formation was received at headquarters that Longstreet had en- 
gaged the enemy. I cannot remember the hour when tliis infor- 
mation arrived, but am inclined to think it was after 4 o'clock 
in the afternoon when General Johnston left his headquarters 
and galloped down the Nine-miles road to the point where Gen- 
eral Whiting was in command of your division. Yon followed 
soon after General Johnston. When I arrived on the field Gen- 
eral Johnston was, in person, giving orders for the movement of 
the troops under General AVhiting, and called upon the different 
members of your staff to assist him, which they cheerful] y did. 
I understood at the time of the tight, in fact prior to leaving 
General Johnston's headquarters (in the suburbs of Eichmond), 
that you were on the field without an immediate command- 
though a portion of your troops under General Whiting were 
engaged— for the purpose of rendering any assistance occasion 
might demand, and watching the movements of the enemy. I 
do not remember now of your taking any active part in the 
affair until it was reported that Genei-al Hampton's command 
was in much peril, and unless assistance was rendered, it would 
possibly be crushed. This aid you promptly rendered, so far as 
It was in your power, and in person went iannediately to the 
scene of action. I saw very little of you after that during the 
engagement ; but was quite near General Johnston when he was 
wounded.'' 

The following quotation is from a letter to me, dated Mill- 
edgeville, Ga., Februaiy, 1S68, written by Colonel B. W. Frobel, 
of the Confederate States Engineers, who was a Major on Gen- 
eral Whiting's staff at the battle of Seven Pines : 

" You have called my attention to the account given by Mr. 
Swinton in his ' History of the Army of the Potomac ' of this 



PRELIillNAEY CHAPTER. 27 



battle; Mr. Swinton is surely greatly mistaken. The division 
was under tlie immediate command of General Whiting, and he 
directly imder General Johnston, who was with the division the 
whole dav until he was wonnded late in the afternoon. I am 
satisfied that no blame can attach to General Whiting for not 
beino- on the field sooner. Mr. Swinton must also be mistaken 
.about the slowness of that division frustrating an important Hank 
movement indicated in ' Johnston's original plan.' I never heard 
of the movement until I saw it mentioned in Mr. Swinton s 
book, and certainly no mention was made of it in any battle 
order sent to our headquarters." 

I had taken no part in the planning of this battle; in tact 
knew nothing of it, in detail, mitil the morning of the 31st of 
May I bad no special command on the field ; but I was there, 
and a large portion of my staff officers were with me. I was m 
the front line of the fighting north of Fair Oaks late that after- 
noon, but my proper command-the left wing of the army-was 
six or eio-ht miles distant. Although I commanded the whole 
Confederate army from dark on the 31st of May, until I turned 
over the command to General Lee early in the afternoon of the 
1st of June-before it was known the fighting had ended— 1 did 
not purpose making an official report; because I was suddenly 
taken very seriously ill on the morning of June 2d, and was 
immediately conveyed to Richmond ; became steadily worse for 
two or three weeks, and was advised by my physicians that per- 
fect quiet, mountain air, and the free use of sulphur waters 
offered the only chance for n.y recovery. A short time before I 
was taken from Richmond to the mountains, General Johnston 
appealed to me to make to him a written report of the operations 
of my division up to the time he was disabled and removed from 
the field. In reply I stated that he knew the division was not 
then under my command ; that he himself was with it, m person, 
from early in the morning, and directed its movements, until he 
was wounded, and that my health was such that I could not 
write. To this he replied : " You were with the division although 
not in direct commaad ; and you can dictate your report. I mally 
I yielded to his solicitations. Neither of us was on duty at that 
time. In making the report, I alluded to some of the mcidents 



"^ BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



connected with my command of the annj, on the 1st of June 
but did not make a detailed statement of that day's operations! 
In his official report, General Johnston says : " General Long- 
street, being near mv headquarters, received verbal instructions?" 
"General Hill, supported by General Longstreet (who had the 
direction of operations on the right), was to advance by the 
Wilhamsburg road to attack the enemy in front." In that report 
he makes no allusion to the transfer of Lon^street's division to 
the Wilhamsburg road, and does not refer to^his attempt to have 
three brigades of that division sent back to the Nine-miles road 
General Longstreet, in his official report, savs nothing in 
regard to the transfer of his division from the Nine-miles road 
aiid Its vicinity, to the Williamsburg road, and gives no intima- 
tion that he received any orders prescribing the direction in 
which his division was to move into action. 

Preference will now be made to the state of affairs on the 
Federal side. On the night of May 80, Keyes' corps was in the 
vicmity of Seven Pines ; Heintzelman's corps at Bottom's Brido-e 
and White Oak Bridge ; both of these corps, on the south side of 
the Chickahommy, were under the control of General Heintzel- 
man; Sumner's corps was on the north side of the Chicka- 
hommy, between the Eailroad Bridge and New Bridge ; and 
two corps were between Sumner and Mechanicsville. Besides 
the fortifications at Bottom's Bridge and White Oak Brid-e 
there were three fortified " lines of defense " across the Willianrs- 
burg road. The first of these lines— five-eighths of a mile west 
of Seven Pines-was held by Casey's division of Keyes' con.s. 
Ihe second-at Seven Pines-was held by Couch's division of 
that cori3s. The third line of defense, about one and a half miles 
east of Seven Pines, was unoccupied. Kearney's division of 
Heintzelman's corps, was at Bottom's Bridge; and Hooker's 
division was at White Oak Bridge. A bridge across the Chicka- 
hommy had been constructed in front of each of the two divisions 
of Sumner's corps— Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions. 

Except the open ground immediately around the first and 
second lines of defense, the country generally in the immediate 
vicinity of Seven Pines was densely wooded. The ground was 
fiat and swampy, the undergrowth tangled with matted vines- 



PKELIMINAEY CHAPTEK. 29 



Both of these lines were strengthened by rifle-pits which extended 
a short distance on each side of the road, with abatis or felled 
timber in front. In the first line there was a small nnfinished 
pentangular redoubt jnst sonth of the Williamsburg road ; and 
the aba'tis of the second line extended in a curve to the rear across 
tlie Nine-miles road. The left of both lines was protected by the 
almost impracticable White Oak Swamp ; but the ground on the 
right offered no strong features for defense. Two regiments and 
a battery were detached and posted near Fair Oaks Station, to 
guard the depot of supplies at that place, where there were no 
artificial defenses. About 1,000 yards in front of the rifle- 
pits of the first line of defense, and nearly at right angles to 
the Williamsburg road, a skirmish line extended from the White 
Oak Swamp on the Federal left to the Chickahominy river. Two 
regiments were detached to support the right of the skirmish 
lii^e— one south of the railroad and not far from it, the other on 
the Nine-miles road. On the morning of the 31st, the two divi- 
sions of Keyes' corps were in their camps just in rear of their 
respective rifle-pits, while strong working parties were engaged 
upon the unfinished earthworks and other artificial defenses. 

On that morning General Keyes reported to General McClel- 
lan's chief of staff : " Everything on the part of the Confederates 
indicates an attack on my position, which is only tolerably strong, 
and my forces are too weak to defend it properly. Brigadier- 
General Sumner told me yesterday he should probably cross the 
Chickahominv last night. If he did so, and takes post nigh 
Old Tavern and this side, I should feel more secure than I do 
now."* 

In his " Fifty Years' Observations," General Keyes says : 
" The left of my lines was all protected by the White Oak 
Swamp, but the right was on ground so favorable to the approach 
of the enemy, and so far from the Chickahominy, that if 
Johnston had attacked there an hour or two earlier than he did, I 
could have made but a feeble defense comparatively, and every 
man of us would have been killed, captured, or driven mto the 

swamp or river before assistance could have reached us." 

* " Official Records," Vol. XI., Part III., page 203. 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



Tn„ ;!"?•" '•"*''"'"'"' ""■"S'"''' *° «>« d"-<'<='io" in which 
Longsh-eet's duns.on should move into action ],ad hecn car cd 
nto effect and the attack had been n,ade early in the morn nt 
here can hardly be a reasonable dot.bt that Keyes's corrS 
have been destroyed before ,t could have been reinforced. H^ 
eas, y .accessible nght flank-the point at which attack was, and 
on«ht o have been, expected-shonld have been, as he indi at s 
strengthened by .additional troops. Confederate success on S 
side would have cut the Federal army in two-separated its r !b 
wing from its left and exposed the litter to destructir ^ 

Glancing now at tlie Confederate side, it will he 'borne in 
mnl there are two mam roads leading from Richmond to Seven 
Pines. One IS the Nme-miles road which leads from the north- 
Seven pT T? "';■' "" ""^ ^''™'-" =''^^' ^''- 0'-"- S''^'-" o 

Seven Pines. The distance to the latter point by this road is 
mue miles and from Fair Oaks Station to Seven Pines is ."o . 
la.ng less than one mile. Three brigades of Longstreefs diWs- 
.on, under the command of Brigadier-General Cadmus M. Wi - 
cox, were on that road three and one-half miles from the citv 
durmg the night of the SOtli. And the other three brigades o^ 
Longstreet s division were north of the city, not far dist.™t from 
the point at which the Nine-miles road leaves the suburbs. 

The Williamsburg road leads from the southeast suburb of 
ftchmond, and It is by this road seven miles from the city to 
Seven Pmes. On the night of the 30th, three brigades of D H 
Hills division were on this road, two or three miles from the 
ci y, and onebngade(Rodes's, was three or four miles out on the 
Ch,,rles City road, south of the White Oak Swamp. Hnjrer's 
division w,as on Gilliss Creek, not far north of the point at which 
tl e Williamsburg road leaves the suburbs. General Johnston 
placed Longstreet in command of these three divisions, gave him 

verbal instructions," and c-derod tUt tl,,. ^ i , , 

begin •< at daybreak.'' movement should 

be Mechamcsville-'road during the night of the 30tli! He 
tells me, however, that he had no map of the country, knew 
very little about the names ,:,f the roads, but distinctly remembers 



PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. 31 

that his troops were three and one-half miles from the city, on a 
road that passed close to General Johnston's headquarters, near 
the northeast subnrb of Richmond, and led to Kew Bridge ; that 
is the Nine-miles road. 

Pie says that at 6.30 a. m. these three brigades moved from 
their camps and proceeded " by by-paths across to the junction 
of the Charles City and Williamsburg roads, and remained at' 
this point till 3.30 p. m."* If they had moved at dawn, say 3.30 
a. m., they could easily have reached McLaws's hne on the New 
Bridge road before 6 a. m., and would then have been in the 
position from which General Johnston intended Longstreet's 
division should move into action and closely support the attack 
D, H. Ilill was to make against the Federals on the Williams- 
burg road. 

The following quotation fi'om a letter written by General 
R. E. Colston, who commanded one of the three brigades under 
AVilcox, bears directly upon the movements that morning. 
General Colston says : " A little bi'ook [Gilliss Creek] near Rich- 
mond was greatly swollen, and a long time was wasted crossing 
it on an improvised bridge made of planks, a wagon mid-stream 
serving as a trestle. Over this the division [Longstreet's] ])assed 
in single file, you may imagine with what delay. If the division 
commander had given orders for the men to sling their cartridge- 
boxes, haversacks, etc., on their muskets and wade without break- 
ing formation, they could have crossed by fours at least, with 
water up to their waists, . . . and hours would have been 
saved. . . . When we got across we received orders to halt 
on the roadside until Iluger's division passed us. There we 
waited for five or six hours. 

Some additional light is thrown upon this subject by the fol- 
lowing extract from a letter w^ritten by Governor William E. 
Cameron, who was Adjutant of the Twelfth Virginia, of 
Mahoue's brigade, Iluger's division. Governor Cameron says : 

"Longstreet [three brigades of his division] moved that morn- 
ing from Fairfield racecourse, and arrived at the crossing of the 
[Gilliss] creek in front of the command [of linger]. We waited 
till Longstreet cleared the way, crossed the creek about 10.30 
* " Official Records," Vol. XT., Part I., page 986. 



^" BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



A. M., moved as far as the Tudor House, rested there until 1 p. m." 
Mahoue's brigade then moved out on tlie Charles's City road ; 
'' the men were fresh, eager, and in light marching trim. The 
roads were bad, but there was no physical obstruction of any 
moment, and we met no enemy." 

From what has already been' stated, it is clearly seen that Long- 
street's "misunderstanding," which resulted in the transfer of 
his division to the Williamsburg road, not only " concerned " 
the movements of the division under Whiting, but materially 
delayed Huger's division at the Gilliss Creek crossing. Long- 
street, by authority from General Johnston, then assumed control 
of Huger's division. Delay on the part of the latter after that 
tmie must be attributed to General Longstreet, unless it can be 
shown that Huger did not obey Longstre'et's orders. 

Captain B. Sloan, of General Huger's staff, gays : " Long- 
street's brigades as they successively reached the plain above the 
creek halted and remained for an hour or two resting on their 
arms. This plain (in front of General Huger's headquarters) 
was, perhaps, between three and four miles in rear of the battle- 
field. Here, at a farm-house, Huger met Longstreet and [D. H.] 
Hill, and a discussion was had as to the relative rank of the divis- 
ion commanders. Longstreet claimed (by instructions from 
General Johnston) to be in connnand of that portion of the army. 
After proc^st Huger accpiiesced." " It was then possibly 10 a. m. 
or 11 A. M." After that time " Huger's movements were directed 
by Longstreet." 

After Longstreet took control of Huger, one brigade of the 
division of the latter was sent out on the Charles City road to 
the point at which Eodes's brigade of D. H. Hill's division had 
been in observation. Two brigades of Huger's, with three of Loner- 
street's, were retained near the junction of the Wiiliamsbui^o- 
and Charles City roads until 3.30 p. m. ; the disposition made of 
these five brigades, by General Longstreet, after that time, will 
be shown in another connection. It is enough now to say that 
t^iese five brigades reached the front too late to be put into the 
fight that day. 

Brigadier-General George E. Pickett, in his official report, 
says : '' On the afternoon of May 31, and just as the battle of 



PEELmiNART CHAPTEK. 33 

Seven Pines was being opened by Major-General Longstreet, I was 
directed by that officer to move [from the "Williamsburg road] 
with my brigade to the York River llailroad, cover the same, 
repel any advance of the enemy np that road, and to hold myself 
in readiness to move to the support of our advance if needed. 
About 9 p. M. received orders from General Longstreet to march 
my brigade at daylight [June 1] and report to Major-General D. 
H. Hill." 

Two brigades of Longstreet's division followed after the four 
brigades of 1). H. Hill's division when the latter, at 1 p. m., 
moved on the Williamsburg road to make the attack. But only 
one of those two brigades went into close action. 

In the attempt to destroy Keyes's corps, early on the morning 
of May 31, General Johnston certainly did not intend that five 
brigades of Longstreet's division should be kept out of the fight 
during the whole of that day. 

In his " Narrative," page 133, General Johnston says : 
" Longstreet .... was instructed, verbally, to form his own and 
Hill's division in two lines crossing the Williamsburg road at right 
angles, and to advance to the attack in that order." There is 
nothing to this effect in the official report of either General 
Johnston or General Longstreet. But, the statements made by 
General Johnston to me that day — and in his letter to me June 
28, 1862 — together with other evidence pi'eviously referred to, 
show, beyond question, that General Johnston intended Long- 
street's division should move on the Nine-miles road, and be put 
in action on D. H. Hill's left. He certainly did not intend that 
Longstreet's division should be transferred from the Nine-miles 
road to the 'Williamsburg road. "When he was informed that 
such transfer had been, or was being, made, he endeavored to have 
three brigades of that division sent back to the Nine-miles road, 
" if they had not advanced so far as to make the change involve 
a serious loss of time." Longstreet made no attempt to form his 
division in line of battle "crossing the Williamsburg road at 
right angles, and to advance to the attack." 



34 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



CHAPTER II. 

Fighting, on the Williamsburg Road, May 31. 

Federal Accounts. — General Silas Casey, commanding the 
advanced division of Keyes's corps, says, in bis official report : 
" I occupied with niy division the advanced position of the army, 
about three-fourths of a mile [west] from the cross-roads at the 
Seven Pines, where I caused rifle pits and a redoubt to be thrown 
up ; also an abatis to be commenced about one-third of a mile in 
front of the pits, and parties were employed upon these works on 
the morning of the 31st. . . . My pickets, . . . toward 
the right of my [skirmish] line, succeeded [about 10 a. m.] in cap- 
turing Lieutenant Washington, an aide of General Johnston. 
This circumstance . . . led me to exercise increased 
vigilance. Between 11 and 12 o'clock a mounted vedette was- 
sent in from the advanced pickets to report tliat a body of the 
enemy was in sight, approaching on the Richmond road. I imme- 
diately ordered the One Hundred and Third Regiment Pennsyl- 
vania Volunteers to advance to the front for the purpose of sup- 
porting the pickets. It was soon afterward reported to me by a 
mounted vedette that the enemy were advancing in force, and 
about the same time two shells were thrown over my camp. . . . 
[I] immediately ordered the division under arms, the men at work 
on the rifle-pits and abatis to be recalled and join their regiments, 
the artillery to be harnessed up at once, and made my dispositions 
to repel the enemy. While these were in progress the pickets 
commenced firing. I directed Spratt's battery of four pieces, 
3-inch rifled guns, to advance [jnst north of the Williamsburg 
road] in front of the rifle pits about one-fourth of a mile. . . . 
[I] supported this battery by three regiments of Naglee's 
brigade and one of Palmer's." 

General Casey then states in detail the preparations made for 
defense, and adds : " About fifteen minutes after these disposi- 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG KOAD. Sa 

tions bad been completed I directed tbe advanced battery to open. 
. . . In a sbort time " tbe regiment," wbicb at tbe first alarm 
had been ordered to tbe support of tbe pickets, came down tbe 
road in some confusion, baying suffered considerable loss. . . . 
Tbe enemy now attacked me in large force on tbe centre and both 
wings. ... In order to save " Spratt's battery, I " ordered a 
cbarge of bayonets by tbe four supporting regiments at tbe cen- 
tre, wbicb was executed in a most gallant and successful manner 
under tbe immediate direction of Brigadier-General Naglee, 
. . . Wben tbe cbarge bad ceased, but not until tbe troops 
bad reacbed tbe edge of tbe wood [west of tbe first abatis], tbe 
most terrible fire of musketry commenced tbat I bave ever wit- 
nessed. Tbe enemy again advanced in force, and tbe flanks be- 
ing again severely tlireatened, a retreat to tbe works [tbe rifle- 
pits and tbe unfinisbed pentangular redoubt] became necessary. 
To be brief, tbe rifle-pits were retained until tbey were almost 
enveloped by tbe enemy. . . . Tbe troops tben retreated to 
tbe second line, in possession of General Coucb's division." 

" Undei- tbe circumstances I tbink it my duty to add a few 
remarks witb regard to my division. On leaving Wasbington 
[a few weeks ago] eigbt of tbe regiments were composed of raw 
troops. It bas been tbe miBfortiine of tbe division in marcbing 
tbrougb tbe Peninsula to be sabjected to an ordeal wbicb would 
bave severely tried veteran troops. Furnisbed witb scanty trans- 
portation, occupying sickly positions, exposed to tbe inclemency 
of tbe weatber, at times witbout tents or blankets, and illy sup- 
pKed witb rations and medical stores, tbe loss from sickness bas 
been great, especially witb tbe ofiicers. . . . Notwithstanding 
all these drawbacks, and tbe fact tbat tliere were not 5,000 
men in line of battle, tbey withstood for three hours tbe attack of 
an overwhelming force of the enemy. . . . It is true tbat the 
division, after being nearly surrounded by tbe enemy and losing 
one-third of the number actually engaged, retreated to tbe second 
line. They wQuld all bave been prisoners of war bad they delayed 
their retreat a few minutes longer." 

This vindication of bis division was called out by tbe follow- 
ing telegram, sent from the battlefield, by General JVIcClellan to 
Secretary Stanton, on tbe 1st of June : " Casey's division, wbicb 



36 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

was the first line, gave way iinaccoimtably and discreditably. . . . 
"With the exception of Casey's division our men behaved splen- 
didly." That telegram did cruel injustice to Casey's division 
and was, perhaps, too complimentary to some of the other troops. 

As already stated, Casey's division was encamped in rear of 
the earthworks of the Federal first line of defense, across the 
Williamsburg road, nearly at right angles to it, and five-eighths 
of a mile West of Seven Pines. It was composed of I^aglee's 
brigade, five regiments, on the right ; Wessells' brigade, four 
regiments, in the centre, across the road ; and Palmer's brigade, 
four regiments, on the loft. The latter two brigades were com- 
posed entirely of raw troops. Two of Naglee's regiments and 
some two or more companies were detached in support of the 
right of the picket line. 

When the Confederate advance was reported, the One Hun- 
dred and Third Peimsylvania, of Wessells' brigade, was ordered 
forward on the Williamsburg road to support the pickets ; two 
regiments of this brigade were placed in the rifle-pits, extending 
from the redoubt across the road, and one regiment was a short 
distance in advance of the rifle pits. General Wessells says the 
*' actual strength [of his brigade] in action [was] less than 1,500 
men." 

General Palmer says that one of his regiments " was dej)loyed 
in the field to the extreme left of our line and in front of the 
woods [south of the redoubt] through which the enemy made the 
flank movement ;" one of his regiments was in the rifle-pits, im- 
mediately on the left of the redoubt, and two regiments " were 
ordered to the front and to the support of the batteries." " I 
estimate the whole fighting force [in this brigade] on the ground, 
at less than 1,000 ofiicers and men." 

Naglee's brigade was partly in support of Spratt's battery, 
partly in support of the picket line and partly on duty in the 
picket line. In his official report General I^aglee says : " There 
were taken into action [in his brigade] eighty-four officers and 
1,669 men." On these data the actual fighting force, of the 
three brigades which constituted Casey's division, was 4,253. 

The commander of that regiment of Wessells' brigade 
which was ordered to support the j^ickets, says : " At about 1 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG EOAD. 37 

o'clock P. M., . . . under orders from Brigadier- General 
Wesseils', I marched my regiment out and formed it immediately 
in rear of the picket reseryes and about half a mile from our 
camp. . . . When the pickets were fired on and driven in I 
ordered the reserve to take their places in the regiment. . . . 
The enemy's fire now opened along the whole line and we were 
also subjected to a very heavy cross fire from both flanks, 
. . . I ordered my men to fall back slowly, which they did, 
and formed on a road running nearly at right angles to the one 
on which we had entered the woods. Tho overwhelming force 
of the enemy, which now almost surrounded us, compelled me 
again to retire, to prevent being entirely cut off. Owing to the 
nature of the ground, which was marshy and covered with under- 
wood and fallen timber, it was impossible to retire in order. The 
regiment when marched out consisted of 430 men." 

General Wesseils gives this regiment credit for having fought 
well, until driven from the woods '" exposed to the terrific fire 
from the front and both flanks ; '' " followed by the enemy, who 
was [now] seen to emerge from the woods and advance." 

After losing nearly one-fourth of its numbers, in a few 
minutes, the regiment seems to have broken to pieces whilst 
being hurled back through the abatis in front of Casey's rifle- 
pits. General Keyes says : It " broke shortly and retreated, 
joined by a great many sick. The numbers as they passed down 
the road as stragglers conveyed an exaggerated idea of surprise 
and defeat," 

The real hard fighting now began ; and there was a prolonged 
contest in the abatis in front of Spratt's battery. The bayonet 
charge referred to by General Casey is described in the ofiicial 
report of Colonel Davis in command of the One Hundred and 
Fourth Pennsylvania, of IS'aglee's brigade. He says : " The 
regiments sprang forward towards the enemy with a tremendous 
yell. . . , The battle now raged with great fury and the 
firing was much hotter than before. , , . The enemy being 
largely re-enforced, pressed us in front and flank, , , . We 
could not hold our position much longer unless re-enforced, 

, , Receiving no re-enforcements, we were ordered with 
Spratt's battery to retire, but unfortunately, the horses of one of 



38 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

the pieces being killed, we were compelled to abandon tbat 
piece." 

When the troops in front were withdrawn, they formed in the 
rifle-pits, and the contest continued hot along the whole of Casey's 
line. One regiment of Peek's brigade was sent forward, from 
the second line, in the woods south of the main road, by General 
Keyes ; and the Fifty-fifth New York, of the same brigade, was 
directed to move on that road, led by General Naglee, to aid in 
protecting the heavy artillery in the unfinished redoubt. General 
Naglee says he placed that regiment " about fifty yards in advance 
of the redoubt, the left resting a short distance from the road." 
He adds : " Leaving the Fifty-fifth, my attention was directed 
toward the rio-ht, where I found the Fifty-sixth New York with 
the Eleventh Maine [of his own brigade that had been detached 
supporting the picket line] . . . had fallen back about 
400 yards . . . and were again placed . . . about mid- 
way between the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and about 
300 yards in front of the Nine-miles road. Near by I found 
the Fifty-second Pennsylvania. . . . At this time the fire here 
had considerably slackened, but was increasing on the left. . . . 
The enemy had discovered, what I had long feared, that there 
were none of our troops between the White Oak Swamp and a 
line parallel with and but 200 yards from the Williamsl)n]'g road. 
. , . At the time of my return [the Confederates] had driven 
our men from the rifle-pits," " being successful in turning our left 
flank." '• The entire field in front of and including the redoubt 
being in possession of the enemy." 

In falling back from their rifle pits and redoubt, Casey's forces, 
whilst moving across the abatis in front of Couch's rifle-pits, en- 
deavored to make a stand. But their own guns, which they had 
lost, were turned upon them ; this, added to the fire of the ad- 
vancing Confederate infantry and artillery, hurled them back in 
great disorder through the second abatis ; and a portion of Casey's 
troops, fiiiding the short rifle-pits of Couch's line already occupied 
and overcrowded, continued their retreat. 

In the meantime Naglee's regiments, that had been support- 
ing the picket line on the right, retained the ground on which he 
had last placed them — in the woods, half way between the Will- 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD. 39 

iainsburg road and the railroad, 300 yards in front of the Nine- 
miles road. 

On his retnrn to these troops, ISTaglee says : " The enemy had 
opened a most destructive cross-fire npon them from the pieces 
near the redoubt that had not been spiked, and this, with the fire 
from their immediate front, was no longer to be endured, and 
they were withdrawn and marched down the Nine-miles road, and 
placed in position in rear of this road, about 300 yards from the 
Seven Pines, when soon their services were [again] required." 

Casey's troops had resisted for two hours and more a very 
determined attack in front; and fell back, fighting, after their left 
flank was turned, and an enfilade and reverse fire, within short 
range, was brought to bear upon the rifle-pits. 

The second line of defense, held by Couch's division, was com- 
posed of Peck's brigade, five regiments, on the south side of the 
Williamsburg road ; Devens's brigade, three regiments, across 
that road ; and Abercrombie's brigade, five regiments, on the 
right. Two regiments and a battery of the latter brigade were 
detached, guarding the depot of supplies at Fair Oaks station. 
In describing the operations in the second line. General Keyes 
eays : " As the pressure on Casey's division became greater, he 
applied to me for re-enforcements. I continued to send them as 
long as I had troops to spare. . . . The Ninety-third Penn- 
sylvania, Peck's brigade, engaged the enemy on the left [of 
Casey's line] . . . until overwhelming numbers forced him 
to retire, whicli he did in good order. ... I ordered the 
Fifty fifth New York ... to 'save the guns,' meaning 
some of Casey's. The regiment moved up the AVilliamsburg 
road at double-quick, conducted by General l^aglee. . . . 
I ordered Neill's Twenty-third and Rippey's Sixty-first Penn- 
sylvania regiments to move to the support of Casey's right. 
. . . Under the immediate command of General Couch, 
these two regiments assailed a vastly superior force of the enemy. 
. . . Almost immediately after ordering the Twenty-third 
and Sixty-first to the right, and as soon as they could be reached, 
I sent the Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Pussell, and the Sixty- 
second ISTew York, Colonel Piker, to re-enforce them." 

But, before either of these four regiments were in position to 



40 BATTLE CF SEVEN PINES. 

support Casey's right, the latter's left flank was turned, and the 
Federal first line of defense was lost. The two regiments ordered 
to re-enforce Couch in his attempt to relieve the pressure on 
Casey's right did not reach him, but joined the two reigments 
that were already at Fair Oaks Station. 

General Couch says : "I advanced with Neill's and Rippey's 
regiments through a close wood, moving by the flank. Direct- 
ing Neill where to move, and pushing on with Rippey, we at 
once came upon a large column of the enemy in reserve, but ap- 
parently moving towards Fair Oaks. . . . They [Neill and 
Rippey] immediately engaged, but were finally compelled to 
retire. . . . Here Colonel Rippey and all his field ofiicers 
fell, and in twenty minutes the enemy had passed over the [Nine- 
miles] road leading to my centre, cutting off the advance at Fair 
Oaks, now re-enforced by the Seventh Massachusetts . . . 
and Sixty-second New York . . . ordered up by General 
Keyes." 

In speaking of this engagement, General Keyes says : " Both 
regiments were badly cut up. . . . The casualties of the 
Sixty-first amount to 263 and are heavier than in any other 
regiment in Couch's division. After this attack the Twenty- 
third took part in the hard fighting which closed the day near 
Seven Pines. The Sixty-first withdrew in detachments, some 
of which came again into action near my headquarters." 

In the meanwhile events of interest were taking place in the 
immediate vicinity of Seven Pines. General Devens, in his 
official report says : " At about 4 p. m., the line of General Casey 
then having been driven back, ... an order was received 
from General Keyes that the Tenth Massachusetts should advance 
up the Richmond [Williamsburg] road through the felled tim- 
ber and endeavor to hold the ground in front. Colonel Brigga 
moved accordingly up the road, . . . [and] found himself 
immediately assailed on the left flank and rear by heavy volleys 
of musketry. . . . Colonel Briggs gallantly struggled . . . 
to maintain his position. From the nature of the ground, en- 
tirely covered with fallen timber, it was not possible for him to 
effect this [necessary change of front], and the left wing was soon 
thrown into much confusion from the heavy fire of the enemy. 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD. 41 

. . . I directed Colonel Bn'ggs to fall back and re-form the 
regiment at the rifle-pits before occupied bj him. ... It 
was not possible for him to effect this in good order ; but at a 
short distance behind the Fair Oak^ [Nine-miles] road Colonel 
Briggs rallied his regiment successfully and led it forward in good 
order to the position indicated. Re-enforcements arrived in a 
ehort time and were thrown forward to the left and front." 

Thus, the Tenth Massachusetts, of Couch's division, after a 
few minutes' experience in the second abatis, could not, at first, 
be rallied in their own vacant rifle-pits, in the second line of 
defense. 

Keyes's affairs were then in a very critical condition. A large 
portion of Casey's troops, in falling back from their earthworks, 
had been thrown into, almost, inextricable confusion whilst cross- 
ing the second abatis under destructive cross-fire, and had left the 
field ; the two regiments under Couch, on the right, had been 
badly cut up, one of them routed and out of the fight, exposing 
the right flank and rear of Couch's earthworks ; four regiments 
and a battery Avere cnt off north of Fair Oaks ; one of Devens's 
regiments on the Williamsburg road had been hurled back from 
the felled timber in disorder ; and the Confederates were press- 
ing into the second abatis and in the woods south of the road, 
seriously threatening the left flank of Couch's main line. Such 
was the state of tilings with Keyes when the leading regiment of 
Berry's brigade, of Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps, 
reached Seven Pines. 

About noon, May 31, Berry's brigade halted at the third line 
of defense on the Williamsburg road, having come up that 
morning from Bottom's Bridge ; and Birney's brigade reached 
that line of defense, but near the railroad, almost at the same 
time. 

General Kearney, in his official report, says : "At 3 p. m. I 
received an order to send a brigade of my division by the railroad 
to support Keyes's corps, said to be severely engaged. Birney's 
brigade was designated, and getting most promptly under arms, 
advanced accordingly.* Captain Hunt, Aide to General Heint- 

* Owing to subsequent conflict of orders, for which General Birney was not 
responsible, his brigade was not in action that day. — G. W. S. 



42 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

zelman, arriving from the iield, made me aware of the discomfiture 
of most of Casey's division. Tlie retiring wagons and a dense 
stream of disorganized fugitives arrived nearly simultaneously. 
. . . I, however, soon received General Heintzelman's direc- 
tions to order forward, by the Williamsburg road the remaining 
brigade [Berry's], and to retrieve the position the enemy had 
driven us from. I put myself at the head of the advanced regi- 
ment and set forward without delay. I also sent written orders 
for Jameson's brigade, camped at the tete-de-pont, near Bottom's 
Bridge (three miles in rear), to come up without delay. This order 
met with General Heintzelman's approval. On arriving at the 
field of battle we found cei'tain zig-zag rifle-pits sheltering crowds 
of men and the enemy firing from abatis and timber in their front. 
... I had but the Third Michigan up, but they moved for- 
ward with alacrity, dashing into the felled timber, and commenced 
a desperate but determined contest." 

General Kearney speaks of the prompt conring up of other 
regiments of Berry's brigade and their hard fighting and steady 
advance in the felled timber, and the woods on the south side of 
the Williamsburg road ; re-enforced later by two regiments of 
Jameson's brigade that arrived from Bottom's Bridge. 

General Berry, in his official report, says : " We steadily drove 
the enemy so far that I had serious fears of being flanked. . . . 
We were at this time in the woods extending from the edge of 
the slashings below, up the woods and on the left of the camping 
ground of General Casey's division, completely commanding his 
old camp and the earthworks with our rifles." 

In the meantime the contest continued across the abatis in 
front of Coach's main line. Whilst Keyes's left flank was pro- 
tected by Kearney's advance in the woods on the south side of the 
Williamsburg road, the danger to his right flank became more 
and more imminent after Naglee's detached regiments had been 
withdrawn, and Couch's two regiments, farther to the right, had 
been so badly cut up. The Confederates, on that side, had now 
crossed the Nine-miles road and were moving toward Seven Pines, 
on ground east of that road. 

General Keyes says : " To make head against the enemy ap- 
proaching " — from the direction of Fair Oaks — " it was found 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG KOAD. 43 

necessary to effect an almost ])erpendici'ilar cliaiige of front of 
tlie troops on the right of the AVilliamsburg road. . . . This 
line long resisted the progress of the enemy with the greatest firm- 
ness and gallantry, but by pressing it verj closely by overwhelming 
numbers, probaljly ten* to one, they were enabled finally to force it 
to fall back so far upon the left and centre as to form a new line in 
rear. . . . Seeing the torrent of enemies continually advanc- 
ing, I hastened across to the left beyond the fork to bring 
forward re-enforcements. Brigadier-General Peck" with two reg- 
iments, " was ordered, with the concurrence of General Heintzel- 
man, to advance across the open space and attack the enemy, 
now coming forward in great numbers. . . . After contend- 
ing against enoi'mous odds those two regiments were forced to 
give way, Peck, and '' one regiment " crossing the Williamsburg 
road to the wood," the other regiment " passing to the right 
[along that road], where thej^ took post in the last line of battle, 
formed mostly after 6 p. isr. . . . As soon as Peck had moved 
forward I hastened to the Tenth Massachusetts, Colonel Briggs, 
which regiment I had myself once before moved, now in the 
rifle-pits on the left of the Williamsburg road, and ordered them 
to follow me across the field. . . . After seeing the Tenth 
Massachusetts and the adjoining line well at work under a mur- 
derous fire, I observed that that portion of the line 150 yards to 
my left was crumbling away, some falling and others retiring. 
I perceived also that the artillery had withdrawn, and that 
large bodies of 1)roken troops were leaving the centre and 
moving down the Williamsburg road to the rear. ... I 
tried in vain to check the retreating current, ... I found 
General Heintzelman and other oflicers engaged in ralljnng the 
men, and in a very short time a large number were induced to 
face about." 

Before describing the fighting that occurred, later, on this 
part of the field, attention is called to those two regiments of 
Kaglee's brigade which had held position to the right of Casey's 
main line after the latter was driven from the earthworks. Gen- 
eral Naglee says that when he " was compelled to retreat about 

* But, see Confederate official reports that will be quoted later. 



M BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

500 yards'' toward Seven Pines, these two regiments formed 
line with the Sixty-seventh New York, facing the enemy 
now advancing from the direction of Fair Oaks ; and adds : 
"Tlie men were ordered to lie down, that they should escape the 
mnrderoiis fire that was incessantly pouring in from the front. 
Scarcely was this done when the Eighty -seventh New York* 
. . . came along the Nine-miles road with rapid step, cheer- 
ing most vociferously, passed " the three regiments in Naglee's 
line ''about fifty yards, received a volley, broke, and passed [to 
the rear], the whole of them runnir.g over the backs of those 
lying down, the latter remaining undisturbed until ordered to rise 
and meet the accumulating force that was bearing all before it. 
Volley after volley was given and received. An order was 
given to charge, but 100 yards brought us into such close 
proximity with the enemy that a sheet of fire was blazing in our 
faces. The ranks on both sides were rapidly thinning, but still 
the great disparity in our number continued. So close were the 
contending forces, that our men in many instances whilst at a 
charge poured their fire into the breasts of the enemy within a 
few feet from the points of their bayonets." 

Another portion of Naglee's brigade had " crossed to the left 
of Couch's position, and advanced 200 yards into and along the 
woods to the left and in front of the Seven Pines, where they 
remained actively employed." 

It has already been seen that whilst the fighting just described 
by Generals Keyes and Naglee was going on, Berry's brigade, of 
Kearney's division, in the woods south of the Williamsburg road, 
had reached a point " completely commanding " Casey's " old 
camp and the earthworks." Berry was supported by two regi- 
ments of Jameson's brigade ; " the other two regiments of that 
brigade having been diverted — one to Birney and one to Peck.'* 
The latter was the Eighty -seventh New York, sent from the left 
of Couch's line to aid in resisting the advance against Keyes's 
right flank. The regiment sent to Birney took part only in the 
last fighting that day on the Williamsburg road. 

General Kearney says: It "was perhaps near 6 o'clock when 

* This regiment was in Jameson's brigade. It did good service on other 
parts of the Meld. 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD. 45 

our centre and right, defended by troops of the other divisions, 
with all their willingness, could no longer resist the enemy's right 
central flank attacks, pushed on M'itli determined discipline and 
with the impulsion of numerous concentrated masses. Once 
broken our troops fled incontinently, and a dense body of the 
enemy pursuing rapidly, yet in order, occupied the Williams- 
burg road [about three-eighths of a mile east of Seven Pines] 
the entire open ground, and penetrating deep into the woods," on 
the south side of that road, "soon interposed between my division 
and my line of retreat. It was on this occasion that seeing my- 
self cut off, and relying on the high discipline and determined 
valor of the Thirty-seventh New York Yolunteers, I faced them 
to the rear against the enemy, and held the ground, although so 
critically placed, and despite the masses that gathered on and had 
passed us, checked tlie enemy in his intent of cutting us off 
against the White Oak Swamp. This enabled the advanced 
regiments, averted by orders and this contest in their rear, to 
return from their hitherto victorious career, and to retire by a 
remaining foot-path known to our sconts (the Saw-mill road), until 
they once more arrived at and remanned the impregnable posi- 
tion we had left at noon at our own fortifled division camp [the 
Federal third line of defense]." * 

]VIost of Peck's brigade, a portion of Naglee's, and some de- 
tached portions of other commands retreated with Kearney's 
troops. The tighting, however, was continued on the Williams- 
burg road, east of Seven Pines. 

After the Federals, who were retiring on this part of the 
field, "were induced to face about," as already related by General 
Keyes, he says : " These were pushed forward and joined to others 
better organized in the woods, and a line was formed stretching 
across the [Williamsburg] road in perpendicular direction. General 
Heintzelman requested me to advance the line on the left of the 
road, which I did. . . . The last line, formed of portions of 
Couch's and Casey's divisions and a portion of Kearney's division 
[one of Jameson's regiments that had been sent to Birney], 

* It will be seen later that this ' ' grand commotion " was caused by three 
Confederate regiments only. 



46 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

checked the advance of the enemy and finally repulsed * him^ 
and tliis was the beginnino; of the victory, which on the following 
day was so gloriously completed." 

In Keyes's corps there were eight batteries of artillery ; 
seven of which were actively engaged in the contest around Seven 
Pines, and one was detached, " cut off," at Fair Oaks. None of 
the artillery of Ilcintzelman's corps was brought to the front 
because of the miry condition of the ground. The Federal 
official reports give great credit to their artillery in this action. 

General Keyes says " the number actually engaged " in his 
corps "did not amount to more than 12,000;" from which 
there should be deducted four regiments and one battery, north 
of Fair Oaks, not engaged in the action on the Williamsburg 
road. He adds : " The Confederates outnumbered us, during 
a great part of the conflict, at least four to one, and they were 
fresh, drilled troops, led on and cheered by their best generals and 
the President of their Republic. They are right wlieu they as- 
sert that the Yankees stubbornly contested every foot of ground. 
Of nine generals of the Fourth Corps [his own] who were pres- 
ent on the field, all, Avith one exception, were wounded or his 
horse was hit in the battle. A large proportion of all the field 
officers in the action were killed, wounded, or their horses were 
struck. These facts denote the fierceness of the contest."" 

The Federal losses in this action numbered 3,351 ; of which 
1,426 were in Casey's f division, 1,042 in Couch's ;{: and 883 in 
Kearney's. § 

About sunset, May 31, one-half of Hooker's division of 
Heintzelman's corps came up and bivouacked that night on the 
Williamsburg road a few hundred yards east of the third line 
of defense ; Keyes's corps occupied that part of this line which 
was south of the road ; two brigades of Kearney's division were 
in the rifle-pits of that line, north of the road, extending nearly 

* But, see official report of Colonel Jenkins, Confederate, whicli will be 
given later. 

t Naglee's brigade, 639 ; Wessells's, 358 ; Palmer's, 392 ; artillery, 37. 

:|: Abercrombie's brigade, 5G3 ; Devens's, 173; Peck's, 298; artillery, 8. 
Not including the losses in two regiments of Abercrombie's, one of Devens's,, 
one of Peck's ; and one battery " cut off " north of Fair Oak Station. 

§ Berry's brigade, 464 ; Jameson's, 419. 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG EGAD. 47 

to the railroad ; and Birney's brigade was in advance, on the 
raih'oad. Early next morning the scattered fragments of the 
eight raw regiments of Casey's division — that had been so badly 
broken np whilst retiring through the second abatis, nnder close 
and deadly fire — were rallied and placed in position at the third 
line of defense. 

The result of the fighting that day, on the Williamsburg 
road, was to throw back Keyes's corps from the vicinity of Seven 
Pines, and bring np Pleintzelman's corps from Bottom's Bridge 
and White Oak Bridge ; thus nniting these two corps, at night 
May 31, in a strong position at the third line of defense. One 
brigade and a half being left in rear to guard the above-named 
bridges. 

Confederate Accounts. — Bearing in mind what was said in 
the preliminary chapter concerning the movement of troops in 
the Confederate right wing under Longstreet, it will, perhaps, be 
no surprise to find — in what will presently be stated — that the 
Federal commanders greatly overrated the numbers by which they 
were attacked. 

General D. H. Hill, in his official report, says : " At 1 
o'clock the signal guns were tired, and my division moved off in 
fine style." " Rodes's brigade on the right of the [Williams- 
burg] road, supported by Kains's brigade ; Garland on the left, 
supported by G. B. Anderson. Each wing was preceded by a 
i-egiment deployed as skirmishers. Having been long delayed in 
waiting for the relieving force the right wing did not advance 
for a quarter of an hour after the left. This exposed Garland 
and Anderson to the whole Yankee force. The right wing was 
hurried forward and came up handsomely, preserving the line, 
although wading through the mud and water in places two or 
three feet deep." 

Brigadier-General Samuel Garland, Jr., in his official report, 
says : " Upon hearing the signal the line of skirmishers promptly 
advanced into the woods in front, and the brigade followed, mov- 
ing by the right flanks of regim3nts at deploying distance. 
. . . Col. George B. Anderson, commanding [a brigade] 
moved a quarter of a mile in rear as a support. . . . My 



48 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

line of skirmisliers had advanced only a few Imndred yards when 
they encountered that of the enemy. The difficulties of the 
ground were almost insurmountable. The recent rains had 
formed ponds of water throughout the woods, with mud at the 
bottom, through which the men waded knee-deep, and occasion- 
ally sinking to the hips in boggy places, almost beyond the hope 
of extrication. The forest was so thick and the undergrowth so 
tangled that it was impracticable to see the heads of the several 
regiments as they moved forward, and the deploying intervals 
were in conserpience very imperfectly preserved. . . . When 
the skirmishers became heavily engaged the regiments pressed 
upon their heels and the fii-e became hot along our whole front 
before emei'ging from the woods. The regiments were brought 
into line of battle to support the skirmishers." 

Garland's whole brigade thus struck the small regiment of 
raw troops sent forward by General Casey to support the Federal 
picket line. General Garland adds : " We drove the enemy 
before us out of the woods back into the abatis, where they had 
several regiments drawn up. . . . We had now reached the 
edge of the wood, where the abatis impeded our further advance, 
and the troops were under heavy fire. . . . Hurrying for- 
ward in person to the abatis, I found that as the regiments 
emerged from the woods they overlapped each other as they 
deployed, and being thus in many places huddled together, were 
suffering terribly from the enemy's fire. The regimental command- 
ers, who had received my orders to move by tlie left flank, were 
unable to effect the movement in good order under the galling 
fire. The alternative was adopted — to push the regiments for- 
ward through the abatis. . . . Meanwhile my regiments had 
advanced more or less into the abatis, the Second Florida and 
Thirty-eighth Virginia up to the fence, and driving away the 
gunners and killing the horses from a section of artillery near 
the road. We were losing heavily, especially in field and com- 
pany officers. . . . The entire brigade of five regiments and 
a battalion was in the front of the fight . . . with only six 
field officers [not already disabled]. . . . The supporting 
brigade advancing at this opportune moment, and the passage 
of lines being a feat in tactics which had never been practiced 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD. 49 

by any of ns, large fragments of those regiments who were 
left without field or company officers were joined in and con- 
tinued forward with that brigade." In the meantime General 
D. H. Hill had ordered Bondurant's battery into action. 

Leaving Garland's brigade, re-enforced at a critical moment, 
in the first abatis, north of the Williamsburg road, by General 
(then Colonel) G. B. Anderson ; attention is called to E-odes's 
brigade on the south side of that road. In his oflicial report, 
Brigadier-General R. E. Rodes describes the movement of his 
brigade through woods similar in character to that encountered 
by Garland's brigade. Rodes's skirmish line, the Sixth Ala- 
bama, under General (then Colonel) John B. Gordon, easily 
drove back the Federal pickets, the regiment ordered to sup- 
port these pickets having been already routed by Garland's 
brigade. Gordon's regiment of skirmishers reached the edge 
of the woods in good order, and at once entered the abatis in 
front of the redoubt. The regiments coming up were deployed ; 
the skirmishers were concentrated ; the whole brigade was 
formed in line, and the contest on this part of the field be- 
came very hot across the first abatis. 

Carter's battery was brought up. General Rodes adds : 
" I determined to attack from the position I then held, and 
requested General Rains, who commanded the supporting bri- 
gade, through an officer of my staff, and soon after in person, 
to move forward his brigade through the woods so as to pro- 
tect my right flank while I attacked the enemy in front ; his 
brigade had a few moments before occupied a line extending 
from my right obliquely to the front, and at the moment of 
our conversation was being thrown back on a line parallel to 
and a little in rear of that occupied by mine. He stated to 
me that he apprehended an attack on his own right flank, and 
declined, therefore, to move." 

Attention will now be again called to G. B. Anderson's 
brigade. In his official report he says : " The brigade was put 
in motion as oiKlered, by the left flank of regiments, between 1 
and 1.30 p. m., so as to be about one-quarter of a mile in rear of 
Garland's brigade. After moving a short distance, not more than 
half a mile, word was sent to me from General Garland that he 
4 



50 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES, 

was in great need of re- enforce ments. . . . The Fourth 
North Carolina being on the right and somewhat in advance, 
came first into action, emerging from the woods half a mile or 
more in front of the enemy's redoubt and breastworks, upon 
ground whicli, up to within 200 or 300 yards of the redoubt, 
was obstructed by the felling of trees. The other regiments 
came up successively. . . . Having started 
the three regiments on the right fairly into action, I found 
mj'self in the woods on the left of the clearing with the 
Twenty-seventh Georgia, and from the force of circumstances, as 
the day advanced, remained on this flank during most of the 
action. This regiment, having formed line in the woods, en- 
gaged the enemy there [one regiment of I^aglee's brigade 
detached in support of the Federal picket line south of the rail- 
road] and charged him over a very difficult piece of obstructed 
ground ; but finding itself in the face of a very greatly superior 
force [two regiments of Kaglee's] and in too advanced a position, 
one, in fact, which endangered its being completely flanked ; it 
was withdrawn a short distance, its left flank thrown back [still 
fighting] and I went into the clearing to endeavor to procure re- 
enforcements before again advancing." 

In the meanwhile the contest had raged in front of Garland's 
brigade and three of G. B. Anderson's regiments, just north of 
the Williamsburg road ; and in front of Rodes's brigade, south 
of that road. General D. H. Hill says, " I now detached General 
Rains to make a wide flank movement to take the Yankee works 
in reverse, while Rodes moved steadily to the front. . , . 
General Rains had now gained the rear of the Yankee redoubt 
and opened fire on the infantry posted in the woods. I now 
noticed commotion in the camps and redoubt and indications of 
evacuating the position. Rodes took skillful advantage of this 
commotion, and moved up his brigade in beautiful order and 
took possession of the redoubt and rifle-pits. So rapid was the 
advance that six pieces were abandoned by the Yankees. These 
Rodes had turned upon the retreating column with effect. Carter 
galloped up with his pieces, and these, with the captured guns, 
successfully repulsed an attempt of fresh Yankee troops to recap- 
ture the works.'' 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG EOAD. 51 

Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains, in liis official report, 
Bays : " Pursuant to the instnictions of Major-General [D. IL] 
Hill, we penetrated the woods to take the enemy in rear and 
drive him from his batteries. . . . We found ourselves in a 
swamp, but pressed on with alacrity until we had gained the rear 
of the enemy. Here we halted, directed by kind Providence, 
exactly at the right place, wliere I made a change of front by a 
wheel in the thicket, and advancing found ourselves facing the 
foe. ... As soon as we reached the e^^ge of the thicket, 
seeing the enemy in front, I ordered the fire ; . . . followed 
by a long, loud and continued roll of musketry for full fifteen 
minutes without cessation. I had heard many a volley 
before, but never one so prolonged and continuous. We 
evidently were unexpected there, were near at hand to the foe 
and' struck them like an avalanche. Their shot and cannon balls 
came like hail into the bushes around us, but the men lay close 
to the ground and only rose up on the knee to fire. The enemy 
were in great force before us, at least ten to one,* and increasing 
by re-enforcements, and at their fire about 100 of our men 
broke to the rear, but happening to be just there I easily 
rallied them, and they fought like heroes, and more than 
redeemed the act of a momentary panic. All acquitted themselves 
well, and when we emerged from the woods and swept through 
the desolated camp of the enemy, and their dead and wounded, 
their property lying everywhere around, not one article was 
taken by the men, who retained their ranks like true soldiers, 
and ultimately passed the night in line of battle without fire or 
light in another part of the woods, ready to receive and check 
the enemy should he advance, also taking a number of prisoners. 
My brigade was again called upon the next day to resist the 
enemy, actively engaged out of view with another part of our 
army, but I presume he had had enough of the fight and carnage 
for once and did not appear. Our loss in the battle was more 
than one-seventh of the whole brigade, and of these very few not 
killed or wounded." 

General D. H. Hill, says : " My division had beaten Casey's 

* But, see the Federal official reports previously quoted. 



52 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

division and all tlie re-enforcements brought him, and had driven 
him and his supports into the woods and swamps. It was desir- 
able, however, to press the Yankees as closely as possible. I 
therefore sent back to Genei'al Longstreet and asked for another 
brigade. In a few minutes the magnificent brigade of R. H. 
Anderson came to my support. A portion of this force, under 
Colonel Jenkins, consisting of the Palmetto Sharpshooters and 
the Sixth South Carolina, was sent on the extreme left to scour 
along the railroad and Nine-miles road, and thus get in rear of 
the enemy, while a portion, under General [R. H.] Anderson, in 
person, was sent on the immediate left of the redoubt, into the 
woods, where the Yankees had hid after being repulsed by the 
fire of Carter's battery and the captured guns." 

The Federal force against which R. H. Anderson, in person, 
was sent, with tw^o regiments, consisted of tliat portion of 
ISTaglee's brigade which had pressed back the Twenty-seventh 
Georgia, under General G. B. Anderson, a short time before 
Casey's earthworks were carried. Before following the impor- 
tant movements of R. II. Anderson's brigade on D. II. Hill's left, 
some account will be given of what occurred, just after that 
time, on the Confederate right. 

General D. H. Hill says : " Bearing's battery had been sent 
Tip by General Longstreet, and rendered important service. . . 
1 now resolved to drive the Yankees out of the woods on the 
right of the road, where they were still in strong force. [This 
force was Berry's brigade of Kearney's division, just arrived from 
the Federal third line of defense.] General Rains was near 
them, and a written order was carried him by my Adjutant to 
move fai'ther to the right. I regret that that gallant and meri- 
torious ofiicer did not advance farther in that direction. He would 
have taken the Yankees in flank, and the direct attack of Rodes 
in front would have been less bloody. The magnificent brigade 
of Rodes moved over the open ground to assault the Yankees 
strongly posted in the woods [south of the Williamsburg road]. 
He met a most galling fire, and his advance was checked. A 
portion of his command met with a disastrous repulse. Kemp- 
er's brigade was now sent me b}^ General Longstreet, and di- 
rected by me to move directly to the su]3port of Rodes. This 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD. 53 

brigade, however, did not engage the Yankees, and Rodes's men 
were badly cut up." 

General Kodes, in his official report, says: " The Sixth Alabama 
upon moving across the field in the edge of which they had first 
halted and entering the woods on the opposite side, ch'iving the 
enemy before them, encountered a heavy fire of musketry upon 
its right and front and finally upon the rear of its right wing. 
Under these circumstances, and finding that my right was not 
supported by the brigade of General Rains, which was bitt a 
short distance behind, ... I ordered this regiment [Sixth 
Alabama] to fall back to the position it had last occupied on the 
edge of the field, where it was about in line with the enemy's 
intrenchments. ... I feel decidedly confident that if we 
had been properly supported in the last charge, the brigade would 
have marched on with uninterrupted progress. . . . When 
the Sixth Alabama moved back, the right wing of the Twelfth 
Alabama . . . retired with it and took position on its left 
behind the intrenchments [Casey's rifle-pits]. ... At this 
time a portion of the Heavy Artillery Battalion [serving as in- 
fantry] retired and, 1 regret to say, headed by their officers, took 
refuge in the ditches in front of the enemy's redoubt, a position 
from which I had much difficulty in dislodging them, when they 
were called upon to man the redoubt. ... It was evident 
that nothing could be effected toward an advance while the right 
wing of the brigade was so exposed. . . . The Fifth Alabama 
and Twelfth IVIississippi [Eodes's left wing] continued to hold 
their ground steadily [in the second abatis] though subjected to a 
constant fire from the enemy's musketry, which inflicted a severe 
loss upon them. Just after the Twelfth Alabama had fallen back 
and about an hour after the brigade had assumed its most 
advanced position . . . re-enforcements commenced to arrive 
and in assisting General Kemper to place his brigade, so that it 
could move forward to relieve my advanced regiments, . . . 
I received a wound in the arm, which in a short time became so 
painful as to compel me to turn over the command of the brigade 
to Colonel Gordon, of the Sixth Alabama. I did not leave the 
field, though, until sunset. . . . The total number of men 



54 BATTLE OF SEVEISr PINES. 

carried into action was about 2,200. The aggregate number 
present at camp was, however, 2,587." 

The official records show the losses in this brigade were in 
killed and woimded, 1,094 ; and 5 missing. The Sixth 
Alabama suffered more severely than any other regiment. It lost 
348 killed and wounded, " near sixty per cent, of its aggregate 
force." 

General John B. Gordon, then Colonel, in speaking of the 
fighting that occurred just before he was ordered to withdraw 
his regiment, says : " Entering the swamp, covered in water two 
or three feet deep, in which the vines, briars, and felled timber 
made an almost impassable barrier, we were driving the enemy 
steadily before us, when he suddenly moved upon my right flank 
a strong force [Berry's brigade] bearing Confederate battle-flags 
and enfiladed my whole line. My adjutant was ordered im- 
mediately off to ask for support, but was shot down. Messenger 
after messenger was then dispatched to urge the troops [Rains's 
brigade] in rear of my right to move down to my supjjort. This 
brigade, although within sight and but a few hundred yards dis- 
tant, failed to give me any assistance whatevei". . . . To 
protect my right and rear it now became necessaiy to change the 
front of my right company. ... In a sheet of fire and 
within a few rods of overwhelming numbers this company stood 
until the last officer and non-commissioned officer — except one 
corporal — and forty-four of the fifty-six men carried into action — 
had fallen. Yet, when General Rodes gave the order for this 
regiment to fall back, the few survivors were loading and firing, 
all undaunted, amid their fallen comrades. . . . Contending 
from the first with superior numbers, flanked on the right and 
unsupported by reserves, officers and men falling thick and fast, 
if not killed possibly to drown in the water in which they stood, 
there was no sign of wavering in any portion of the line. Two 
field officers had fallen, three companies had not an officer spared, 
four others had but one [each], and more than half of these brave 
men had fallen, when, under orders, they retired to the enemy's 
intrenchments in the rear." 

In the records I find nothing that tends to explain or to justify 
the inaction of Rains's brigade after Casey's camp was captured. 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD, 55 

It is not necessary to dwell upon the effect that would probably 
have followed had this brigade made a determined movement 
against Berry's left flank and rear, when far advanced, 'in the 
woods, south of the Williamsbui'g road, " on the left of the 
camping ground of General Casey's division." 

In his otScial report of the operations of Rodes's brigade, 
after he was placed in command of it, General Gordon says : 
*' Although Brigadier General Bodes did not retire from the 
field, in one hour and a half after he was wounded, and not until 
the firing had entirely ceased [on that part of the field], he was 
compelled from exhaustion to turn over the command of the 
brigade. Notified that I was placed in command, I reported to 
Major-General [D. H.] Hill for orders. Under his direction I 
moved the brigade about half a mile to the rear, and ordered 
them to encamp on either side of the Williamsburg road, spend- 
ing nearly the entire night with large details from the brigade in 
nursing the wounded whom the surgeons had been unal>le to 
remove." 

On Rodes's left Garland's brigade, and three regiments of 
G. B. Anderson's brigade — more or less intermingled — had been 
engaged in front of, and in, the second abatis. General Garland 
says : " Late in the afternoon I succeeded in separating and 
reorganizing my command, and held it under orders in reserve. 
Sleeping upon the field of battle, this brigade, along with Colonel 
Anderson's, was held in reserve on Sunday, the 1st instant." He 
states that the strength of his brigade was 2,065, and that the 
killed and wounded numbered 698 ; missing, 42. 

General G. B. Anderson says that the three regiments of his 
brigade that supported Garland, " being exhausted and cut up 
and to some extent scattered, and the ground being held by 
fresher troops, I proceeded, as the evening closed in, to collect 
them together at a point in the rear portion of the clearing to the 
left of the road. After night we were ordered by the Major- 
General connnanding the division to take position in the woods 
in rear of the clearing, where we spent the night." He states 
the brigade went into action 1,865 strong, and lost in killed and 
wounded 829 ; missing, 37. The heaviest losses were in the 



56 BA.TTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Fourth Nortli Carolina. Out of 678 carried into action, this 
regiment lost 353 killed and wounded ; missing, 6. 

It is thus seen that three brigades of D. H. Hill's division, 
after five or six hours of bloody fighting-, were withdrawn from 
the second abatis, and bivouacked that night in the edge of the 
woods west of the first abatis. Re-enforcements had at last come 
up in full force. It has already been shown, by General Rains's 
report, that his brigade "ultimately passed the night in line of 
battle, without fire or light, in another part of the woods, ready 
to receive and check the enemy should he advance " ! 

Attention will now be called to the arrival of re-enforcements 
in such numbers that D. II. Hill was enabled to withdraw his 
brigades from the front line. These re-enforcements were the 
five brigades — three of Longstreet's, followed by two of Ilogei-'s — 
from the Charles City road to the Williamsburg road. It has 
already been stated, the head of that column of five brigades 
reached the latter road, far in rear of the fighting, at 5 p. m. 

In his ofiicial report General Wilcox says : " The leading 
legiment . . . was ordered immediately to the front by the 
division commander [Longstreet] to report to Major-General 
D. II. Hill. . . . Soon after . . . [another regiment] 
received similar orders. I was directed to place Colston's brigade 
in rear of the right fiank of the troops then engaged ; this being 
accomplished, I moved forward in C(,>mraand of the two remain- 
ing regiments of my own brigade . . . and reported to 
General D. II. Hill. The [first regiment that had been sent for- 
ward] . . . had been ordered by General Hill to report to 
General Kemper ; the latter ordered tliree companies of this regi- 
ment to dislodge the enemy holding a certain point that proved 
to be very annoying to our line. Colonel Moore took command 
of these companies, dislodging the enemy, receiving two wounds, 
one of which proved mortal, his horse being killed at the same 
time. This affair occasioned a loss of 6Q killed and wounded in 
a few minutes." 

It will be borne in mind that General D. H. Hill, in his 
official report, says : " Kemper's brigade " was ' ' directed by me 
to move directly to the support of Rodes. This brigade, how- 
ever, did not engage the Yankees, and Rodes's men were badly 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG EOAD. 57 

cut "up." But it seems that, later, this brigadQ being "annoyed" 
by musketry fire from the woods soutli of the Williamsburg 
road, Kemper ordered three companies of the leading regiment 
of Wilcox's brigade, just brought forward from the Charles City 
road, to "dislodge the enemy." That enemy was the Federal 
rear guard, stationed there by General Kearney to cover the 
withdrawal of liis troops. The manner in which the "three 
companies " did the work assigned them by General Kemper is 
sufficient evidence of what the " five brigades " from the Charles 
City road would have done if they had been promptly put in 
close action by General Longstreet, to support the attack made 
by D. H. Hill, at 1 p. m. 

General Wilcox adds : " On reporting to General Hill he 
directed me to form in line with three of my regiments in the 
edge of the woods beyond [south of] the field in which were the 
captured batteries and rifle-pits of the enemy [Casey's line]. A 
feeble fire from the enemy continued in the woods for some ten 
or fifteen minutes after my line was formed, and then ceased. 
The fire, however, on the left of the road continued until after 
dark, and at times with great vivacity, and on this side the enemy 
had been driven much farther." 

The fire referred to by Geiieral Wilcox, which " continued until 
after dark,'' was on the Williamsburg road, a short distance east 
of Seven Pines, where Heintzelman and Keyes made their last 
attempt that day to drive back the advancing Confederates. The 
other brigades from the Charles City road followed after Wilcox's 
brigade, and went into bivouac on and near the open ground 
around Casey's captured earthworks. At that time JVIahone's 
brigade was in observation vf ell out on the Charles City road, and 
Pickett's brigade was far back on the railroad. It remains to 
account for but one of the thirteen brigades which composed the 
right wing under Longstreet — " the magnificent brigade of R. H. 
Anderson," sent to the front, at D. 11. Hill's request, by General 
Longstreet, after Hill's division, unaided, "had beaten Casey's 
division and all the re-enforcements brought him." 

It will be recalled that two regiments of this Lrigade, under 
General R. H. Anderson, in person, were sent into the woods 
north of the redoubt, where two regiments of JSTaglee's brigade 



58 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

still held position. No official Confederate report of tlie details 
of tliis operation seems to have been made. Bnt there is no 
donbt of the correctness of General Naglee's statement that : 
" The enemy had opened a most destructive cross-fire npon them 
[his two regiments] from the pieces near the redoubt that had not 
been spiked, and this, with the fire [of the two regiments under 
R. H. Anderson] from their immediate front was no longer to be 
endured, and they [ISTaglee's two regiments] were withdrawn." 

Reference will now be made to the operations of two regi- 
ments of E.. H. Anderson's brigade under Colonel Jenkins, 
ordered by D. H. Hill to move to " the extreme left to scour 
along the railroad [far in advance of Pickett's brigade] and 
[along] the Nine-miles road, and thus get in rear of the enemy." 
It will be remembered that on the part of the field to which 
these two regiments were ordered, the Twenty-seventh Georgia, 
under General G. B. Anderson, in person, had been engaged with 
varying success, whilst the rest of D. II. Hill's division was 
attacking Casey's line ; and that G. B. Anderson "went into the 
clearing to endeavor to procure re-enforcements before again 
advancing." The latter says : " Colonel Jenkins's regiment 
. . . and the Sixth South Carolina Volunteers were sent 
with me, and as soon as they could be formed in line . . . 
the three regiments again charged in the best style over the 
same piece of obstructed ground [on which the Twenty-seventh 
Georgia had previously fought], . . . through the woods 
beyond, . . . routing him completely." 

This was the affair described by General Couch in which 
Rippey's regiment and Neill's regiment were so quickly, and so 
"badly cut up." General G. B. Anderson adds : " The Georgia 
regiment, having been in action much longer than the South 
Carolina, and being somewhat scattered and very much fatigued, 
was now halted and reformed in line. The South Carolina 
regiments advanced some distance farther, and after a short time 
became [again] engaged with the enemy. I sent to General R. 
H. Anderson,who I learned was then in advance, and informed him 
of the position of the [Twenty-seventh Georgia] Regiment. He 
came himself and conducted it v;ith me to a position where it was 
placed in line of battle. I then left it and went to look after the 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG KOAD. 59 

rest of tlie brigade." The disposition he made of the latter, for 
the night, under instructions of General D. H. Hill, has already 
been stated. 

It appears from the records that, whilst General Wilcox com- 
manded the three brigades of Longstreet's division that were on 
the Xine-miles road, three and one-half miles from Richmond, 
May 30, General E.. H. Anderson commanded the three brigades 
of that division which were in camp north of Richmond, and 
Colonel M. Jenkins, of the Palmetto regiment, was temporarily 
in command of R. H. Anderson's brigade. When that brigade 
was ordered to the front, General R. H. Anderson accompanied 
it, but did not relieve Colonel Jenkins of its executive command. 
When General D. H. Hill detached two regiments to go with 
General G. B. Anderson, Colonel Jenkins accompanied those 
regiments, and General R. H. Anderson took control of the rest 
of the brigade in the attack against General Kaglee's two regi- 
ments, as already stated. 

In his official report, Colonel Jenkins speaks of the " Twenty- 
eighth Georgia " when he means the " Twenty-seventh.'' In 
the following quotations the latter is substituted for the former. 

Colonel Jenkins says : " Guided by Col. George B. Ander- 
son to the left of the Twenty-seventh Georgia (one of his regi- 
ments), [I] took position against a small abatis with my left com- 
pany deployed near the York River Railroad and my right 
adjacent to the Twenty-seventh Georgia. Col. John Bratton, 
with the Sixth South Carolina Volunteers, having afterwards 
<5ome up, took position on the right of the Twenty-seventh 
Georgia, and an advance being concerted, the regiments moved 
forward across the abatis under fij-e. Not being able, on account 
of the thick undergrowth, to see the enemy, I moved my regi- 
ment forward without tiring and with fixed bayonets." 

Colonel Jenkins describes the affair in which Neill's and 
Rippey's regiments were so badly " cut up, " and adds : " Our 
advance was now continued, with little or no opposition, . 
across a neighborhood road leading to [the] railroad. Here the 
lines were halted and dressed . . . and at this time, see- 
ing General Richard H. Anderson, I reported to him. His 
instructions beino: to advance, we went forward to the second 



60 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

abatis, a very heavy and difficult one to pass. At tliis point, the 
raih'oad being open to view and some of the enemy being seen to 
our left and front, I threw out skirmishers to feel it. . . . 
I [then] advanced my regiment through the abatis under a very 
heavy lire. . . . Finding after crossing that the Sixth regi- 
ment . . . and mine were isolated, I instructed Colonel 
Bratton to keep his left touching to my right and the enemy's 
line, after a stubborn resistance, having given way to our attack, 
. . . I executed under fire from the right front a change 
of front obliquely forward on right company. Directing the two 
regiments forward in line, we drove the enemy to the front and 
right. ... At this point the enemy, heavily re-enforced, 
made a desperate stand, and our lighting was within seventy-five 
yards. Not pausing even to load, and pouring in my volleys at 
close range as I advanced, I never allowed a broken line to get 
through their new lines before I pushed on the new line and 
drove them back, losing heavily myself, but killing numbers of 
the enemy. Our advance continued in this steady manner, the 
enemy steadily giving back. The ranks of the enemy having 
broken to our right and front and the fire having lessened, I 
halted the lines, dressed them, and then changed front obliquely 
forward." 

Having crossed the Nine-miles road at a point only a few 
hundred yards south of the railroad, the first change of front, 
obliquely to the right, caused tlie general movement of Jenkins's 
line, on the east of the Nine-miles road, to be towards the south- 
east ; his second change of front made the direction of his advance 
nearly south, almost at right angles to the Williamsburg road, 
on a line crossing the latter at a point about three-eighths of a 
mile east of Seven Fines. 

Continuing his report, he says : " Following the retreating 
enemy either fresh troops or heavy re-enforcements met us, and 
. . . offered us battle with greatly superior numbers. With- 
out pausing our lines moved on him, and our steady advance was 
not to be resisted. After a most obstinate resistance and terrible 
slaughter the enemy gave back to our left and right across the 
Williamsburg road, about a mile or more from General Casey's 
headquarters. [A portion of these beaten Federals fell back on 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG KOAD. 61 

the Williamsburg road and tlie other portion fell back south of 
that road]. Following the latter and heavier body, they were 
again re-enforced and took position in a wood parallel [to] and 
abont 300 yards on the right [south] of the Williams- 
burg road. With the Sixth Regiment . . . and six com- 
panies of my regiment in line on the Williamsburg road, and 
with five companies sweeping the remnant of the enemy who had 
retired to our left, I was fired upon by our battery near General 
Casey's headquarters, the fire enfilading my line in the road and 
leading me to believe that I had gotten too far in the enemy's 
rear, but on sending notice of my position to General [D. II.] Hill 
the fire was stopped. ... At this moment Major William 
Anderson, then commanding my regiment, reported to me a 
heavy column of the enemy advancing on me by the Williams- 
burg road, and being then engaged with superior numbers in 
my front and not wishing to retire, I determined to break the 
enemy in front before I could be reached by this new advance, 
and then by a change of front to meet them. I sent . . 
to get re-enforcements either from General [R. H.] Anderson or 
General [D. IL] Hill, and ordering Major William Anderson to 
fight the advance of the column on the Williamsburg road, 
. . . I carried forward swiftly and steadily my line against 
the enemy [south of that road]. Having to pass across an open 
field on this advance, I lost heavily, but succeeded in routing and 
dispersing the enemy in my front driving them at least a 
quarter of a mile. ... In the meanwhile, Major William 
Anderson, advancing down the Williamsburg road and firing 
upon the enemy's advanced skirmishers, they retired to the 
advancing column, and in the momentary check gave me time to 
make ray dispositions to meet them. Having dressed the lines, 
I moved by the flank . . . and took up line of battle oblique to 
the [Williamsburg] road ; ... so as to present front 
at once to the enemy's advance by the road and to any rallied 
party that might recover from my last attack. ... [It was 
then] reported to me the Twenty-seventh Georgia [was] about 
300 yards to my rear, and I sent ... to bring them up 
at the double-quick. During . this time we had evidence 
of the near approach of the enemy by hearing their words of 



62 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES, 

command and tlieir cheers. . . . The enemy [was now 
reported] in line of battle, advancing at the double-quick. 
Strengthened by the nearness of support, I advanced my line 
toward them also at the double-quick, and assumed a position 
perpendicular to the Williamsburg road in the open field along 
the crest of a hill, the woods immediately in front, and the enemy 
in line about one hundred yards distant. The Twenty -seventh 
Georgia was placed on the right, touching to the road ; my regi- 
ment ... in centre, and the Sixth Ilegiment on left. The 
enemy poured in a heavy fire ; . . . the supporting regiment, 
under a terrible fire, gave back. . . . The enemy, encouraged, 
redoubled his fire ; . . . cheered and advanced, and I deter- 
mined to meet him. In prompt obedience the two regiments 
rose from their knees, from whence they had been firing upon 
the enemy with decided effect, and resumed their old, steady 
advance, firing full in face of the foe. The two lines neared 
each other to thirty or forty yards, and now the left of my regi- 
ment and the Sixth South Carolina Volunteers passing the swamp, 
came full upon the enemy's right. Losing heavily, I pressed 
on, and the enemy sullenly and slowly gave way. . . 
Driving them in this way, we had advanced some 200 or 300 
yards, the enemy getting more and more disordered and 
beginning to break badly. By this time . . . the Fifth 
South Carolina . . . came up at the double quick. The 
Twenty-seventh Georgia . . . rallied and came forward on 
my right. . . . [The Fifth South Carolina] . . . came 
up on their right, sweeping . . . the rallied fragments who 
had collected and resumed fire from the woods to the right, 
and thus, at 7.40 p.m., we closed our busy day. . . . Night 
having settled upon the field, I posted in this extreme position, 
with instructions to throw out pickets, the Nineteenth Mississippi 
Ilegiment [of Wilcox's brigade], which . . . had now 
arrived. I retired tlie other regiments to the enemy's camp in 
rear [at Seven Pines] where we reposed for the night, my regi- 
ment sleeping in the camp of the Tenth Massachusetts Yolun- 
teers [of Devens's brigade]. . . . We passed in our march 
through two abatis of fallen timber, over four camps, and 
artillery twice, driving the enemy from three pieces. . . . 



FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD. 63 

The service we did will be evidenced by our list of killed and 
wounded. . . . Out of 11 in the color guard, 10 were shot 
down. . . . Captain Caq^enter . . . advanced by my 
colors until his gallant little band of 28 dwindled to 12 ; . . . 
when the fatal ball pierced his heart.'' 

The official records do not show the number of casualties in 
either of the two South Carolina regiments that were sent by 
D. H. Hill to " the extreme left to sconr along the railroad and 
Nine-miles road." But, Colonel John Bratton, commanding the 
Sixth South Carolina, says the losses in his regiment that day 
were 269 in killed and wounded, out of 521 taken into action. 
It is probable that the losses in the Palmetto Sharpshooters 
were in number about the same. General George B. Anderson's 
official report shows that the losses in the Twenty-seventh 
Georgia, which supported these two South Carolina regiments, 
were 145, in killed and wounded, out of 392 carried into action. 

It is believed that the annals of war show few, if any, in- 
stances of more persistent, skillful and effective " battle-field fight- 
ing " than was done by the two South Carolina regiments, under 
Colonel Jenkins, in the afternoon of May 31. 

In the meanwhile, Pickett's brigade, under Longstreet's order, 
was held back on the railroad " to repel an}' advance of the enemy 
up that road " ! Of the five brigades from the Charles City road, 
only three companies were put in close action. The Confederate 
successes were gained by the four brigades of D. H. Hill's divi- 
sion aided, after 4 p. m., by but one of the six brigades of Long- 
street's division. Yet, General Longstreet attributes " the failure 
of complete success,'' that day, " to the slow movements of 
General Huger's command,'' and claims that the hardest part of 
the battle was thrown on his " own poor division '' ! ! 

The losses in three brigades of D. H. Hill's division are officially 
reported to have been 2,705, of which 740 were in Garland's 
brigade ; 866 in G. B. Anderson's ; and 1,099 in Kodes's. The 
losses in Kains's brigade are officially reported " more than one- 
seventh of the whole brigade." It may be safely stated that the 
losses in D. H. Hill's division were about 3,000. 



64 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



CHAPTER III. 

Alleged " Slow Movements " of IIugek's Division. 

General Longstkeet says : '* Our plan was " " to turn your 
[the Federal] left by moving Huger's command across the head of 
White Oak Swamp ; that to be followed by the attack of General 
D. H. Hill ...."* 

Previous to the recent publication of the " Official Pecords " 
the weight of evidence, so far as it was generally made known, 
seemed to give color of probability to the above statement ; which 
constitutes the foundation upon which is based the censure cast 
upon Huger by Generals Longstreet and Johnston. Investiga- 
tion, however, at a later period, developed the fact that Long- 
street, himself, was directly responsible for the movements of 
Huger's division. This fact would exonerate Huger, even if he 
had been ordered by General Johnston " to make a strong flank 
movement around the left of the enemy's position and attack him 
in rear of that flank." 

But, General Johnston's written instructions to Huger have 
now been ])ublished, and it is very clearly seen that General 
Longstreet has misstated their import. In view of those instruc- 
tions, it is plain that the very severe censure to which Huger has 
been, to this day, widely subjected, is not founded upon facts. 
To facilitate a fair comprehension of the whole question an out- 
line of the various phases of the controversy will be given. 

The first intimation that the failure of the Confederates to 
achieve complete success was due to the slow movements of 
General Huger's command, is found in a letter dated June 7, 1862, 
written by General Longstreet to General Johnston. At that time 
General Johnston was disabled by very severe wounds. General 
Longstreet commanded the right wing of Johnston's army in the 

*■ See Century Magazine, May, 1885, p. 127. 



ALLEGED SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HUGEe's DIVISION. G5 

battle. That wing was composed of three divisions — Longstreet's, 
D. H. Hill's and Huger's. 

The following is a copy of the letter above referred to : 

" Headquarters, ) 

June 7, 1862, 11a. m. \ 
" General Johuston, C. S. A. : 

" General — Your kind favor and present are received. I 
hope you wou't think that I could visit the city without doing 
myself the pleasure to see you the first thing. I have desired to 
go in every 'lay, and for no other purpose, but I have been afraid 
to leave iny command for a single morqent. It has so turned 
out that I might have done so, but I did not know it. l*^ot knowing 
what moment I may be called upon, I am afraid to move. 1 shall 
not fail you the first moment that I consider safe. 

" The failure of complete success on Saturday [May 31], I 
attribute to th") slow movements of General Huger's command. 
This threw, pe.'haps, the hardest part of the battle upon my own 
poor division. It is greatly cut up, but as true and ready as ever. 
Our ammunition was nearly exhausted when Whiting moved, and 
I could not therefore move on with the rush that we could had 
his movement been earlier. We did advance, however, through 
three encampments and only stopped at nightfall. The enemy 
ran in great confusion, but the troops were arranged en echelon, 
and we encountered fresh troops every few hundred yards. These 
readily fell back, however, as the fleeing ones came to them 
closely pursued. 

"I can't but help think that a display of his forces on the left 
flank of the enemy by General linger would have comj^leted the 
affair and given Whiting as easy and pretty a game as was ever 
had upon a battle field. Slow men are a little out of ^^lace upon 
the field. Altogether it was very well, but I can't help but 
regret that it was not complete. 

" With kindest expressions for Mrs. Johnston and the members 
of your stafi:, 

"I remain, truly and sincerely yours, 

" James Longstreet." * 

* " Official Records," Vol XI., Part III, p. 580. 



66 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

The facts, stated and proved in the precec'ing chapters, in 
regard to the bloody and persistent fighting, May 31, by D. H. 
Hill's division and one brigade of Longstreet's division, are not 
in accord with that portion of the above letter ii: which General 
Longstreet says: "The enemy ran in great cor fusion ; " "we 
encountered fresh troops every few hundred yards. These readily 
fell back, however, as the fleeing ones came to them closely 
pursued." 

In presenting to General Johnston the above "rose-colored 
view '' of the successes obtained by the five Confede -ate brigades 
that did the fighting on the Williamsburg road. May 31, it is 
more than probable General Longstreet was endeavoring to show 
that there was no occasion for him to put more than one of the 
six brigades of his own division in close action that day. But it 
is hard to account for his claim that the " slow movements of 
General Huger's command " threw " the hardest part of the 
battle on '' Longstreet's " own poor division. " 

Soon after the letter of June 7, 1862, appeared in the pub- 
lished " Oificial Records," I wrote to General D. H. Hill asking 
him what he thought of the claim that " the hardest part of the 
battle," May 31, was thrown upon Longstreet's division ? In reply, 
dated May 22, 1885, General Hill said : " I have been looking over 
the Rebellion Record and cannot find that letter of Longstreet to 
Johnston, of June 7, in which he speaks of the suffering of his 
' poor division.' Longstreet was not on the field at all on the 
31st of May, and did not see any of the fighting." " But he 
ought to have known that I got no assistance from him except 
the brigade of R. H. Anderson.'' "I was much hurt by Long- 
street's claim, at the time, of the victory as his. I was still more 
hurt that the ten pieces captured by my men were turned over to 
Longstreet's division." 

On the 13th of June, 1885, Hill wrote : " The Longstreet 
letter to Joe Johnston is a reality. I am sorry, sorry, sorry that 
it is so. But it relieves my mind in regard to General Johnston. 
I always felt that he had done my division great injustice in his 
report ; but with such a letter from the supposed commander on 
the field, how could he report differently ? " 

January 13, 1886, Hill added : " I have not felt kindly to 



ALLEGED SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HUGEr's DIVISION. 67 

Longstreet since I read that letter of liis to Joe Johnston in the 
Record of the Rebellion, I can't understand how he had the 
"brass to write such a letter." 

General Longstreet's official report is dated June 10, 1862. 
In that report he said : " The division of General Huger was 
intended to make a strong flank movement around the left of the 
enemy's position and attack him in rear of that flank." 

General Johnston, in his official report, dated June 24:, 1862, 
said : " General Huger with his division was to move down the 
Charles City road in order to attack in flank the troops who 
might be engaged with Hill and Longstreet." 

Fortunately for General Huger's reputation, the written 
instructions given to him by General Johnston are found in the 
recently published " Official Records." 

On May 30, 1862, 8.40 p. m., General Johnson wrote to 
General Huger. " The reports of Major-General D. H. Hill give 
me the impression that the enemy is in considerable strength in 
his front. It seems to me necessary that we should increase our 
force also. For that object I wish to concentrate the troops of 
your division on the Charles City road and concentrate the troops 
of Major-General Hill on that to Williamsburg. To do this it will 
be necessary for you to move as early in the morning as possible . 
to relieve the brigade of General Hill's division now on the 
Charles City road. I have desired General Hill to send you a 
guide. The road is the second large one diverging to the right 
from the Williamsburg road ; the first turns off near the toll- 
gate. On reaching your position on the Charles City road learn 
at once the routes to the main roads to Richmond on your right 
and left, especially to the left, and try to find guides. Be ready, 
if an action should be begun on your left, to fall upon the 
enemy's left flank." "P. S. — It is important to move very 
early."* 

On May 31 — hour not stated — General Johnston wrote to 
Huger : " I fear that in my note of last evening, of which there 
is no copy, I was too positive on the subject of your attacking the 
enemy's left flank. It will, of course, be necessary for you to 

* "Official Records," Vol. XI., Part I., p. 938. 



08 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

know what force is before you first. I hope to be able to liave that 
ascertained for you by cavalry. As our main force will be on your 
left, it will be necessary for your progress to the front to conform 
at fii'st to that of General Hill. If you find no strong body in 
your front, it will be well to aid General Hill ; but then a strong 
reserve should be retained to cover our right." * 

Whilst there can be no doubt that General Johnston, on the 
30th, intended to concentrate the larger portion of his army 
against the Federals in the vicinity of Seven Pines — attack them 
early on the morning of the 31st — and, if possible, overwhelm 
them before they could be re-enforced ; it is very clear that the 
foregoing written instructions did not require Huger's division to 
initiate that attack. On the contrary, there is, in documents 
previously referred to, positive evidence that " the combined 
movement which had l)een planned " required that Longstreet's 
division — moving on the Nine-miles road — should be promptly 
put in action on D. H. Hill's left, and closely support the 
attack Hill's division was to make against the Federals on the 
Williamsburg road. Longstreet misunderstood the direction in 
which his division was to move into action — General Johnston 
determined not to make Longstreet's " misunderstanding " 
generally known — the latter misrepresented the orders Huger 
received — endeavored to make it appear that the failure of the 
Confederates to achieve complete success was due to the inex- 
cusable " slow movements of General Huger's command '' — and 
General Johnston sided with General Longstreet. 

General Johnston's instructions show that Huger's first and 
main duty was to guard against the approach of the Federals, on 
the Charles City road, from the vicinity of White Oak Bridge — 
where it was known there had been, for several days, a large 
force of infantry, artillery and cavalry. There is not enough of 
the " spirit of fight " in the orders given to Huger, by General 
Johnston, to justify the latter in asserting that " Huger with his 
division was to move down the Charles City road in order to 
attack in flank the troops who might be engaged with Hill and 
Longstreet." 

* " Official Records," Vol. XI., Part I., p. 938. 



ALLEGED SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HUGER^S DIVISION. 69 

It is true that General Johnston modifies this statement by 
adding : " Unless he found in his front force enough to occupy 
his division." But giving full weight to this qualification of his 
first statement, General Johnston has unfairly interpreted the 
sense of the orders he gave Huger. The latter was positively in- 
structed to make his " progress to the front " " conform at 
first to that of General Hill." In case he should find no strong 
body in his front he was mildly instructed : " It will be well to 
aid General Hill ; but then a strong reserve should be retained 
to cover our right." 

These instructions say nothing about General Longstreet or 
his division. At the time they were written General Johnston 
expected that Longstreet's division would move on the Nine-miles 
road and go promptly into action, in suj^port of D. H. Hill's 
division, as soon as the latter attacked the Federals on the Will- 
iamsburg road. It was not then intended that Huger, from 
the Charles City road, should aid Longstreet on the ISTine- 
miles road. But, in " the combined movement which had been 
planned," General Johnston intended — " should there be cause 
of haste " — that McLaws's division ; on, and north of the Nine- 
miles road ; should re-enforce Longstreet. 

It should be noticed that whilst Generals Longstreet and 
Johnston severely censure the " slowness " of Huger's division, 
they are silent in regard to the causes of " delay." In his offi- 
cial report to General Johnston, General Longstreet says that 
"It did not get into position, however, to make any such attack^ 
and I was obliged to send three of my small brigades on the 
Charles City road " " to protect my right flank ; " and he adds : 
" After waiting some six hours for " Huger's division " to get 
into position I determined to move forward without regard to 
them." " I have reason to believe that the affair would have 
been a complete success had " Huger's division " been put in 
position within eight hours of the proper time. The want of 
promptness on that part of the field and the consequent severe 
struggle in my front so greatly reduced my supply of aimnuni- 
tion, that at the late hour of the move on the left [by the division, 
under Whiting, on the Nine-miles road] I was unable to make the 
rush necessary to relieve that attack." "My own troops have 



70 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

been so often tried and distinguished on other fields that thej 
need no praise from my lips. A truer, better body of men never 
marched upon a battle-field.'" 

The battle of Seven Pines was the first great contest between 
the Federal Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of 
Northern "Virginia. When the two small Confederate armies, 
under Johnston and Beauregard, contended against the Federals 
under McDowell at the first battle of Manassas, General Long- 
street commanded a Confederate brigade, which, from its posi- 
tion on the field, was not called upon to do any special fighting. 
In the affair at Williamsburg — between the rear of the Con- 
federates, retiring from Yorktown to the vicinity of Richmond, 
and the advanced portion of the Federal army — Longstreet's 
division took an active part in the rather blind fighting in the 
woods east of the Confederate fortifications; and they did good 
service there. If his troops had been tried and distinguished on 
any other fields than those just mentioned, that fact is not gen- 
erally known. 

What he says of his being " obliged to send '' three of his 
brigades on the Charles City road to protect his right fiank, and 
his statement that Huger's " want of promptness " so greatly 
reduced the " supply of ammunition," will be referred to in another 
connection. 

General Johnston, in his official report, says : The divisions 
*' of Smith, Hill and Longstreet were in position early enough " 
" to be ready to commence operations by 8 a. m. Major-General 
Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack, instead of the 
combined movement which had been planned, w^aited from hour 
to hour for General Huger's division." 

He adds : " Had Major-General Huger's division been in 
position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet 
and Hill moved I am satisfied that Keyes's corps would have 
been destroyed instead of being merely defeated. Had it gone 
into action even at 4 o'clock, the victory would have been much 
more complete.'' 

Without discussing here " the combined movement " which 
Generals Johnston and Longstreet claim required that Huger's 



ALLEGED SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HUGEk's DIVISION. 71 

division should attack the left flank and rear of the Federals, it 
may be stated : 

The divisions of Smith, Hill and Longstreet were not in posi- 
tion early enough to commence operations by 8 a. m. 

Smith's div'ision, under Whiting, directed by General John- 
ston, in person, went into action, against Sumner, north of Fair 
Oaks Station, at 5 p. m. 

Hill's division moved to the attack, on the Williamsburg 
road, at 1 p. m.* 

One brigade of Longstreet's division was put into the fight 
at 4 p. M. The five other brisrades of Lono^street's division were 
not in action that day. 

K Huger's division " did not go into action by 4 o'clock, it 
was because General Longstreet did not require it, as it was in 
position and awaiting his orders." 

Attention will now be (jailed to the action taken by General 

* In reference to the hour at which D. H. Hill's division was in " po- 
sition" "to commence operations," attention is called to the following 
quotations, in addition to what has already been stated in regard to the time 
at which the divisions were moved into action. At 6.30 a. m.. May 31, 
General D. H. Hill wrote to General Rodes : " Have your men ready 
to start at a moment's notice. Examine their cartridge boxes, and if their 
ammunition be damaged, have it supplied from the ordnance wagons. 
. . . Carter's battery will move with you. Have a strip of cloth 
(white) prepared as a battle badge for each man. . . . Specific battle in- 
structions will be given hereafter." See "Official Records," Vol. XL, Part 
in., p. 534. The date, 6.30 A. m., of these preparatory instructions, would 
hardly indicate that Hill's division would be in position "to commence oper- 
ations" at 8 A. M. But on this point we are not left to "inference." General 
Rodes in his official report says : "On the morning of the 31st, the brigade was 
stationed on the Charles City road, three and one-half miles from the point on 
the Williamsburg road from which it had been determined to start the columns 
of attack. Between 10 and 11a. m. I received an order through an officer of 
Major-General HilFs staff to put my brigade in motion. . . . Finding that 
the movement of my brigade under this order was premature, with Major- 
General Hill's approval, I sent a .staff officer to remand it to its original position. 
A short time after this I received a verbal order from General Hill to conduct 
my command at once to the point at which the attack was to be made. . . . 
When the signal for attack was given [at 1 p. m.], only my line of skir- 
mishers, the Sixth Alabama, and another regiment, the Twelfth Mississippi, 
were in position." 



72 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Huger soon after the official reports of Generals Longstreet and 
Johnston were made public. 

On the 10th of August, 1862, General Huger made the fol- 
lowing indorsement on General Longstreet's official report : * 

" I received this day the within report. I applied f for it on 
July 26, but could not obtain it till this date. It is respectfully 
returned, with my objections to its being received as the proper 
report of that battle : 

" 1st. General Longstreet was not the senior officer present. 
We met on duty, and I inquired of him if he knew which was 
the senior, as I did not. He replied that he was. I told him, 
if he knew it, that was sufficient. But General Longstreet was 
mistaken, and the statement that he was the senior was erroneous. 
I was the senior. 

" 2d. The whole of the remarks of the delay of my division 
are erroneous. There was a delay owing to the sudden rising of 
the stream on which the troops were encamped. General Long- 
street's division got the road at the crossing first and my troops 
had to wait until they had passed. The delay after that [at the 
stream] was the time necessary to cross. I regretted the delay 
as much as any one and did all in my power to expedite the 
movement. 

"3d. His statement, 'I have reason to believe that the affair 
would have been a complete success had the troops npon the 
right [Huger's division] been put in position within eight hours 
of the proper time,' is a gross error. If the proper time was 4 
A. M. the troops were eight hours late, but under the circum- 
stances that was impossible. The ' ])roper time ' is a vague ex- 
pression. The idea of gross or criminal negligence is conveyed, 
but not proved. If he had said ' possible time,' there might have 
been some delay that greater exertion or better management 
would have avoided, but none other. 

" 4th. I have applied to General Longstreet to correct the 
errors he has made, and desire he may have time to do so." :}: 

* It does not appear that any report of the operations of Huger's division 
was called for by either General Longstreet or General Johnston. It is believed 
that no regular official report was made by Huger. G. W. S. 

f To the Confederate States War Department. 

t " Official Records," Vol. XI., Part I., p. 943. 



ALLEGED SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HUGEr's DIVISION. 73 

On the 20tb of September, 1862, General Hnger wrote to 
General Johnston : 

" I beg to refer you to my letter* of the 20th ultimo. I 
have waited one month, and no reply has been received from 
General Longstreet. As you have indorsed his erroneous state- 
ments, to my injury, I must hold you responsible, and desire to 
know from you if you have any reason to believe an answer will 
be made by General Longstreet. You mnst perceive that by 
postponing an answer your published report is allowed to go 
down to history as true. I cannot conceive that you desire to 
perpetrate such an injustice, for though it may ruin me, it cannot 
redound to your credit. If you will investigate the case I am 
sure you will discover the errors of your report and correct them ; 
but if I am thus to suffer by sixty and ninety days' delay, 1 must 
claim a court at once. I send you herewith an abstract of such 
parts of your report as refer to my division, with my remarks 
annexed, to which I invite your attention." f 

In that abstract the quotations already given from General 
Johnston's report are made by General Huger ; and he adds the 
following ^^ remarks'''' : 

" Appended hereto are the instructions — two letters from 
Genei'al Johnston to Major-General Muger. [These letters have 
already been given.] No mention is made in them that General 
Longstreet had the direction of operations upon the right, and it 
will be seen from these letters that the plan of attack was not 
communicated to him [Huger]. He, the senior officer present, 
was deprived of the position due to his rank and kept in igno- 
rance of the troops he was to act with. General Longstreet's 
troops were not in position to conimeuce operations by 8 a. M.,and 
General Longstreet makes no mention of the delay [caused] by the 
rain of tlie previous night. When General Longstreet's troops 
moved to support General Hill's attack, General Huger's division 
[two brigades of it] moved down the Charles City road at the 
same time with three brigades of General Longstreet's division. 
This report conveys the impression tliat the brigades of General 
Huger's division were not present at all, whereas they [except 

* Not found in oflBcial records. 

t " Official Records," Vol. XL, Part I., p. 935. 



74 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Malione's brigade, which for several hours had already been far 
out on the Charles City road], moved to their position with three 
brigades of General Longstreet's division. This statement [con- 
veying the impression that Huger's division was not present at 
all] is not sustained by the above facts. To the last paragraph 
[quoted from Johnston's report] I have only to say that if it 
[Huger's division] did not go into action by four o'clock it was 
because General Longstreet did not require it, as it was in position 
and awaiting his orders. . . ."* 

On the 21st of September, General Huger wrote to President 
Davis: "I send you herewith an extract of such portions of 
General J. E. Johnston's published report of the battle of Seven 
Pines as refer to my division, with my remarks appended. As 
General Johnston does not seem disposed to investigate the sub- 
ject, and shields himself by endeavoring to make General Long- 
street responsible for his statements, I have to request that you 
direct General Johnston to prefer charges against me for the 
negligence he attributes to me, and we then be examined by a 
court-martial. If this cannot be done, I ask a court of inquiry to 
examine into the facts. I am entitled to this protection to my 
reputation and this justice to the troops I command." 

On the 28th of September, President Davis placed the follow- 
ing indorsement on the above letter : 

" Secretary of War will communicate a copy of this applica- 
tion to General Johnston, that he may, if he chooses to do so, put 
liis statement in the exact form of charges and specilications, and 
should he decline to adopt that course, the request of General 
Huger, presented as an alternative, will be granted, and a court of 
inquirj^ ordered as soon as the state of the public service will 
permit." 

On the 2d of October the Secretary of War wrote to General 
Johnston : 

" I have the honor to inclose for your attention copies of a 
letter addressed to the President by General Huger, and of the 
indorsement made thereon by the President." 

To which General Johnston replied on the 4th of October : 

* "Official Records," Vol. XL, Part I., p. 937. 



ALLEGED SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HUGEk's DIVISION. 75 

" I liave just had the honor to receive your letter of the 2d 
instant. I have no disposition to prefer charges against Major- 
Genei'al Huger. The passage in my report of which he com- 
plains was written to show that the delay in commencing the 
.action of May 31 was not by my fault. Permit me to suggest 
that there can be no full investigation of this matter without 
Major-General Longstreet's participation. 

" Major-General Huger's assertion that I ' shield myself by 
endeavoring to make General Longstreet responsible for my state- 
ments ' is utterly unfounded. He certainly knows that I cannot 
contradict that officer's report unless upon the weight of evidence 
against it. He makes no material contradiction of what I said of 
his troops. I say or imply that they arrived after 4 p. m. ; he, 
that they reached the ' designated point ' before 4 o'clock. 

" As to investigation, General Huger knows that his own 
course has made any other than that which has been had imprac- 
ticable. He knew that for several weeks after he read my report 
General Longstreet was near Richmond, yet he did not address 
me on the subject in question until that officer had joined the 
army in Northern Yirginia. When so addressed I wrote imme- 
diately, which General Huger did also. General Longstreet has 
lately replied to his letter. 

" I hope that the President will do me the favor to read the 
last two paragraphs." * 

On the 9th of October, President Davis placed the following 
indorsement on the above : 

" To Secretary of War — It may be that the expected answer 
of General Longstreet will enable General Johnston to relieve 
General Huger of the grievance presented by the latter. Should 
it be otherwise, his request for a court of inquiry will be com- 
plied with as soon as the state of the service will permit." 

The " expected answer of General Longstreet " is not found ; 
but whatever it may have been, it did not relieve General Huger 
of the " grievance " to which he was subjected by Generals 
Longstreet and Johnston. The indorsement placed by President 
Davis on General Johnston's letter of October 4, 1862, was the 

* " Official Records," Vol. XL, Part I., p. 938. 



76 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

last official action in the case. The President did not order the 
court of inquiry; and the letter of General Johnston, just referred 
to, was all the " redress " accorded to General Huger, in response 
to liis appeal to President Davis for " protection " against 
injustice. 

Tlie failure — practical refusal — of President Davis to permit 
a legal investigation in this case resulted in leaving Huger under 
the very severe censure contained in the published official reports 
of Generals Lougstreet and Johnston. The " papers " in the 
case remained on file in the Confederate War office — andllnger's 
statements were not made public until tliey came out in the 
" Official Records " published l)y the United States War Depart- 
ment. 

If President Davis had permitted an inquiry to be made by 
a court of competent jurisdiction, the written instructions given 
by General Johnston to General Huger would have shown the 
court that Huger was not ordered " to make a strong flank move- 
ment around the left of the enemy's position and attack him in 
rear of that flank," as stated in the official report of General 
Longstreet. Those instructions would have shown, too, that 
General Huger was not ordered " to move down the Charles 
City road in order to attack in flank the troops who might be 
engaged with Hill and Longstreet;" as stated in General John- 
ston's official report. Huger was instructed : " If you find no 
strong body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill ; 
but then a strong reserve should be retained to cover our 
right." 

The court could hardly have failed to find that, whilst Huger 
was delayed in leaving his camp by a sudden freshet in Gilliss 
creek; which, at daylight, was a raging torrent; Longstreet's 
division reached Huger's camp between 7 and 8 a. m., took pre- 
cedence of Huger's division, and still farther materially delayed 
the latter. Between 10 and 11 a. m,, by authority from General 
Johnston, Longstreet took control of Huger and of the move- 
ments of Huger's division. From that time Huger cheerfully 
and promptly obeyed every order he received from Longstreet. 

After both of these divisions had crossed Gilliss creek, 
Mahone's brigade, of Huger's division, was sent well out on the 



ALLEGED SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HUGEr's DIVISION. 77 

Charles City road, and remained there nntil June 1. The two 
other brigades of Huger's division and three brigades of Long- 
street's division were retained near the junction of the Charles 
City and Williamsburg roads until 3.30 p. m. The disposition 
made of these five brigades by General Longstreet after that 
time will be described later. 

Whilst the facts submitted to President Davis by General 
Huger lay dormant in the archives of the Confederate War 
Department; subject to promulgation only by order of the Presi- 
dent or by act of Congress ; the official reports of Generals John- 
ston and Longstreet were widely published and. " allowed to go 
down to history as true," notwithstanding Huger's appeal for 
" protection " to his reputation and " justice " to the troops 
under his command. 

In illustration of the extent to which erroneous statements of 
Generals Longstreet and Johnston, in regard to Huger's instruc- 
tions have been incorporated in history, the following quotation 
is made from the writings of ex-President Davis. Although his 
attention had been specially called to the instructions given to 
Huger by General Johnston, it will be found that the ex-Presi- 
dent accepts as true General Longstreet's incorrect version of the 
oixlers given by General Johnston for the movements of Huger's 
division. It will be seen, too, that whilst he ignores all that 
General Huger said in reference to the " delays " and the causes 
thereof, the ex-President introduces explanations and excuses for 
Huger's " dilatoriness " that have little or no foundation. In 
attempting, at this late day, to exonerate General Huger, the ex- 
President differs from Generals Johnston and Longstreet. He 
offers "some explanation," whilst they adhere to their unqualified 
censure. 

Ex-President Davis says :* " The reference made without 
qualification, in General Longstreet's report, to the failure of 
General Huger to make the attack expected of him . 
renders it proper that some explanation should be given of an 
apparent dilatoriness on the part of that veteran soldier 

* See " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 125. 
Published 1881. 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



It will be remembered that General Huger was to move by the 
Charles City road, so as to turn the left of the enemy and attack 
him in flank. The extraordinary rain of the previous night 
had swollen every rivulet to the dimensions of a stream, and the 
route prescribed to General Huger was one especially affected by 
that heavy rain, as it led to the head of the White Oak Swamp. 
The bridge ov^er the stream flowing into that swamp had been car- 
ried away, and the alternative presented to him was to rebuild 
the bridge or leave his artillery. He chose the former, which 
involved the delay that has subjected him to criticism. If any 
should think an excuse necessary to justify this decision, they are 
remanded to the accepted military maxim, that the march must 
never be so hurried as to arrive unfit for service. . . . To 
show that the obstacles encountered were not of such slight char- 
acter as energy would readily overcome, I refer to the report of 
. . . Brigadier-General Kodes." 

The latter commanded a brigade of D. H. Hill's division, in 
observation on the Charles City road, three and one-half miles 
from the point on the Williamsburg road from which it had 
been determined to start D. II. Hill's columns of attack. Mr. 
Davis quotes Kodes's report : " ' The progress of the brigade was 
considerably delayed by the washing away of a bridge near the 
head of White Oak Swamp, by reason of which the men had to 
wade in water waist deep, and a large number were entirely sub- 
merged. At this point the character of the crossing was such 
that it was absolutely necessary to proceed with great caution to 
prevent the loss of both ammunition and life.' "' 

Mr. Davis adds : " General Huger's line of march was fur- 
ther to the right, therefore nearer to White Oak Swamp, and the 
impediments consequently greater than where General Rodes 
found the route so diflicult as to be dangerous even to infantry." 

The only stream that delayed Huger's movements was Gilliss 
creek, on the banks of which his division was encamped on the 
night of the 30th, near the eastern suburb of Hichmond, not far 
north of the point where the Williamsburg road leaves the city. 
Gilliss creek flows into James river within the city limits. The 
accounts make no reference to the washing away or the rebuild- 
ing of a bridge for the passage of artillery over that stream. 



ALLEGED SLOW M0VP:MENT8 OF HUGEr's DIVISION. 79 

The causes of delay at this crossing, and the movements of 
Huger's division, previous to 3.30 p. m., have already been stated. 
It is now proposed to show, from the official record, the disposi- 
tion made of Huger's division by General Long-street after that 
time. It will be borne in mind that Mahone's brigade of Hu- 
ger's division had already been sent out on the Charles City road 
to the point previously occupied by Rodes's brigade, and remained 
there until June 1. Mahone's orders were " to cover our right " 
and guard against the approach of the enemy, on that road, from 
the White Oak Bridge. Huger's division was composed of three 
brigades only. There are two brigades still to be accounted for. 

General Cadmus M. Wilcox commanded three of the six 
brigades of which Longstreet's division was composed. In his 
official report to General Longstreet General Wilcox, after stating- 
that his command was halted near the junction of the Williams- 
burg and Charles City roads until 3.30 p. m., adds : 

" I was then ordered to move with three brigades, my own, 
Colston's and Pryor's, on the Charles City road, in rear of a part 
of Huger's division (Blanchard's and Armistead's brigades) as a 
support to these troops ; this order was soon modified and my 
three brigades ordered to precede Huger's. Having passed 
Huger's brigades, the march was continued but a short time, 
when orders were again received, and this time to countermarch 
to the Williamsburg road and follow on in rear of the troops 
then advancing. The brigades had retraced their steps near one 
mile, and orders were again given to face about and march down 
the Charles City road, and to keep abreast with the firing then 
heard raging furiously off to our left front, and known to be on 
the Williamsburg road. Again orders were received in wi'iting 
to move across to the Williamsburg road, following country 
roads and paths through woods and fields, a guide being furnished 
to conduct the command. The intervening distance between the 
two roads was low and flat, and in many places covered with water, 
and at one point waist-deep. The march was of necessity very 
slow. It was about 5 p. m. when the head of the column reached 
the Williamsburg road." 

General Wilcox's i-eport shows farther that only three com- 
panies of the leading regiment of these five brigades reached the 



80 BA.TTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

front in time to take part in the fighting. The remainder of this 
column of five brigades, from the Charles City road, under 
Longstreet's ordei's, were not in close action that day. Thi'ee of 
these brigades were in Longstreet's own division ; and, by his 
order, they had been placed in front of Huger's two brigades. 

From General Wilcox's report it is seen that the route fol- 
lowed by Huger's troops from the Charles City road to the Will- 
iamsburg road was to the left of that by which liodes's brigade 
marched to its position in D. H. Hill's line of battle ; not to the 
right of Rodes's route, as stated by Mr. Davis. It is also clear 
that the whole " bridge scene," as described by Mr. Davis, includ- 
ing the " alternative " and his application of the " accepted 
military maxim," are fictions of imagination. Whereas, Huger's 
proper and complete defense against the severe censure to which 
he has been so long unjustly subjected, is found in well estab- 
lished facts, many of which were plainly stated in the documents 
which accompanied his application to President Davis for the 
appointment of a court of incpiirj'. 

General Longstreet's letter^ June 7, 1862, addressed to Gen- 
eral Johnston, seems to be the germ from which the official cen- 
sure of General Huger was evolved. In that letter Longstreet 
says : " Our ammunition was nearly exhausted when Whiting 
moved, and I could not therefore move on with the rush that 
we could had his movement been earlier.'' When Longstreet's 
note, complaining of Johnston's slowness, in moving Whiting, 
was written, not one of the six brigades in Longstreet's division 
had been put in action. Eight of the thirteen brigades under 
Longstreet's control were not put into the fight that day. Yet, 
he would have it believed that before 4 p. m. his ammunition was 
so nearly exhausted, " I could not, therefore, move on with the 
rush that we could.'' 

He adds : " I can't but help think that a display of his forces 
on the left flank of the enemy by General Huger would have 
completed the affair and given Whiting as easy and pretty a game 
as was ever had upon a battle-field." It is not quite clear that a 
''display" of Huger's "forces/' in the impracticable White Oak 
Swamp, " on the left flank of the enemy," would have " given 
Whiting an easy and pretty game," with Sumner north of Fair 



ALLEGED SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HUGEe's DIVISION. 81 

Oaks Station. But, if General Longstreet bad then really believed 
the " display " be speaks of wonldbave " completed tbe affair," — 
including Simmer, and sucli Federal re-enforcements as migbt be 
sent from tbe nortli side of tbe Cbickabominy — all tbat General 
Longstreet would bave bad to do, in order to test tbis matter, was 
to direct Huger to make tbat " display." Huger's division " was 
in position and awaiting " Longstreet's " orders." 

But tbe " display " tbeory, promulgated by General Long- 
street on tbe 7tb of June, is not in accord witb bis action on tbe 
31st of May, in placing tbree brigades of bis own division on tbe 
Cbarles City road, in order to protect bis riglit flank, and marcb- 
ing and counter-marcbing tbese tbree brigades and two brigades 
of Huger's division up and down tbat road, near its junction witb 
tbe Williamsburg road, wbilst D. II. Hill's four brigades, aided 
only by one brigade of Longstreet's division, were desperately con- 
tending witb superior forces in fortified position near Seven Pines. 

But it seems tbat wbat Longstreet said in bis letter of June 7, 
and in bis official report, June 10, in regard to Huger's division, 
was accepted by General Jobnston as sufficient to prove tbat tbe 
" slow movements of General Huger's command "was tbe real 
cause of tbe failure of tbe Confederates to destroy Keyes's corps 
on tbe 31st of May. Tbis, too, wben Jobnston knew that five 
brigades of Longstreet's own division were not put in action tbat 
day, and that Huger was under Longstreet's control ! 

In making up their respective official reports, Generals Jobn- 
ston and Longstreet gave no bearing to Huger in regard to tbe 
operations of bis division ; and when Huger appealed to General 
Jobnston for justice, tbe latter adhered to all tbat be bad said in 
censure of Huger — declined to investigate tbe subject — discour- 
aged inquiry by a court — and said : " Tbe passage in my report 
of which be complains was written to show tbat tbe delay in 
commencing tbe action of May 31 was not by my fault " ! 

If General Jobnston bad then permitted tbe fact to be " gen- 
erally known '' tbat Longstreet " misunderstood " tbe direction 
in which bis own division was to move into action, there would 
bave been no occasion to say more in order to prove that this 
" misunderstanding '' caused " delay in commencing the action 
May 31." 
6 



82 BA.TTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Instead of saying : " Had " Huger's division " gone into 
action even at 4 o'clock the victory would have been more 
complete ; " General Johnson might well have said : Had Long- 
street put his ivliole division into action, even at 4 o^clocJe, 
Reyes's corps luould have been destroyed and the victory over 
McGlellanh left wing ivould have been complete. 

In spite of Longstreet's letter of June 7, and his official 
report, and the official report of General Johnston, and all that 
has been said and written by both of them in censure of Huger 
and Huger's division, the facts, now established, show, beyond 
doubt, that General Longstreet should be held responsible, under 
General Johnston, for the failure of the Confederates to destroy 
Keyes's corps at Seven Pines, on the 31st of May, 1862. 



FIGHTING NORTH OF FAIR OAKS STATION. 83 



CHAPTER lY. 

Contest Korth of Fair Oaks Station, May 31. 

The practical relation wliich this action bore to the fighting 
that day on the Williamsburg road, by D. H. Hill's division 
and R. H. Anderson's brigade of Longstreet's division, was, that 
the Federal re-enforcements, from the north side of the Chicka- 
hominy, did not reach their friends who were beaten in the vicin- 
ity of Seven Pines. Moreover, fonr regiments of infantry and a 
battery of artillery of Couch's division were cut off from the rest 
of that division and were not engaged against Longstreet. 

In addition, this contest, incidentally prevented one brigade 
of Kearney's division from joining Iveyes at a very critical time 
for the latter. The foregoing results were obtained by four 
brigades of the division under Whiting ; General Johnston hav- 
ing sent the other brigade of that division direct to the assistance 
of General Longstreet, who was then supposed to have met with 
greater opposition than the three divisions under his control could 
well overcome. 

Federal Accounts. — General McClellan, in his official report, 
says : " As soon as firing was heard at headquarters, orders were 
sent to General Sumner to get his command under arms and be 
ready to move at a moment's warning. ... At 1 o'clock 
General Sumner moved the two divisions to their respective 
bridges, with instructions to halt and await further orders. At 
2 o'clock orders were sent from headquarters to cross these 
divisions without delay and push them rapidly to General Heint- 
zelman's support. This order was received and communicated at 
2.30 o'clock, and the passage was immediately commenced." 

General Sumner, in his oflicial report, says: "At 1 p. m., 
while stationed with my corps dhirmte at Tyler's, I received an 
order from the commanding general to be in readiness to move 



S4: BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

at a moment's notice. ... At 2.30 o'clock p. m., I received 
tlie order to cross the river and support Heintzelman. The 
cohimns immediately moved over the river and marched rapidly 
to the field. . . . On arriving on the field I found General 
Couch with four regiments and two companies of infantry and 
Brady's battery. The troops were drawn up in line near Adams's 
house, and there was a pause in the battle." 

General Sedgwick, in his ofiicial report, says : " Upon de- 
bouching into the open field, near Adams's house, we found 
Abercrombie's brigade, of Couch's division, sustaining a severe 
attack and hard pushed by the enemy." 

General Couch, in his official report, after stating that " in 
twenty minutes" from the time Rippey and ITeill were cut up, 
the enemy had passed over the road leading to his centre, cutting 
off the advance at Fair Oaks, adds : " At this moment Cap- 
tain Yan Ness, brigade quartermaster to General Abercrombie 
[the commander of the troops guarding the depot of supplies at 
Fair Oaks Station], volunteered to notify General Sumner of our 
situation. After making demonstrations to cut through and re- 
join the main body, it was abandoned as suicidal. At the same 
time large masses of the enemy were moving across the railroad 
to the front and right with the intention of inclosing us. There- 
fore, with General Abercrombie, four regiments, the battery and 
[thirty-five] prisoners, we moved off toward the Grapevine 
Bridge for half a mile, and took a position facing Fair Oaks. 
Soon Captain Yan ]^ess brought me word that General Sumner 
was at hand. Upon receiving the information, word was sent to 
Generals Heintzelman and Keyes, that my position would be held 
until General Sumner arrived. This noble soldier came on 
rapidly with Sedgwick's division, and when the head of his 
column was seen half a mile distant, I felt that God was with us 
and victory ours." 

General Birney, in his official report, says : " Captain Brady, 
of the artillery, now rode up to me and said that he came from 
General Couch, who sent word that his command had been cut 
off ; that he had found a road by which to extricate his artillery 
through the swamp, and if I could hold the railroad and prevent 
the enemy from cutting him off, he could extricate himself. I 



FIGHTING NORTH OF FAIR OAKS BTATION. 85 

sent him word that I had been sent to his support, and would and 
could hold the railroad. At this time (about 6 o'clock) Captain 
Suydam, of General Keyes's staff, rode up to me and told me 
that General Ileintzelman ordered me to advance still up the rail- 
road. ... I at once made disposition to move forward. 
. . . When mj lines reached the woods near Fair Oaks 
Station, an oblique artillery fire from the right across my front 
commenced. To advance would have subjected me to this fire, 
and supposing that it was General Sumner who had crossed and 
was advancing, I sent successively three aides to report to him 
my position [and] instructions, and to ask orders. The orders 
from him were to connect with General French, commanding his 
left, and advance pari pas.m. He also sent the Seventh Massa- 
chusetts, Colonel Russell, to report to me in order to strengthen 
my command, as the position held by me was important." 

French's brigade did not reach the field until after dark. Bir- 
ney's brigade was not in action that day ; but there can be no 
reasonable doubt that it would have taken part in the fighting 
against Colonel Jenkins's forces late that afternoon but for the fact 
that Couch was held cut off by the Confederates, under Whiting, 
who advanced on the Nine-miles road. 

General Abercrombie, after stating that he fell back about 
half a mile north of the station, says that he " formed line of 
battle, the Thirty-first Pennsylvania [on the west of the road] 
nearest the house, behind a low rail fence, in the rear of a piece 
of woods. Two companies of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania and 
First United States Chasseurs [Sixty-fifth JSIew York Infantry] 
were posted on the right of the Thirty-first Pennsylvania. The 
other troops on the ground at the time were the Sixty-second 
New York and Seventh IMassachusetts, and a section of Brady's 
battery, formed on the left [east] of the road. The other section 
of Brady's battery was placed on the riglit of my command." 

General Sedgwick says : " The First Minnesota, Colonel Sully, 
the leading regiment, was, by request of General Couch, approved 
by General Sumner, promptly formed into line of battle under 
a very sharp fire, and posted on the right of Abercrombie's brigade. 
. . . The remainder of Gorman's brigade, led by him in per- 
son, and composed of the Thirty-fourth and Eighty-second New 



86 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

York, supported by the Fifteenth Massachusetts, formed on the 
left of Abercrombie's brigade. . . . Lieutenant Kirby 
brought his battery into action in a most gallant and spirited 
manner. . . . Generals Burns and Dana were promptly on 
hand — the former with his whole brigade, the latter with two of 
his regiments. . . . General Dana with the two regiments 

. . was ordered to form in column of attack to the rear and 
left of Kirby's battery, but before the order could be executed it 
became necessary to push him to the front, where he went im- 
mediately into action on the left of Gorman's brigade. . . . 
General Burns with two regiments took post on the right of 
Colonel Sully, holding his other two in reserve. It was not the 
fortune of any of the regiments in this brigade to meet the enemy 
[that day] at close quarters." 

Lieutenant-Colonel Nevin, commanding the Sixty-second 
New York, of Peck's brigade, states that' the regiment marched 
from Couch's line at Seven Pines to Fair Oaks Station. He 
describes a movement from that point to feel the enemy approach- 
ing on the railroad, and adds : " AVe wxre then ordered to move 
up the road leading north from the station to a clump of woods. 

. . We discovered the enemy emerging from the woods on 
the west of us. . . . They tiled along the railroad to the 
open space, when the enemy formed in line of battle, advanced 
at double-quick, when our late Colonel ordered the regiment to 
file out of the woods by the left flank. As soon as the enemy 
saw our colors they opened fire upon our regiment. AVe were 
immediately formed in line of battle by the Colonel to the rear 
of Ricketts's * and Brady's batteries. Shortly after forming in 
line, Colonel J. Lafayette Piker was killed while gallantly cheer- 
ing on his men to save the battery." 

This regiment remained in support of the battery until the 
action ended. There seems to have been no ofiicial report of 
that day's operations made by Colonel Pussell, the commander 
of the Seventh Massachusetts, of Devens's brigade. It supported 
the batteries until sent by General Sumner to aid General Birney 
on the railroad. Two regiments of Burns's brigade remained in 
position, supporting the batteries until the action was over. 

* Commanded by Lieutenant Edmund Kirby. 



FIGHTING NOKTH OF FAIR OAKS STATION. 87 

The official reports of the Federal general officers give great 
credit to the artillery in this action. Lieutenant Edmund Kirby, 
commanding Light Battery I, First United States Artillery, says : 
" I was ordered by General Sumner to place the battery [six pieces] 
in position, the right resting on a strip of woods and the left about 
seventy yards from Adams's house, facing nearly south and 
toward Fair Oaks Station. The enemy advanced through an 
open field, and were about 1,000 yards from the battery when 
I commenced tiring with spherical case and shell. They imme- 
diately tried to cover themselves in the woods on my right. 

. . I ordered shell and spherical case to be fired until the 
enemy were within 500 yards of my right flank, when I 
opened with canister. The enemy now pi'epared to charge my 
right. I advanced the left of the battery. They came down a 
road which was on my right when the firing commenced, and 
when they emerged from the woods found themselves directly in 
front of the battery instead of on the right, as they expected, and 
were consequently subjected to a tremendous fire of canister from 
five * light twelve-pounder guns, which they were unable to 
stand. They retreated in disorder into the woods. . . . Dur- 
ing the entire action the enemy kept up a continuous fire of 
musketry upon us, but fortunately most of their balls too high, 
as the caissons and limbers were well covered by an elevation 
upon which the pieces were placed. During the battle I made a 
complete change of front to the right, and at no time had more 
than five pieces engaged. ... I claim that we are indebted 
in no small extent for the success of the day to the personal 
bravery and efficiency of the officers, non-commissioned officers, 
and privates of Light Company I, First Artillerj^" 

Captain James Brady, Battery H, First Pennsylvania Reserve 
Artillery, in his official report, says : " The left section . . . 
was particularly noticed for the rapidity and effectiveness of its 
fire, repulsing the head of the enemy's column as it frequently 
appeared emerging from the wood charging on the battery. 
This section, after exhausting canister, played upon the enemy's 
lines wnth spherical case and shell without fuse, bursting the shell 

* " In the meantime one trail had broken after the fourth discharge, render- 
ing the piece useless." See Kirby's report. 



bo BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

as it left the gun. . . . The right section, held under mj 
immediate command, moved down to support the centre in time 
to check a charge of the enemy in that direction, and was, the 
next moment, ordered to the support of Colonel Sully, First 
Minnesota. . . . AYe opened, throwing shell and spherical 
case without fuse, exploding in the enemy's lines and crushing 
his flank, causing them to retire, leaving their dead and wounded 
officers and soldiers on the field." 

General Burns, in his official report, says : " Before my 
brigade had completely formed, the enemy opened on the right 
of the first line. I received an order from General Sedgwick to 
throw two of my regiments perpendicularly to the right [these 
regiments faced nearly west] to prevent the enemy from turning 
our right flank and getting to our line of communications, which 
they seemed inclined to do. . . . Night aj)proacliing and the 
enemy being driven back [in his attack on the batteries] the 
battle ceased." 

Colonel Sully, commanding the First IVIinnesota, Gorman's 
brigade, in his official report, says : " On reaching the field of 
action, I found . . . that General Couch's division were 
hard pressed by an overwhelming force of the rebels. I here 
met the latter general, and was informed by him that the enemy 
in strong force were marching to outflank him on the right, and 
as I was ahead of the rest of the division some distance, not 
waiting for the commander of my troops, I moved rapidly to the 
right, about a quarter of a mile ; . . . and charging across 
the field, took my position in an oblique direction, my right 
resting on a farm-house, my left on the edge of a woods. The 
enemy o^Dened on us, but fired too high. Soon after the First 
Chasseurs [Sixty-fifth I^ew York], formed on my left. . . . 
The enemy left the field in front, and forming in the woods on 
my left, opened a severe fire on us. . . . Two pieces were 
sent late in the evening to my assistance, under command of 
Captain Brady, and did good execution.'' Colonel Sully's regi- 
ment faced nearly west. 

Colonel John Cochrane, Sixty-fifth 'New York, says : " By 
order of General Abercrombie, the regiment took position in 
front of a belt of woods through which the enemy's forces were 



FIGHTESTG NORTH OF FAIR OAKS STATION. b\) 

approaching. Our riglit rested on the left of Colonel Sully's 
Minnesota regiment, and our left on the right of the Thirty-first 
Pennsylvania. The men took their places immediately behind the 
rail fence by which the wood was skirted, and the enemy coming 
in sight, opened their fire upon them at about twenty-five yards 
distance. The fire continued tw^o and a half hours, and until the 
enemy was effectually repulsed. During this time the fire of the 
men was steady, continuous and accurate, as I have reason to sup- 
pose from the very numerous dead found subsequently in the 
front of our lines. . . . The regiment slept on their arms 
that night in their position." Colonel Cochrane's regiment and 
the regiment on his left faced nearlj^ south. 

Colonel Williams, commanding the Thirty-first Pennsylvania, 
says : " We were posted in a well-chosen position behind a low 
rail fence, an open field in our rear and a wood in front, when the 
enemy appeared so suddenly and with such impetuosity that our 
skirmishers could scarcely regain their position in the battalion. 
The enemy first opened fire, but was met with such a withering vol- 
ley that his next attempt was made wnth more caution and delibera- 
tion but no better success. His ranks were renewed with fresh 
troops, which repeatedly charged to within twenty yards of our 
lines, but no valor or impetuosity could withstand the steady and 
well-directed fire of our men. As the enemy withdrew to form 
his shattered lines our fire was slackened, to be renewed with 
undiminished severity as he approached. The conflict was sus- 
tained for nearly two hours, when the enemy withdrew on the 
approach of night. . . . Our men slept upon their arms in 
the ranks where the battle had been fought." 

General Gorman says : " The Thirty-fourth New York^ 
Fifteenth Massachusetts and Eighty-second New York were 
formed upon the left of a portion of General Couch's position 
and Kirby's battery. . . . We had not remained longer than 
ten minutes in position before heavy columns of the enemy 
dashed heavily upon us, evidently attempting to take Kirby's 
battery. . . . The engagement became general from one end 
of our line to the other, the enemy pushing forward with the 
most wonderful determination, while I steadily advanced the 
brigade, from time to time, until we came to a distance of fifty 



90 BATTLE OF 8EYEN PINES. 

yards, wlien General Sumner (being present with mj brigade) 
directed me to charge the enemy with the bayonet. . . . 
The men threw themselves at double-quick headlong upon the 
enemy, the Thirty-fourth New York somewhat in the advance 
on the left and in perfect line, the Eighty-second New York on 
the right, the Fifteenth Massachusetts supporting the centre. I 
halted the Eighty-second New York and Fifteenth Massachu- 
setts before they entered the w^oods, but the Thirty-fourth New 
York plunged into the thicket some fifty paces before I could 
halt them. A further advance would have imperiled their left 
flank." 

Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson, commanding the Eighty -second 
New York, says : '' In company with the Thirty-fourth [New 
York], we were at once marched double-quick to support the 
battery [Kirby's] and took our position with the battery on our 
right, the Thirty-fourth on our left. At this time the enemy 
had charged to within about forty or fifty rods of the battery, 
and received a most terrific fire from my command, which 
evidently staggered him and caused him to fall back witli heavy 
loss. Again and again did he renew his eft'orts to take our 
position, but every time repulsed with heavy loss. In company 
with the Thirty-fourth New York and Fifteenth Massachusetts 
we pressed forward, filing as we advanced, and finally drove him 
from the field at the point of the bayonet, and darkness closing 
about us, we rested on our arms, the Fifteenth Massachusetts 
advancing in front of us on the edge of the timber when the 
enemy liad retreated.'' 

Colonel Suiter, Thirty-faurth New York, says, " We arrived 
on this field about 5.30 p. m. I immediately formed my com- 
mand in line, its right near the house on the high ground and ex- 
tending thence easterly along a post-and-rail fence toward the 
wood in that direction ; . . . about this time we heard volleys 
of musketry on the westerly side of the house. I was ordered to 
forward in line over the fence and then formed on the right into 
line. While I was executing the last-mentioned movement the 
right of my line received heavy volleys of musketry from the 
direction of the woods on the west side of the house, which was 
returned by my command as it arrived on the line. The Eighty- 



FIGHTING NORTH OF FAIR OAKS STATION. 91 

second JSTew York wheeled into line on my right, its n'ght rest- 
ing upon and supporting the battery, its left on my right. The 
firing became general along the whole line and continued so for 
some time ; the enemy several times emerged from the woods? 
evidently with the intention of charging upon and capturing the 
guns above mentioned, but were as often repulsed and driven 
back. About 7.30 o'clock the enemy were seen to file out of the 
woods on the west, evidently with the intention of outflanking and 
turning our left. About this time the Twentieth Massachusetts 
[of Dana's brigade] wheeled- into line in continuation of ours and 
on our left. A few well-directed volleys repulsed the enemy at this 
point and drove them back under cover of the woods ; about a 
quarter of 8 o'clock I was ordered to charge the enemy with the 
bayonet in the woods, which they [his regiment] did in good 
order, pouring into them a withering and deadly fire as they 
charged, the eoeiny standing their ground till my command 
mounted the fence on the skirt of the woods, when they broke 
and ran in great confusion ; we followed them about twenty rods 
when we lost sight of them in the darkness ; I was ordered to 
withdraw my command, which I did, and formed it in the field 
just outside of the woods, where we rested for the night." 

Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball, commanding the Fifteenth Mas- 
sachusetts, says, " I arrived on the field about 5 o'clock. . . . 
I immediately formed line of battle in rear of the Eighty-second 
New York. I had scarcely given the order to rest when a sharp 
fire of musketry commenced upon Kirby's battery, stationed a 
short distance to my right ; I was ordered to go to the support of 
that battery. ... I immediately formed line of battle in 
rear of that battery, and remained in that position some time. 
. . . I was ordered to move by the left flank and to come into 
the rear and left of the Eighty-second New York, and then to 
move forward at double-quick, passing their line to the front, 
and to occupy and hold the wood from which the enemy were 
being driven. My orders were promptly obeyed, the men charg- 
ing bayonets into the woods with a terrific 3'ell. I established 
my line by your command near the edge of the wood, throwing 
out pickets in front. The men rested upon their arms until 
morning.'' 



92 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

General Dana says, upon reaching the field with tlie Seventh 
Michigan and Twentieth Massachusetts, " I received an order from 
you [Sedgwick] to form my command in columns of divisions in 
rear of Kirby's battery. ... I was carrying this order into 
execution when I received one from General Sumner to form in 
line of battle, and immediately afterward an order to prolong the 
first line of battle, already formed, by extending on the left of it, 
and immediately to engage the enemy." 

Gorman's line, the left of which Dana was to prolong, was 
then facing nearly west, its right near Kirby's battery. General 
Dana adds : "Ko sooner was my position taken in line [on the 
left of Gorman] than I discovered the rebel force in a slight 
valley in front, where he found a little cover, extending his right 
so as to outflank our force, and my arrival was not a moment too 
early. After replying to his first volley, I immediately advanced 
at double-qnick, dislodging him and compelling him to take 
to cover of woods about 150 yards in his rear. Halting 
a moment to reform my line, I advanced again to force 
him through the woods with the bayonet. We received only a 
scattering fire from him until we came within fifty yards of the 
wood (it being then dark) when we were again met with a full 
volley. At this time I compelled the Seventh Michigan, which 
was on the left, to cease its fire, changed its front a little to meet 
a corresponding change of the enemy, and then ordered a fire by 
company, which was well executed in volleys. This closed the 
action for the day, and we lay on our arms where we stood for 
the night." 

Colonel Lee, of the Twentieth Massachusetts, says : " Con- 
ducted by a brigade staff officer we proceeded to the left, where 
the battalion came into line of battle, forming on the right of 
the Michigan Seventh. . . . We opened a rapid and effective 
fire, maintained only a few moments . . . when, in compli- 
ance with orders from General Dana, simultaneously with the 
infantry battalion on our right [the Thirty-fourth ISTew York], 
and the Michigan Seventh on our left, the line rushed forward 
with loud cheers. ... It was now getting quite dark and the 
enemy soon ceased firing. . . . We occupied the field on 
which we halted after the last movement to the front, all night 



FIGHTING NORTH OF FAIR OAKS STATION. 93 

under arms, engaged mainly in securing prisoners and collecting 
and providing as best we could for the enemj's wounded, who 
were numerous, and scattered on the field around us.'' Among 
the wounded prisoners he mentions Brigadier-General Pettigrew. 

Thus, the Federal accounts show that the fighting continued 
until dark, at which time Kirby's battery faced west instead of 
south, without having otherwise changed position during the 
action. The three regiments of Gorman's brigade, which were in 
the beginning on the left of the batteries, and facing south, now 
faced nearly west, their right being still on the left of the 
batteries. Dana's two regiments prolonged Gorman's line, and 
extended nearly to the railroad a little east of Fair Oaks Station. 
The two regiments that were on the right of Kirby's battery, and 
facing nearly south when the action commenced, had not changed 
position. Sully's regiment and two of Burns's were still on the 
right, facing nearly west. 

The Federal losses on this field were 468. Of which 342 were 
in Sedgwick's division, viz. : Gorman's brigade, 196 ; Burns's 
brigade, 35, and Dana's brigade, 111. In the four "■cut-off" 
regiments of Couch's division, 115 ; and in the two batteries, 11. 

From the foregoing, it is clear that the oj^portune arrival of 
Federal re-enforcements under Sumner, from the nortli side of 
the Chickahominy, at a point about 1,000 yards north of Fair 
Oaks Station, saved Couch's four regiments and battery. But 
these re-enforcements did not reach Heintzelman and Keyes, 
by whom tliey were so greatly needed when Kearney was forced 
to retreat through the White Oak Swamj), and Heintzelman and 
Keyes were desperately contending against Colonel Jenkins until 
dark, on the Williamsburg road, east of Seven Pines. These 
re-enforcements, being thus prevented from joining the friends 
they were sent to aid, the question arises : What would have been 
the probable result to Heintzelman and Keyes — who were badly 
beaten by five brigades — if Longstreet had promptly put into the 
fight the five brigades of his own division, which were not in 
action that day. 

Confederate Accounts. — It is greatly to be regretted that neither 
General Whiting, nor any of the brigade or regimental commanders 
under him, made a report in regard to the operations of their 



94 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

respective commands. The circumstances under which my 
official report was made have ah-eadj been stated. 

Wlien General Johnston hurriedly left his headquarters near 
Okl Tavern to direct the movement from tliat point " against the 
right flank of Longstreet's adversaries," he ordered me to have 
Hampton's and Hatton's brigades brought up at once, and imme 
diately follow the three leading brigades. I was soon informed 
that Hampton and Hatton were in motion. I then joined Generals 
Johnston and Whiting in the advance. At that time the troops 
had just passed McLaws's pickets, and were receiving the fire of 
the Federal skirmish line, from rifle-pits in the edge of the woods, 
on the eastern side of the large open field. General Johnston had 
ordered Hood's brigade to bear to the right and go direct to 
Longstreet's assistance ; whilst Whiting's brigade and Pettigrew's 
continued along, and on either side of, the Nine-miles road. I 
remained with Generals Johnston and Whiting in rear of the 
leading brigade, Whiting's, until we reached a point on the Nine- 
miles road about three-fourths of a mile from Fair Oaks Station, 
from which a wood road branched otf towards the north. I 
remained at that point until the rear of Pettigrew's brigade 
passed me. ^rom that time I did not see either General Johnston 
>- General Whiting until after dark. 

The former, in his official report, says : " Major-General 
Smith's division moved forward at 4 o'clock, Whiting's three 
brigades leading. Their progress was impeded by the enemy's 
skirmishers, which, wnth their supports, were driven back to the 
railroad. At this point Whiting's own and Pettigrew's brigades 
engaged a superior force of the enemy ; Hood's, by my order, 
moved on to co-operate with Longstreet. General Smith was 
desired to hasten up with all the troops within reach. He 
brought up Hampton's and Hatton's brigades in a few minutes. 
The strength of the enemy's position, however, enabled him to 
hold it until dark. About sunset, being struck from my horse 
severely wounded by a fragment of a shell, I was carried from 
the field, and Major-General G. W. Smith succeeded to the com- 
mand." 

In the Century Magazine^ May? 1885, General Johnston says : 
" On my way to Longstreet's left, to combine the action of the 



FIGHTING NORTH OF FAIB OAKS STATION. OS' 

two bodies of troops, I passed the head of General Smith's col- 
umn near Fair Oaks, and saw the camps of about a brigade in the 
angle between the Nine-miles road and the York River Railroad, 
and the rear of a column of infantry moving in quick time from 
that point towards the Chickahominy, by the road to Grapevine 
ford. A few minutes after this, a battery near the point where 
this infantry had disappeared commenced tiring upon the head 
of the Confederate column. A regiment sent against it was re- 
ceived with a volley of musketry, as well as canister, and recoiled. 
The leading brigade, commanded by Colonel Law, then ad- 
vanced, and so much strength was developed by the enemy that 
General Smith brought his other brigades into action on the left 
of Law's. An obstinate contest began, and was maintained on 
equal terms, although we engaged superior numbers on ground 
of their own choosing. I had passed the railroad a few hundred 
yards with Hood's brigade when the firing commenced, and 
stopped to see it terminated. But being confident that the enemy 
opposing us were those whose camp I had just seen, and there- 
fore only a brigade, I did not doubt that General Smith was more 
than strong enough to cope with them. Therefore, General 
Hood was directed to go on in such a direction as to connect his 
right with Longstreet's left and take his antagonists in flank. 
The direction of that firing was then nearlj' southwest from Fair 
Oaks. It was then about 5 o'clock. . . . It was nearly half- 
past 6 o'clock before I admitted to myself that Smith was engaged, 
not with a brigade, as I had obstinately thought, but with more 
than a division ; but I thought that it would be injudicious to 
engage Magruder's division, our only reserve, so late in the day.'' 

It is not deemed necessary to comment here upon what Gen- 
eral Johnston says about " Smith's column " : " General Smith 
brought his other brigades into action ; " "I did not doubt that 
General Smith was more than strong enough to cope with them;" 
" it was near half-past 6 o'clock before I admitted to myself 
that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade ;" and like expres- 
sions, conveying the distinct impression that I was that day in 
executive command of the division which bore my name. 

The following testimony of Captain George Lemmon,* Yol- 

* lu a letter dated San Francisco, April 13, 1884, addressed to me. G.W.S. 



96 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Tinteer Aide-de-Camp to General Hood, is of interest in connec- 
tion with the events of tliat afternoon. He says that when Hood's 
brigade, moving along the railroad, was closely approaching Fair 
Oaks Station, they " saw troops in front," " on the left, moving 
in the same direction." " General Hood ordered me to see what 
troops they were ; and, if they were onr men, to tell them not to 
fire into his brigade. As I got to them General Hood passed me, 
his horse at full gallop, and called out ' I am General Hood. Who 
are you V And they answered, ' Third Brigade, General.' He 
said, ' All right ; don't fire into my men.' '' The third brigade 
was Whiting's ow^n. 

Captain Lemmon's testimony shows that, in the vicinity of 
Fair Oaks Station, Hood's brigade was again close on the right of 
Whiting's. It was from that j)osition Hood was again directed 
by General Johnston " to go on " and " connect his right with 
Longstreet's left." Whilst Hood was moving under this order, 
the two wings of his brigade became separated — Colonel Archer 
of the Fifth Texas and another regiment getting separated from 
the two that were left with General Hood, with whom Captain 
Lemmon remained. He adds : " We pushed on . . . until 
we came to an open space where we found Colonel Archer with 
two recriments and several brigades, standing still in front of us 
in the same open space. General Hood asked , ' What troops are 
those ? ' and Archer replied, ' D. H. Hill's.' * Hood said, ' There 
is no use for us here ; . . . Captain Lemmon, take the First 
Texas and lead off to the left.' Colonel Rainey of the Fu-st 
Texas asked, ' What shall I do if I am fired on ? ' Hood replied, 
* Face to the firing and go in where it is heaviest ; you can 
make no mistake then.' . . . An order was passed from the 
right of the line to return. ... I found myself in the woods 
with darkness fast growing, under heavy fire and wounded men 
coming out who belonged to Whiting's brigade. Staying there 
until the firing ceased, I called for Colonel Rainey, when he arose 
some ten or fifteen feet from me. I asked him why he had not 
advanced to the firing ; and he told me he had done so, but other 

* These were the brigades of G. B. Anderson and Garland, that had been 
withdrawn from the second abatis and reformed in the clearing, and "after 
night " were ordered to take position in the woods west of the first abatis. 



FIGHTING NOKTH OF FAIR OAKS STATION. 97 

troops arose between liim and the enemy and he ordered his men 
down, not knowing but the enemy were firing into each other 
and not caring if they were. I told him that it was the Third 
Brigade in front of him and then led him back to General Hood. 
. . . "We then crossed the railroad and returned to the north 
side and laid the men down until General Whiting ordered Hood 
to move his men to the right, placing one regiment across the 
railroad." 

When Hood reached the edge of the open space around Casey's 
redoubt, D. H. Hill's troops had retired from the second abatis 
and Colonel Jenkins was fighting the right of " Longstreet's 
antagonists," on the Williamsburg road, east of Seven Pines, 
When Hood again reached Fair Oaks, it was about dark, and 
Whiting's brigade had just been beaten back. In fighting qualities 
Hood's brigade was equal to any in the Confederate Army. It 
is not proposed to speculate at any length upon what would have 
been the probable result of the contest north of Fair Oaks, if 
General Johnston had been less "obstinate " in the opinion that 
" Smith " was only contending with " a brigade " ; and had not 
ordered Hood from Fair Oaks Station " to go on," and in such a 
direction as to " connect his right with Longstreet's left." If 
Hood liad been recalled earlier, he would have come upon the 
field before dark ; in position to fall in full force upon Dana's 
left flank ; and would have materially disturbed the equanimity 
with which the five regiments that charged Whiting just before 
dark, laid on their arms that night. 

In reference to the attack Whiting made upon the batteries 
north of Fair Oaks, Colonel Frobel, in his letter to me, previously 
quoted, says : " Generals Johnston and Whiting were following 
immediately after Whiting's brigade. As Whiting's brigade 
reached the road near the railroad crossing, I was sent to halt 
it. On returning after doing this, I joined Generals Johnston 
and Whiting, who were riding toward the crossing. General 
Whiting was expostulating with General Johnston about taking 
the division across the railroad — insisting that the enemy were in 
full force on our left flank and rear. General Johnston replied 
' Oh ! General Whiting, you are too cautious.' At this time we 
reached the crossing and nearly at the same moment the enemy 
7 



98 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

opened an artillery lire from the direction pointed out by General 
Whiting. We moved back up the road near the small white house. 
Whiting's brigade was gone — it had been ordered forward to 
charge the batteries wliicli were firing on us. The brigade was 
repulsed, and in a few moments came streaming back through the 
little skirt of woods to the left of the ISTine-miles road near the 
crossing. There was only a part of the brigade in this charge. 
Pender soon rallied and reformed those on the edge of the woods. 
General Whiting sent an order to him to reconnoiter the batteries,. 
and if he thought they could be taken to try it again. Before 
he could do so some one galloped up, shouting ' charge that 
battery ! ' The men moved forwai'd at a double-quick, but were 
repulsed as before, and driven back to the woods. In the mean- 
time there was heavy fighting going on to the left ; Hatton's, 
Hampton's and Pettigrew's brigades having engaged the 
enemy in that direction. At this moment matters had 
become so critical on that portion of the field that, although not 
commanding the division, you had gone to Hampton's and Hatton's 
brigades and taken a personal supervision over their immediate 
line of battle. Hampton was wounded, Pettigrew wounded and 
a prisoner, and Hatton killed, and his brigade much demoralized. 
At this time I was ordered to bring up Hood. I found him to 
the right of the railroad, a little to the left of the Williamsburg 
road and not a great way from Seven Pines. By the time he 
reached the position indicated on the left of the railroad it wag 
nearly dark. I joined General Whiting and yourself in the little 
oat-field where the battle began, and about 200 yards from 
the place where General Johnston was wounded. Whiting's 
brigade still held the wood where [from which] they had made 
their first charge, and so did Hampton's, Hatton's and Pettigrew's 
brigades. You immediately set about reforming our lines." 

In my ofiicial, published, report it is stated that : 

" Between 4 and 5 o'clock heavy musketry was distinctly heard 
[by those near Old Tavern], and General Johnston directed General 
Whiting to move the three brigades then at that point by the 
Nine-miles road to Longstreet's assistance and the two brigades 
at Mrs. Christian's farm were oi'dered to move up, follow, and 



FIGHTING NORTH OF FAIR OAKS STATION. 99 

support them. All the generals and staff officers were at once 
occupied in impressing upo!i the troops the necessity of moving 
rapidly forward. . . . The troops, notwithstanding the 
mud and difficulties of the ground, moved forward in double- 
quick time ; . . . only anxious to find the enemy in force, 
who were still making resistance in front of Longstreet and Hill. 
Hood's brigade had crossed the railroad to the right of the Nine- 
miles road, part of Whiting's had also crossed, l*ettigrew close 
upon it, with Hatton's and Hampton's a short distance in rear, 
when a fire from two batteries of artillery opened upon the ad- 
vance brigade from a position on their left and rear. These 
batteries were supported by infantry, and the fire becoming 
troublesome, it was determined to take them, at the same time 
not giving up the forward movement in favor of Longstreet. 
. . I received from General Johnston instructions to 
move all the troops within reach forward as fast as possible. 
This order was at once transmitted to General Magruder, who 
caused all his troops [Griffith's brigade and two regiments] in that 
vicinity to be put in motion. General Johnston was at this 
time near the point where the Nine-miles road crosses the railroad. 
I was about half a mile farther back, and the batteries of the 
enemy, on the left, were in his rear, but in front of the position 
where I was. As soon as General Hampton came up I directed 
him to take a by-road through the woods leading to the left and 
front ; left orders for Hatton's brigade to come on by the main 
road, and moved forward to an open field upon the left hand side 
of the road. From this point I could, for the first time, see the 
relative positions of the batteries and the different brigades ; I 
soon learned that General Whiting's brigade was returning to 
attack the batteries ; that Pettigrew's brigade was also moving in 
that direction ; that Hampton had come upon it and had 
already attacked, and that the three brigadier-generals were all 
apprised of each other's relative positions ; and were acting in 
concert under Whiting's orders. The force of the enemy was not 
known, but it was confidently believed that we would soon cap- 
ture or drive off the batteries and resume our march in support of 
Longstreet. The musketry fire increased, and after a short time, 
becoming impatient of the delay, I rode across the open field to 



100 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

the woods where the troops were engaged, and there learned 
from Colonel [afterward Lieiitenant-General S. D.] Lee, [then] of 
the artillery, that General Hampton had driven the enemy some 
distance through the woods, but that they were being rapidly 
re-enforced and held a strong jjosition, either fortified or offering 
natural shelter, and were fast extending beyond Hampton's left. 
The firing indicated that Whiting's brigade and Pettigrew's were 
fully occupied by the enemy in their immediate front. Hatton's 
brigade had in the meantime come up and was formed in the 
edge of the field near the Nine-miles road. Colonel [C. E.] 
Lightfoot's regiment, of Pettigrew's brigade, was in the field in 
reserve. On learning from Colonel Lee the condition of affairs 
in Hampton's front, I immediately ordered Hatton's brigade and 
Lightfoot's regiment to move forward. ... I had not pro- 
ceeded far into the wood before meeting with General Hampton. 
In a few words he communicated to me the state of affairs, and 
instructions were at once given for putting the brigade of General 
Hatton and Colonel Lightfoot's regiment in close action. At 
the time they were already under a deadly fire in a dense, entangled 
wood, struggling through the morass, covered with logs and thick 
bushes. . . . Coming up with the front line of troops already 
engaged . . . [Hatton's brigade] commenced firing, advanc- 
ing upon tlie left to within fifteen or twenty yards of the line of 
fire of the enemy, which apparently came from the low bank of an 
old ditch, either a drain or the foundation of a fence. . . . 
Various attempts were made to charge the enemy, but without 
that concert of action almost absolutely necessary to success. . . . 
Our troops held their position close to the enemy's line until it 
was too dark to distinguish friend from foe. . . . The troops 
[on the line where 1 was] were withdi'awn from the wooded 
swamp, immediately in contact with the enemy, and bivouacked in 
the open field. . . . After leaving the wood I heard for the 
first time that General Johnston had been severely wounded and 
compelled to leave the field. This unfortunate casualty placed 
me, as second in rank, in command of the Army of Northern 
Virginia." 

General Hatton was killed just as his line reached Hampton's. 
A few minutes later General Hampton was severely wounded ; 



FIGHTING NORTH OF FAIK OAKS STATION. 101 

and I soon heard tliat General Pettigrew was wonnded — perhaps 
mortally. In this condition of affairs in that wood, I sent word 
to General Whiting that I would remain at the front and take 
executive control of that part of the line, thus enabling him to 
give exclusive attention to his right. Just before dark the only 
troops of Magruder's command that were within reach — when I 
transmitted General Johnston's order for them to be brought up 
— arrived upon the field ; but it was then too late to put them in 
action. 

The losses in G. W. Smith's division, under Whiting, on the 
31st of Ma}^ were 1,270. Of which 356 were in Whiting's 
brigade (under Law) ; 31:1 in Pettigrew's ; 329 in Hampton's ; 
and 244 in Ilatton's. The fact that the Confederate losses 
were more than 1,200, whilst the Federal losses were less than 
500, may be fairly attributed to the very effective fire of two 
Federal batteries in well-selected positions. The Confederates 
had no artillery on this field. 

As General Keyes seems to attach some importance to his 
statement that, in this battle, "The Confederates" were " led on 
and cheered by" "the President of their Republic," it may be 
well to refer to what the latter says in regard to the part he 
played at Seven Pines. In " The Rise and Fall of the Confederate 
Government," Yol. II., p. 123, ex-President Davis states that: 
*' When General Lee and I, riding down the Nine-miles road, 
reached the left of our line, we found the troops hotly engaged. 
Our men had driven the enemy from his advanced encampment, 
and he had fallen back behind an open field to the bank of the 
river, where, in a dense wood, was concealed an infantry line, 
with artillery in position. Soon after our arrival General John- 
ston, who had gone farther to the right, where the conflict was 
expected, and whither re-enforcement from the left was march- 
ing, was brought back severely wounded, and, as soon as an 
ambulance could be obtained, was removed from the field. Our 
troops on the left made vigorous assaults under most disadvan- 
tageous circumstances. They made several gallant attempts to 
carry the enemy's position, but were each time repulsed with 
heavy loss. After a personal reconnaissance on the left of the 
open in our front, I sent one, then another, and another courier 



102 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

to General Magruder, directing him to send a force down by tlie 
wooded patli, just under tlie bluff, to attack the enemy in flank 
and reverse. Impatient of delay, I had started to see General 
Magruder, when I met the third courier, who said he had not 
found General Magruder, but had delivered the message to 
Brigadier-General Griffith, who was moving by the path desig- 
nated to make the attack. On returning to the field, I found 
that the attack in front had ceased ; it was, therefore, too late for 
a single brigade to effect anything against the large force of the 
enemy, and messengers were sent through the woods to direct 
General Griffith to go back." 

It is more than two and a half miles from Fair Oaks Station 
to the river. " The enemy " fell back about half a mile from the 
station, and took position about two miles from the river, instead 
of on its bank, as asserted by ex-President Davis. He arrived on 
the field about the time General Johnston was wounded, and 
only commenced giving orders after the latter was removed from 
the field. It was then too late to bring up the nearest of Magru- 
der's troops before dark, to say nothing of the additional time 
that would be required to send them " down by the woodecl path, 
just under the bluff," " to the bank of the river," "to attack the 
enemy in flank and reverse." When the '" third courier " met 
Griflith's brigade the latter was, no doubt, coming up under in- 
structions I had transmitted from General Johnston, before the 
President and General Lee " reached the left of our line." 

Wliilst tlie ex-President says that he recalled Griflith's brigade, 
because he " found that the attack in front had ceased," and " it 
was, therefore, too late for a single brigade to effect anything 
against the large force of the enemy," he ignores the fact that 
the attack in front only ceased at dark ; and would thus have it 
believed that his failure to accomplish important results, by the 
skilful use of one brigade, was caused by the untimely cessation 
of the attack in front.* 

When I was informed that General Johnston had been wound- 
ed, I had not heard that President Davis was anywhere near the 

♦ The ex-President seems not to have been aware that Sumner had ad- 
vanced two miles from the river and was checked in his march to the assistance 
of Heintzelman and Keyes. G. W. S. 



FIGHTING NORTH OF FAIR OAKS STATION. 103 

field of operations. And I have reason to believe tliat of all the 
men in close action, that day, there were not ten who knew any- 
thing more of his presence than I did. Yet, stress is laid upon 
the claim that, on the 31st of May, " The Confederates " were 
*' led on and cheered by " "the President of their Republic.'' 

Within two or three minutes after heaj-ing General Johnston 
had been wounded and taken from the field, I met President 
Davis. He was near the point where the Nine-miles road leaves 
the large wood which was the western border of the open field 
on the north side of that road. After saying that he supposed I 
knew the command of the army had devolved upon me, he asked 
me what were my plans. In reply I told him of General John- 
ston's intentions early that morning — referred to the misunder- 
standing which resulted in the unexpected transfer of Long- 
street's division from the ISTine-miles road to the Williamsburg 
road — the delay on the latter road, in commencing the attack — 
and to Longstreet's note received by Johnston about 4 p. m. 1 
explained the nature of the contest in the woods where we had 
been closely engaged with Federal re-enforcements from the north 
side of the Chickahorniny — and remarked that whilst we had not 
been able to drive them back, we had effectually barred their 
farther progress against Longstreet's left flank. The latter being 
the special purpose for which General Johnston had ordered my 
division, under Whiting, to move from the left wing of the army, 
near the Meadow Bridge road. 

I then asked Mr. Davis, and those with him, if anything had 
been heard from the right wing, under Longstreet, later than the 
note just mentioned. Nothing farther had been heard. Mr. Davis 
again asked me what were my plans. I repeated what I had said 
in reference to General Johnston's intentions and expectations 
that morning — the delays — and the disappointment felt by Gen- 
eral Johnston in the failure to strike an effective blow against 
the Federals, isolated near Seven Pines, early that morning, in 
time to regain position covering Richmond — before any attempt 
could be made against it, on the north side, by the large Federal 
force between New Bridge and Mechanicsville. But, that I 
could not determine, understandingly, what was best to be done 
until I knew what had occurred in the right wing. 



104 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Mr. Davis did not seem pleased with what I said. He makes 
no reference to any conference or conversation with me at that 
time ; but, after stating that he sent messengers " through the 
woods to direct General Griffith to go back,'' he adds : " General 
Lee, at nightfall, gave instructions to General Smith, the senior 
officer on that part of the battle-field, and left with me to return 
to Richmond." 

" General Smith " was then the senior officer of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, on that battle-field. General Lee gave him 
no instructions. 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 105 



CHAPTER Y. 

The Fighting, June 1. 

General Sumner, in his official report, says : "On Sunday 
morning, June 1, at 6,30 o'clock, the enemy attacked us again 
in great fury, and this time the brunt of the action was borne by 
Richardson's division. This division was placed on Saturday 
niglit parallel with the railroad. . . . This was a most ob- 
stinate contest, continuing for four hours, in which our troops 
showed the greatest gallantry and determination and drove the 
enemy from the field." 

Early on the morning of June 1, Sedgwick's division and 
Couch's cut-off forces w^ere drawn up in line facing almost west ; 
the left was a little north of the railroad, and a little east of Fair 
Oaks Station. Including Brady's, there were five batteries in 
position in Sedgwick's Hues. General Burns, with four regi- 
ments, was detached to guard Sumner's communications. 

General Israel B. Richardson, in his oflicial report, says : 
" Finding I could not get my artillery through the deep mud, 
was forced to leave it, and followed General Sedgwick by another 
road. Getting on as fast as possible, we came up just after the 
firing of Generals Couch and Sedgwick had ceased, it being then 
dark [May 31]. On reporting to General Sumner, he ordered 
me to take position on the line of railroad and on the left of 
General Sedgwick, and to communicate with pickets of General 
Birney's brigade on my left. I placed the brigade of General 
French on the railroad, three regiments of General Howard in 
second line, three regiments of General Meagher in third line, 
and one of General Howard's (the Fifth New Hampshire) as the 
advance guard to the brigade of General French. . . . Sun- 
day, June 1, at 3 o'clock in the morning, the division stood to 
arms. . . . Three [Confederate] regiments (Second and Fifth 
Texas and Second Mississippi) bivouacked within half musket 



106 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINE8. 

shot of tlie ISTew Hampshire regiment ; and, [the latter] having 
retired before daylight, withont noise or confnsion, nothing was 
seen of the enemy until abont 5 in the morning." Richard- 
eon's line faced nearly sonth. 

Captain G. W. Hazzard, Chief of Artillery, Richardson's di- 
vision, says : " Pettit's battery (B, First New York Artillery) 
. . . arrived on the battlefield of Fair Oaks abont 4.30 o'clock 
Sunday morning and was placed by the division commander 
along the road which runs north from the railroad station. In 
this position this battery completely defended the only open 
ground by which the enemy could approach our position, namely, 
some cleared and level fields extending west and southwest 
from 900 to 1,500 yards, and bounded north and south by dense 
woods. [Pettit's battery faced nearly west, and was on the pro- 
longation of Sedgwick's Ime]. Frank's battery (G, First New 
York Artillery) was placed 200 yards in rear [of] and at right 
angles to Pettit's battery, so as to drive back the enemy should 
he attempt to emerge from the woods which line the southern 
side of the railroad. My own battery (C, Fourth Artillery) was 
at first placed in reserve, but subsequently four pieces (12- 
pounders) were moved south to the railroad." 

General French's line made a very acute angle with the rail- 
road. He says: "At 5 o'clock a. m. I was authorized by Gen- 
eral Richardson to move the length of three regiments to the 
left.'' The Sixty-sixth New York formed the right of French's 
line ; next on its left came the Fifty-seventh New York ; then 
the Fifty-third Pennsylvania; the Fifty-second New York 
formed the left of French's line. 

General Howard says that, " at about 5 a. m." he " was directed 
to detach the Eighty-first Pennsylvania [of his brigade], Colonel 
Miller, to prolong the line of General French to the left. . . . 
On the execution of that order word was brought to me that the 
left of Colonel Miller extended in front and beyond the right of 
General Birney's brigade.'' 

The Colonel commanding the Sixty -sixth New Y'ork, which 
formed the right of French's line, says that after making the 
flank movement to the left, above referred to, the left of his 
regiment rested on the railroad, " to which my line preserved an 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 107 

acute angle." French's line crossed the railroad at the left of 
the Sixty-sixth New York ; his three other regiments and How- 
ard's were in the prolongation of the line ; but on the south side 
of the railroad — not far from it at any point. 

General Birney, in his official report, says : " At 10 o'clock 
p. M. [May 31], I had my connection perfect with General French. 
I found the railroad embankment aflorded natural rifle-pits, and 
posted my brigade behind them and bivouacked for the night, 
throwing out strong pickets. . . . My brigade, in the posi- 
tion to which it was assigned Ijy me, did gallant service under 
Colonel Ward on the 1st of June, and protected partly by the 
railroad did great execution with little loss." 

Colonel J. H. H. Ward, in his official report, says: " The 
Seventh Massachusetts [Deveus's brigade, but then attached to 
Birney'sJ and Fourth Maine were stationed on the right and left 
of the railroad in the advanced field. . . . the Thirty-eighth 
New York, Fortieth New York and Third Maine in an oblique 
line across the wo<:>ds and next field, connecting with General 
Kearney on the left." 

It has already been stated that on the night of May 31, the 
brigades of Berry and Jameson, of Kearney's division, occupied 
the rifle-pits, of the third line of defence, on the north side of the 
Williamsbui'g road, extending nearly to the railroad. Colonel 
Ward adds : " Previous to the attack on Sunday morning [June 1] 
I was visited by yourself [Kearney's A. A. Adjutant General], 
with directions from General Kearney to hold my position and 
■connect by skirmishers with the general at the rifle-pits, and that 
if attacked he would re-enforce me at once." 

General Richardson, in his official report, after stating that 
"Nothing was seen of the enemy until about 5 in the morning," 
adds : " There is a large open field opposite my right front. 
About 1,000 yards across on the opposite side it is covered with 
timber, and at the time mentioned the enemy's pickets were de- 
ployed on the other side of this field and moving toward us. The 
head of a column of cavalry was also seen just in the edge of the 
woods; also some reconnoitering officers mounted. Captain Pettit's 
battery had just come up. . . . These pieces now opened their 
fire ; . . . the skirmishers and cavalry broke and retired into 



108 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

the woods in rear. Tliis no doubt was intended as the head of the 
real attack, to come down this open field, but no movement of the 
enemy in that direction, after our firing ceased, could be seen dur- 
ing the remainder of the day." 

It will hereafter be plainly seen, from the Confederate ac- 
counts, that an attack, such as General Richardson describes, was 
not intended. There was no Confederate cavalry on that part of 
the field except couriers. 

Continuing his report, General Richardson says : " At 6.30 
o'clock A. M., . . . along the whole of our front line, the 
enemy opened a heavy rolling fire of musketry within fifty yards. 
Near our left two roads crossed the railroad, and up these the enemy 
moved his columns of attack, supported on his left by battalions 
deployed in line of battle in the woods, the whole line coming up 
to us at once and without skirmisheis in advance, showing that 
they had a good and perfect knowledge of the ground." 

Or — which will be seen hereafter — they had no knowledge of 
the ground. 

General Richardson proceeds to say : " Our men returned 
the fire with vivacity and spirit, and it soon became the heaviest 
musketry firing that I had ever experienced, during an hour and 
a half, and the enemy interposed fresh regiments five different 
times, to allow their men to replenish their ammunition. The 
action had continued in this way about an hour. ... I now 
ordered in General Howard to reinforce the first line. . . 
Soon after this the whole line of the enemy fell back for the first 
time, unable to stand our fire, and for half an hour the firing 
ceased on both sides." 

General W. II. French, in his official report, says : " A dense 
thicket and swamp . . . covered the approach of the enemy, 
who opened his fire at about fifty yards distance. Although this 
attack was bold and sudden the line never swerved. The fire was 
returned coolly and deliberately. The first attack was at once re- 
pulsed. After a few moments' pause the heads of several columns 
of the enemy threw themselves upon the intervals of the regi- 
ments on the right and left of the Fifty-second New York. For 
some time the most desperate efforts were made to break our 
line. . . . The left of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania, consist- 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 109 

ing of seven companies, led on by the gallant Colonel Brooke, 
repulsed them again and again. The dashing Colonel Frank, of 
the Fifty-second New York, after holding them in his front and 
finding them turning his left Hank, threw back three companies 
to receive and repulse the attack, ... I called on Brigadier- 
General Howard who, with the Sixty-first New York, was await- 
ing impatiently ou the railroad in rear to pass my lines. This 
was done in the most regular manner." 

General Howard, in his official report, says : " A staff oflScer 
of General French's brigade then brought word to me that the 
Fifty-second New York was falling back. I was directed to send 
the Sixty-first New Y'ork and Sixty-fourth New Y^ork to the sup- 
23ort of General French. I took these regiments up the ■^ailroad, 
forming them in deployed line on this road in rear of General 
French's left [wing]. Hej'e I learned that Colonel Millei, Eighty- 
first Pennsylvania, was killed at the first fire of the enemy, and that 
the right and left wings of that regiment had become separated, and 
that one wing was without a field ofiicer. I directed Lieutenant 
JMiles, my Aide-de-Camp, to collect the companies of that wing 
and to make the best disj^osition of it he could. ... I im- 
mediately moved forward into the woods with the Sixty-first and 
Sixty-fourth New York." 

When General French called upon General Howard to re-en- 
force the first line, the Eighty -first Pennsylvania, of Howard's 
brigade, which prolonged French's line to the left, had given 
way. 

Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Johnston, in his ofiicial report of the 
operations of that regiment, says : " On the first fire Colonel 
Miller fell, being killed instantly. The attack on our right was 
made by a superior force, representing that they were our friends. 
One regiment claimed to l)e Owens's regiment. Colonel Miller 
commanded the men to recover arms. In an instant a murder- 
ous fire was poured into the regiment at a distance of about 
100 feet. The right wing fell back, returning the fire. Al- 
most simultaneously the left flank was attacked by a large force, 
led by a man bearing a white flag. Tliey [the left wing] fell 
back. . . . The right wing . . . was formed by their 
ofiicers m an open field on the north of the railroad. A portion 



110 BATTLE OF SEVEiN^ PINES. 

of the left wing, being separated from the regiment, took up a. 
position on the raih'oad, and continued iiring until all their am- 
munition was expended. The regiment being formed, I took up 
a position on the edge of the woods, supporting the party on the 
railroad. I reported to headquarters for orders, and was ordered 
by General Sumner to remain in the position I then held until 
further orders." This regiment remained in that position until 
the fifrhting was over. 

Reference will now be made to the movements in other por- 
tions of the Federal lines, caused by the driving back of the 
Eighty-first Pennsj-lvania, and the determined attack upon the 
left wing of French's brigade. Meagher's brigade was ordered 
into the gap on French's left ; Pettit's battery was ordered from 
the right of Richardson's hue to the left, and four guns of Haz- 
zard's battery were brought to the front. Captain Hazzard says : 
" Ten horses were required to move our guns from one part of 
the field to another, and our wheel-traces and prolonges snapped 
like pack-threads." Biirns's brigade — which was protecting the 
communications — was ordered back to Richardson's assistance. 

So far Birney's l)rigade had not taken an active part in the 
main fighting. Colonel Ward, commanding this brigade, says : 
" A new fire was opened in the woods to my right and diagonally 
to my front. I immediately changed front to face the woods 
from where the fire emanated, and as the enemy advanced and 
their fire increased, I gave the order to fire and immediately 
thereafter to charge. This movement was most brilliantly per- 
formed, driving the enemy before them. This brilliant feat was 
accomplished by the Third Maine, Thirty-eighth and Fortieth 
Kew York. The enemy now retreating to the opening beyond^ 
were met by a destructive flank fire from the Fourth Maine and 
Seventh Massachusetts, stationed on the railroad. The rout was 
complete." 

Major W. II. Baird, commanding the Thirty-eighth New 
York, says : This regiment "was formed in line of battle at day- 
break, my right resting near the railroad and connecting on the 
left with the right of the Third Maine. . . . We remained 
under arms until 8 o'clock a. m. In the meantime I had de- 
tached . . . two companies ... to deploy and act aa 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. Ill 

skirmishers. . . . They skirmished back in good order, keep- 
ing the enemy in check until within less than 100 yards 
of our front. I then repeated Colonel Ward's order to ' Fire, 
charge and give them the bayonet'. . . . After delivering 
onr fire we charged through the woods, driving the enemy before 
us at every point, and at last routed him completely. . . . 
Fearing I should receive the fire of the Fourth Maine, which was 
stationed on the railroad at right angles with our own front, 
pouring a murderous fire on the enemy's left flank, I ordered a 
halt . . . and fell back to assume the same position occu- 
pied before the action." 

Colonel H. G. Staples, of the Third Maine, says : " By your 
[Colonel Ward's] order we charged over the fence, and I am 
pleased to say that the command was gallantly executed, the 
regiment, cheering continually, rushed on the enemy with such 
impetuosity that they broke and fled at the first onset. We 
pursued them for a mile through woods and swamps, they 
endeavoring in vain to check us during their retreat by a 
rapid fire. When we crossed the run we met their reserve in 
large numbers on the top of an eminence ; our brave boys, 
still advancing, threw themselves upon the ground half way up 
the hill and fired upon them steadily, the rebels returning our 
fire with terrible effect at this point, and most of our casualties 
took place here. After silencing their fire, by your order we 
retired and formed a line with the rest of the brigade." 

Lieutenant-Colonel T. W. Egan, conmianding the Fortieth 
Kew York, says : " About 8 o'clock in the morning, . . . 
on an order from Colonel J. II. H. Ward, who was commanding 
the brigade, I wheeled the battalion to the right, in order to face 
the enemy, and under a galling fire charged over the fence into 
the woods, our men at the same time delivering a vigorous fire 
upon the rebels." 

It will hereafter be made clear that the Confederates encount- 
ered later, by the Fortieth New York, were not at any time near 
Richardson's line. The same may be said in reference to the 
Confederates who were met by Hooker's troops, who advanced 
about the time that Birney's brigade did. This branch of the 
subject will be taken up after finishing the account of operations, 
in Richardson's front. « 



112 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

The Confederates who attacked the left wing of French's bri- 
gade and broke tlirough the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, were sub- 
jected to a strong flank fire from the Fourth Maine and the 
Seventh Massachusetts. Colonel E. Walker, of the Fourth 
Maine, after describing the movements of four companies of his 
regiment under Captain Pitcher, that were strongly posted, well 
to the front, as skirmishers, to check and delay the enemy, 
known to be advanging through the woods, says : " I found 
the enemy had attacked and driven in the [Eighty-first] Pennsyl- 
vania, of General Howard's brigade, on the right and in front of 
Captain Pitcher's command. . . . The enemy soon appeared 
in large force at the edge of the woods, but were repulsed and 
held in check by these four companies until the [Thirty-eighth] 
New York formed in their rear ; ... he [Pitcher] withdrew 
to the same line, took position on the left of the other regiment, 
and continued his fire. While the enemy were engaged by them 
at short range on the left they [the enemy] also suffered severely 
from the raking fire of the remainder of the regiment at longer 
distance. They must have sustained great loss, too, from the 
cross-fire of the whole while retiring through the slashing before 
the other regiments of this [Birney's] brigade." 

These events were transpiring beyond Pichardson's left, about 
the time General Howard passed two of his regiments to the front 
of French's left wing, and took up the fighting on that part of 
the field. Extracts will now be given from the oflicial report of 
the commander of each of these two regiments of Howard's 
brigade. 

Colonel F. C. Barlow, Sixty -first New York, says, " Immedi- 
ately on our left was the Sixty-fourth New York. . . . The 
firing in the woods in our front was very brisk, and we were im- 
mediately ordered by the General commanding the brigade to 
advance. We advanced in a woods of tall trees, thickly inter- 
spersed with an undergrowth of young oaks, which rendered it 
impossible for us to see to any great distance before us ; the 
ground in some places was muddy and marshy. After advanc- 
ing some 150 yards we came upon the Fifty-third Pennsyl- 
vania, Colonel Brooke, formed in line and briskly engaging 
the enemy. I requested Colonel Brooke to cease firing that 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 113 

we might pass in front of and relieve liim ; this was done, 
and we at once advanced npon the enemy, who were drawn up in 
line before us, and who kept up a heavy firing; after advancing 
some twenty-live yards beyond Colonel Brook's regiment I halted 
the regiment and fired one or two rounds ; the enemy fell back 
firing, out of sight among the thick undergrowth ; not willing 
to deliver our fire until we could see those opposed to us, I ordered 
the regiment to cease firing. . . . We then moved forward 
in excellent order some 180 yards, meeting with a heavy 
fire, but not seeing the enemy with sufiicient distinctness to 
warrant, in my opinion, our halting and renewing the fire. 
On arriving upon the crest of a hill within some twenty 
yards of the road running parallel to the railroad . . . the 
battalion was halted, the enemy being plainly in sight by the 
roadside, and at once opened fire, receiving a very heavy one in 
return ; this continued considerable time, and it was there that 
our principal loss occurred. We drove the enemy back, and he 
ceased firing. . . . I considered it unwise to advance farther, 
as there wei'e no regiments on our flanks and we were consider- 
ably in advance of the line in our rear. . . . Finding that 
our flanks were not supported, I sent to ask Colonel Brooke to 
bring u]) his regiment upon our line, which he did ; scarcely any 
firing was done after his arrival. . . . With orders from the 
General commanding the division for us to retire, we marched off 
in perfect order by the road leading to our right and returned 
to the field whence we started. We were not again engaged. 
• . . Our wounded, who were left on the ground, state that 
the position was occupied by the enemy immediately after we 
left it. . . . This regiment took some ten prisoners. 
From these prisoners and from some of our wounded I learned 
that the force opposed to us was the Third Alabama . . . 
supported by the Twelfth and Forty-first Virginia." 

These three regiments constituted Mahone's brigade of Huger's 
division, which attacked French's left wing. But tliey formed no 
part of the Confederate force from whose front Howard's regi- 
ments were withdrawn. 

Colonel T. J. Parker, of the Sixty-fourth New York, on the 
left of the Sixty- third — in Howard's movement to the front of 



114 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Frencli's left wing — says : " On advancing through a thick woods 
on the south side of the railroad under a shower of balls from the 
enemy, General O. O. Howard and his Aide, C. H. Howard, 
wei'e both severely wounded near our line. On arriving within 
about fifty yards of the enemy's line we opened fire up }n them. 
They fought desperately, being soon re-enforced, and the battle 
raged about two hours, both lines holding their position. We 
then charged bayonet on them, they falling back in disorder, 
leaving their dead and wounded on the field. I then received 
orders to reform the line in rear of General Meagher's brigade." 

The following extracts from the official report of Colonel E. 
E. Cross, of the Fifth New Hampshire, show that the " bayonet 
charge '' described by Colonel Parker was not so effective as 
might be inferred from his words. Colonel Cross says : " I 
received notice that Brigadier-General Howard was severely 
wounded, and the command of the first brigade devolved upon 
me. Finding that the three other regiments of the brigade had 
been some time in action and severely handled, I directed that 
they should move out of the woods, and reform in rear of 
Meagher's brigade, while I advanced my regiment to occupy the 
ground. We moved forward in line of battle through a thick 
woods, and about 300 yards from the railroad track encountered 
the rebel line of battle, and a fierce fire commenced on both 
sides. Twice my line advanced in the most gallant style, and 
each time the enemy fell back. The fire was now very close 
and deadly, the opposing lines being several times not over thirty 
yards a})art. When about ordering another charge I was struck 
by a rifle-ball in the thigh and disabled. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Langley then took command of the regiment, and the rebels 
endeavoring to flank us, he brought off the regiment in excellent 
order, carrying most of our wounded." 

French's right was not attacked. When the action was 
virtually over that wing advanced into the woods — came across 
two Confederate regiments, that were, by mistake, firing into 
each other; and one of the latter regiments, which had just gone 
into the woods, fell back in confusion, more afraid of friends 
than of foes. This accidental fiasco has been very much mag- 
nified. In certain quarters it has been accepted as convincing 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 1 I 5 

proof that the Federals gained an " overwhelming victory." 
The Sixty-sixth New York, which, it is claimed, effected these 
results by " a bayonet charge," lost, that day, one enlisted man 
killed and five enlisted men wounded ! Dm'ing this advance 
into the woods French's right whig did not touch the Confederate 
position — in front of his left wing — about 300 yards south of the 
railroad. 

From tlie Federal accounts it is clear that a determined, per- 
sistent and staggering blow was made against the left of Richard- 
son's front line ; the Confederates who made that attack were 
finally repulsed by fresh troops from Richardson's second line, 
and by Birney's brigade of Kearney's division. One regiment 
of the latter, however, and three regiments of Howard's brigade, 
ran against a Confederate force which had not attacked Rieliard- 
8on. That force successfully resisted these four regiments. 
Genera] Richardson states that the number of his " division en- 
gaged was about 7,000." The official records show that his 
aggregate losses were 838, of which number 557 were in Howard's 
brigade. 

The aggregate losses in Birney's brigade were 207. But, 
one regiment of the latter brigade, in its advance, passed south 
of the Confederate position above referred to, and ran against 
another Confederate force in the vicinity of the Williamsburg 
road. That regiment was the Fortieth New York, commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Egan, whose official report has already 
been partly quoted. Continuing his report, he says : " I then 
ordered my men to charge bayonets, and in an instant they 
were advancing at double-quick, which the enemy perceiving, 
and not relishing the idea of cold steel, turned and fled. 
We continued driving them to the front and when near 
the edge of the woods we received a heavy fire from the 
front and left. Here many of our men fell, notwithstanding 
which not one faltered, but with tremendous cheers continued 
to advance, driving the enemy entirely from the woods and scat- 
tering them in all directions, notwithstanding they made a des- 
perate resistance.'' 

General Hooker, in his official report, says : " Apparently the 
enemy were actively engaged with the troops of Sumner's corps, 



116 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

and in making for the heaviest fire my object was to attack in 
rear and destroy him. On the route, and near by the enemy, I 
passed on my right a brigade of Kearney's division, under Colonel 
Ward. ... As there was delay, orders were given Colonel 
Ward to support my command ; . . . his brigade was brought 
into action on the right of the ISTew Jersey regiments [which 
formed the right of Hooker's line ; Sickles's brigade being on 
the left]. From the beginning of the action our advance on the 
rebels along the wliole line was slow, but I could feel that it 
was positive and unyielding. Our lines were well preserved, 
th® fire brisk and unerring, and our troops reliant — all the 
omens of success. After an interchange of musketry of this 
character for more than an hour, directions were given to advance 
with the bayonet, when the enemy were thrown into wild con- 
fusion, throwing away their arms, hats and coats and broke 
through the forest in the direction of Richmond. At this moment 
chivalry and rebellion presented a deplorable picture. Pursuit 
was hopeless. This being ended, and no other fire heard on any 
part of the field, the troops were ordered to return to their 
respective camps. The engagement lasted upwarrds of two hours, 
and almost all our loss occurred prior to the bayonet charge. The 
movements of the rebels on Sunday indicate that their purpose 
was to finish the business they had commenced on Saturday. 
The column attacked and routed were attempting to force their 
way over the belt of land lying between the Williamsburg Old 
Stage road and the railroad, in the direction of our depots in 
rear. * 

The losses in the two New Jersey regiments were 79 ; in 
the five regiments of Sickles's brigade, 71. The reports of sub- 
ordinate commanders show that Sickles's brigade remained on 
the ground from which the Confederates retired. Aggregate 
losses in Hooker's division, 153. 

It will presently be seen that the Confederates opposed to 
Hooker were withdrawn in compliance with a positive written 
order from General D. H. Hill. The so-called " bayonet charge " 

* In his official report General Hooker mentions that his " Chief of Artil- 
lery attempted to follow with his batteries, but was prevented by the miry 
condition of the fields through which we were compelled to pass." G. W. 8. 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 117 

did not drive tliem back. The " column " which Hooker claims 
to have routed was not attempting " to force its way in the direc- 
tion of " the Federal "depots in rear." 

Confederate Accounts. — In his official report, already quoted, 
General Wilcox continues : ''My line remained as formed [in the 
vicinity of Casey's redoubt just befoi'e night, May 31,] till 10 
p. M., and was then ordered, together with Pryor's brigade, near 
a mile to the front on the road to relieve [R. H.] Anderson's 
brigade. . . . 8foon after daylight, the following morning, a 
few musketry shots were heard, revealing the fact that the 
enemy were in our front and rear. Dispositions were promptly 
made for a renewal of the fight. The position held by my troops 
was near a mile in advance of the captured batteries and rifle- 
pits [Casey's headquarters]. . . . The ]S[ineteenth Missis- 
sippi had been ordered to report to General [R. H.] Anderson 
the previous evening, and had bef^n thrown forward a few 
hundred yards farther on the road. . . . Pryor's brigade 
had bivouacked a few hundred yards in rear of mine, but was 
moved near after daylight, but not until a few shots had been 
exchanged between the pickets. The field in which my brigade 
bivouacked was inclosed by a heavy forest, filled with a thick 
entangled undergrowth of bushes and branches. The ground 
[was] low and in many places boggy and covered with water. 
Having no knowledge of the ground or of the position and 
strength of the enemy, I did not feel justified in making an ad- 
vance, but made snch disposition of my troops as to be prepared 
to meet the enemy in any direction he might appear, awaiting 
orders in the meantime." 

General Wilcox states in detail the location of every regiment 
in the two brigades ; gives a description of the initial firing, and 
adds : " The men were eager for the fight, and everything 
seemed to indicate a success as full and complete as the day pre- 
vious. The ]S[ineteenth Mississippi had already repulsed the 
enemy in its front, the other troops were doing well, and the 
engagement, now raging furiously, was going on as well as could 
be desired ; but just at this time an order in writing was sent to 
me to withdraw my command, which was instantly done, my 



118 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

brigade retiring by the right flank and keeping in the woods. 
Pryor's brigade following [falling ?] back directly across the open 
field in rear, being pursued by the enemy to the field and expe- 
riencing some loss as it entered it. The enemy did not cross the 
field and soon ceased firing. The two brigades were now moved 
back to near the field in which were the captured batteries and 
rifle-pits, referred to above, formed in line and facing to the north 
side of the road." 

In a postscript General Wilcox says : " The order given me 
to retire my command on the second morning was given in writ- 
ing by D. H. Hill, and for the reason, as he stated in his note, 
that Mahone's men had acted badly." No report seems to have 
been made by General Pry or or any of his regimental command- 
ers. General Wilcox says : " Pryor's brigade was not engaged 
on the 31st but acted well on the second day, and yielded re- 
luctantly to the order to withdraw." No statement of the losses 
in this brigade is found. 

The losses in Wilcox's brigade in both days are stated by 
him to have been 110. Of that number he says Q6 
were killed and wounded in the only three companies of 
liis brigade that were put in action the first day. These three 
companies accomplished in a few minutes the work to which they 
were assigned. The conduct of those companies in action. May 
31, may be taken as an indication of the reception Hooker would 
have met with on the 1st of June, if the brigades of Wilcox 
and Pry or had not been withdrawn in compliance with a per- 
emptory order given by D. H. Hill. 

In reference to the operations of Mahone's brigade, in this 
action, no ofiicial report is found from any one connected with 
that brigade. But the following extracts from correspondence 
throw light upon the subject. In a letter dated October 13, 
1862, addressed to Captain Benjamin Huger, General Mahone 
says : " About 1 o'clock that night [he means 1 a. m. June 1] 
I received an order from General Huger directing me to move at 
daylight for the battle-field of ' Seven Pines ' where I would re- 
port to Major-General D. II. Hill. In accordance with this order 
the brigade moved a!id reported to General Hill about 7 a. m., 
June 1, or perhaps earlier, at the same time General Pickett's 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 119 

brigade reported upon the field. The brigade [Malione's] was in 
a few moments thereafter, thrown into action, a report npou 
•wliich General Hnger has." JSTo trace of that report is found. 

In a letter dated December 14, 1885, addressed to me, Gen- 
eral Mahone says that at the time of the battle of Seven Pines 
two regiments of his brigade " had been temporaril}' detached 
leaving with him only the Twelfth and Forty-first Virginia and 
the Third Alabama Reo-iments.'' After statins: that his brigade 
relieved that of General Rodes, on the Charles City road, May 
31 ; he adds, " Late that night I received orders to move the next 
morning at daylight to the battle-field of Seven Pines, and thei-e 
report to General D. H. Hill. I moved the brigade . . . 
(starting before day) directly and speedily as possible to Seven 
Pines, and forming my brigade in line, jnst in rear or south of 
the works from which the enemy had been driven, on the right 
hand or south side of the main road, and quite opposite General 
Casey's headquarters tent, now occupied by General D. H. Hill. 
I reported in person to General Hill at this tent. At the moment 
I was reporting to General Hill some person rode up and ex- 
citedly stated to him that the enemy were in the wood on the 
north side of the road and were moving down upon his then 
headquarters. General Hill said : ' General Mahone take your 
brigade in there,'' referring to the wood in which the enemy were 
said to be, and moving as just stated. Immediately I put my 
brigade in motion, l^y column of companies for the wood, and I 
had given the order ' right and forward into line,' which would 
have brought the three regiments facing the enemy, when I dis- 
covered that my rear regiment, the Twelfth Virginia, had been 
detached and sent off in another direction by General Hill. 
. . . The Forty-first Virginia and the Third Alabama w^ere 
quickly brought into line ... and without halting rushed 
forward into the woods . . . until we reached the I'e-en- 
forced line of the enemy. . . . Meanwhile the Forty-first 
Virginia and Third Alabama had become separated in the dense 
wood. Lomax, Colonel of the Third Alabama had been killed, 
and the regiment had fallen into some confusion. At this junc- 
ture the Twelfth Virginia had reached me, and while under a 
pressing fire from the enemy, by some misunderstanding fell 



120 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

back, when I was about to order it to charge. In this condition 
of things I reformed my brigade on tlie line of the main road. 
. . . There was nothing more of consequence done that day.'^ 

In a letter to me dated December 25, 1885, General Mahone 
says : The " second attack " described by General liichardson, 
was " doubtless the charge of the Tliird Alabama and the Forty -first 
Virginia. . . . The impetus of the charge of the Third Alabama, 
a splendid regiment, I am satisfied must have severely shocked 
and disordei'ed his [Richardson's] line ; and if there had been any 
intelligent understanding of the position of the enemy, and in- 
structions as to what we were to do, it can be seen now how easy 
a destructive blow might have been given ; but, ' Take your 
brigade in there ; ' to one just reaching the field, can scarcely be 
taken as evidence that the commanding ofiicer knew what he 
was about." " I also remember to have seen Colonel Tomlin's 
regiment of Armistead's brigade immediately following the 
charge of the Third Alabama. It came up in good order and 
halted . . . between the Third Alabama and Fortj'-first 
Yirginia. After receiving a fire from the enemy (all woods) 
Colonel Tomlin's regiment suddenly retired. ... It was 
just after this that the Twelfth Virginia, which had been detached 
by General Hill, came up. . . . Meanwhile the Third Ala- 
bama had advanced far into the wood to the north. . . . And 
hotly engaged the enemy — and doubtless being overlapped and 
greatly outnumbered, and, having lost its Colonel, was broken 
and remarched to the open field and reformed ... on the 
most advantageous line." 

On the 6th of January, 188G, General Mahone wrote me : 
" I am quite certain that Armistead's Ijrigade was on my imme- 
diate right. . . . There was no fighting which would indicate 
an attack by either side before my two regiments went in as 
described in previous letters and none on my left during the 
engagement that followed. Armistead's brigade and mine must 
have struck the enemy about the same time. I cannot give you, 
I am sorry to say, reliable estimate of my loss." 

In a letter to me, March 9, 1886, Governor W. E. Cameron, 
who was Adjutant of the Twelfth Virginia, at Seven Pines, cor- 
roborates in the main what is said above by General Mahone, and 



FIGHTmG, JUNE 1. 121 

adds : the losses in the Twelfth Yirginia were " 9 killed, 31 
wounded, 1 officer and 11 men unaccounted for, a total of 52. 
The Forty-first [Virginia], 11 killed, 44 wounded," " 1 officer 
and 56 men" "missing." "It was discovered afterward that a 
large proportion of the men of both regiments, reported missing 
or unaccounted for, had been killed or wounded, but I am only 
able to get now the reports made on the field through the 
Medical and Adjutant-General Departments." 

On the 30th of March, 1886, Robert M. Sands, Captain, 
Mobile Cadets, Company A, Third Alabama Infantry, A. N. Y.y 
in a letter addressed to me, says : 

" In answer to your inquiry regarding the loss of the Third 
Alabama at Seven Fines, I, having just counted hy names, from a 
detailed report, make it as follows: killed 38, wounded 123, 
missing 14, total 175, including our Colonel, Lomax, and his 
Adjutant." 

The total losses in the three regiments of Mahone's brigade in 
this action are thus shown to have been 338. One of Mahone's 
regiments was detached at Chafin's Bluff and one at Gordons- 
ville. 

In his official report Colonel H. B. Tomlin, of the Fifty-third 
Virgin ia, Armistead's brigade, says : that, upon reaching the 
Williamsburg road from the Charles City road, late in the after- 
noon, May 31, the regiment "was ordered by Major-General 
Longstreet to remain as a reserve with him until further orders. 
It was then detached from General Armistead's brigade. Early 
next morning I dispatched Major G. M. Waddill to report the 
above fact to General Armistead, to ascertain the position he 
occupied, and to report that I would join him with my regiment 
as soon as relieved. . . . Upon reaching Seven Pines [he 
means Casey's redoubt and rifle-pits], Major G. M. Waddill indi- 
cated the direction in which General Armistead had gone, and 
informed me that his Adjutant had sent me instructions to deploy 
on the left of the Ninth Virginia, then not in sight, and saying it 
had entered the woods near a given point. Just Iiefore this point 
was reached the order was given to form column by companies 
and then forward into line of battle. And though this movement 



122 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

was executed in double-quick time, before it was executed we 
received a heavy cross-fire from the right and left, which was 
immediately returned. Seeing no enemy, and having received 
no other order than tlie one above recited, I ordered the men to 
lie down. Discovering troops coming toward our right wing 
with white bands on their hats [I] ordered mine not to fire, that they 
were friends; but the fire continuing [ed] down the whole line, 
yet too high to do much injury. Some one, without authority, 
in the right wing gave the command to retreat, which was passed 
down the whole line by the Captains, and the men fell back 
in great disorder into the field on which they had just emerged ; 
reformed, and, with every company in proper position in line of 
battle, double-quicked it back into the woods, and shortly after 
crossing the road came up with the Forty-first Virginia, marching 
directly toward us. From this direction we received a constant 
fire, which we returned until some of our officers, recognizing 
some of the ofiicers of the Forty- first Yirginia (Major G. M. 
Waddill, who was upon the left wing, while I was at that time 
upon the right), commanded them to march in retreat. At this 
time my horse was killed, and not hearing the command nor 
knowing the cause [I] attempted to rally the men ; . . . 
friends and enemies were so indiscriminately mixed up together 
tliat it was most advisable to return to the open field. We re- 
turned slowly to the field, apprehending more danger from friends 
than the enemy. We again reformed and reported for duty to 
Major-General Hill." 

This regiment was then posted in the open space around 
Casey's earthworks, and finally " joined General Armistead's 
brigade (late in the afternoon), which we met with for the first 
time during the day, placed on the outer post nearest the enemy." 
Colonel Tomlin reports 1 killed, 18 wounded and 3 missing. 
Total losses, 22. 

No other oflicial report from any one connected with Armi- 
stead's brigade is found among the records. By correspondence 
and inquiry I have not been able to obtain any material facts in 
reference to this brigade, that day, other than those already 
stated. 

There is, however, very distinct reference made to Armistead's 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 123 

brigade in the official report of Brigadier-General George E. Pick- 
-ett, wlio says that " about 9 p. m.," May 31, he received orders from 
General Longstreet to march his brigade at daylight [June 1] 
and report to Major-General D. H. Hill, at or near Seven Pines. 
Pickett adds: " [I] found General Hill at General Casey's late 
headquarters, just in rear of enemy's redoubt — ' The Kedoubt.' 
My brigade had marched some 400 yards in advance of this point 
when it was there halted. General Hill directed me to ride 
over to the railroad and communicate with Brigadier-General 
Hood, whose right was resting on that road. I asked General 
Hill of the whereabouts of the enemy. He said they were 
some distance in advance — in fact, I had no definite idea 
where, as I saw no one, and had not had time to examine the 
nature of [the] ground or the position. "With two of my staff 
officers ... I proceeded through the undergrowth and 
thickets towards the railroad some 400 yards, when I was 
met by a party of the Louisiania Zouaves (who had evidently 
been on a plundering expedition) rushing past me at a most head- 
long speed. One fellow, riding a mule with a halter, I seized on 
and detained for explanation. He said the enemy were within a 
few yards of us, and entreated me to let him save himself. I 
immediately rode back with him at a gallop, and as briefly as 
possible informed General Hill of the circumstances. He ordered 
me to attack, and I supposed [the] same order was given to other 
brigade commanders. I rejoined my brigade at once, and by a 
change of front forward put it in line of battle nearly perpen- 
dicular to the railroad and advanced. Armistead on my left, and 
Pryor and Wilcox (the latter I did not see, but heard he was 
there) on my right, struck the enemy within a short distance 
(who opened heavily on us), drove him thi'ough an abatis, over a 
crossroad leading to railroad, and was advancing over a second 
abatis when I had discovered Armistead's brigade had broken 
and were leaving the field j)ell-mell. At this moment I was on 
foot and half-way across the abatis, the men moving on beauti- 
fully and carrying everything before them. I could scarcely 
credit my own eyes in witnessing this misfortune on my left. I 
immediately rode to that part of [the] field, found nothing be- 
tween me and [the] railroad except the gallant Armistead himself, 



124 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

with a regimental color and some thirty persons, mostly officers,, 
with him. I saw our danger at once and dispatched a courier to 
Genei'al Hill, asking for more troops to cover the vacuum. Ke- 
ceivingno reply, and the enemy pressing forward in force, brigade 
after brigade,* and threatening my left flank, I threw back the left 
wing of the Nineteenth Virginia, the left regiment, so as to op- 
pose a front to them, dispatched a staff officer to General Hill 
with [a] request for troops ; and after a while sent a second dis- 
patch, similarly worded. As a matter of course, from having 
been the attacking party, I now had to act on the defensive. 
Fortunately the enemy seemed determined on attacking and car- 
rying my front and driving me out of the abatis, which our men 
succeeded in preventing, though with considerable loss." 

When Pickett formed his brigade ''in line of battle nearly 
perpendicular to the railroad," and advanced, the direction of his 
movement was toward the east, nearly parallel to Richardson's 
front. There is reason to believe that such opposition as Pickett 
met with — wliilst his troops were " moving on beautifully," 
through abatis, etc., parallel to and 300 or 400 yards south of 
the railroad — was from the strong skirmish hues thrown well 
to their front, on the south side of the railroad, by regiments 
of Birney's brigade, for the purpose of holding the Confederate 
advance in check long enough to enable Kearney to come, 
from the trenches in the third line of defense, to Birney's 
assistance. Before Pickett found himself constrained to act on 
the defensive, in the abatis, his briga,de had met with no material 
opposition. From his description of all his operations it is clear 
that his brigade never touched Eichardson's line. While he was 
"moving on beautifully;" against Federal regimental grand- 
guards and skirmishers ; he seems to have been serenely uncon- 
scious that a few hundred yards on his left, in the dense and tan- 
gled wood, other Confederate troops had struck the main line of 
the enemy near the railroad. 

He adds : " Hearing nothing from General Hill, I rode as 
rapidly as possible to him, and explained as laconically [as I could] 
the position of affairs. He asked me if I could not withdraw my 

* Federal accounts already quoted show that Pickett's position was attacked 
by four regiments in all. 



FIGHTING, JUNE 1. 125 

brigade. I said yes, but did not wish to do so ; that I would 
leave all my wounded, lose many more men, and that the enemy 
would pour down on the disorganized mass, as he himself termed 
the troops about him. He then sent two regiments of Colston's 
brigade, which my Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Pickett, 
put in position on my left, and asked me to take Mahone's brigade 
and put it on my right, which was done. ... A brigade de- 
bouched from the piece of woods in my front and moved steadily 
toward my left flank. They came up to within about range, 
when their commander, seeing his men about to commence firing, 
stopped them (and) called out, ' What troops are these ? ' Some 
of our men shouted * Virginians.' He then cried out, ' don't fire, 

they'll surrender ; we'll capture all these d d Yirginians.' 

Scarcely were the words uttered when the Nineteenth and left 
of the Eighteenth rose up in the abatis and fired a withering 
volley into them, killing'^ their commanding officer and literally 
mowing down their ranks. Just then Colston's regiments came 
up on the left and Mahone's on the right. The enemy retreated 
to their bushy cover and their fire immediately slackened. No 
other attempt was niade by tliem to advance, and about 1 p. m., 
I judge, by General Hill's order, 1 withdrew the whole of our 
front line, Pryor and AYilcox, and some other troops I do not 
remember, being in position some 400 yards in our rear. We 
withdrew in perfect order, not a gun was fired at ua, and 
bringing off all our wounded. This was the conclusion of the 
battle of Seven Pines." 

Whilst Pickett was thus appealing for help in order to enable 
him to prevent the enemy from pouring down on the disorganized 
mass, as he says (D. H. Hill) liimself "termed the troops around 
him " — the latter was endeavoring to concentrate the whole 
thirteen brigades of the right wing " around the captured works, 
in the hope that the Yankees would attempt to retake them." 
The " disorganized mass," Pickett speaks of, contained the five 
brigades that had done all the bloody fighting under Hill on the 
previous day — in addition to two brigades of Longstreet's divi- 
sion and one brigade of lluger's division that were not in close 

* But see the report of the Colonel of the Fifth New Hampshire. 



126 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

action either clay — besides the two brigades under Wilcox that 
had been withdrawn, from their position east of Seven Pines, 
by D. H. Hill's order. 

General Pickett states that his brigade consisted of four 
regiments ; " aggregate, 1,700, Loss, 350 killed and wounded ;. 
no prisoners." 



LONGSTEEET IN THE FIELD, JUNE 1. 127 



CHAPTER YI. 

LONGSTKEET IN THE FlELD, JuNE 1. D. H. HiLl's OfFIOIAL 

Report. — Withdrawal of the Confederates from the 
Captured Works, June 2. 

Just after President Davis left the front, about dark, May 31, 
I sent for General Longstreet to come as soon as possible to the 
headquarters on the Nine-miles road near Old Tavern. I then 
directed General Whiting to care for the wounded and dead of 
the division he commanded, assign proper officers to take charge 
of the three brigades that had lost their regular commanders, see 
that the vacant places among the field and company officers were 
properly filled, and place the division in position confronting the 
enemy ; his own brigade and Hood's in first line, the three other 
brigades within close supporting distance. 

A few minutes later, General J. E. B, Stuart, the commander 
of the cavalry of Johnston's army, reached me and reported that 
the Federals had made no advance on the Charles City road ; 
that our troops had captured the works at Seven Pines (Couch's 
line) some time before sunset, and had advanced beyond that 
point ; he did not know to what distance, or in what numbers. 
He had good guides with him, and ofl^ered to go in person to 
General Longstreet, and have him piloted to my headquarters. 

I then left the front and returned to the house from which 
General Johnston so hurriedly moved forward " against the right 
flank of Longstreet's adversaries," immediately after he received 
the note, previously referred to, complaining of his " slowness.'' 
When I retui'ned from the front I knew nothing more, in regard 
to the operations of the right wing, than the information con- 
tained in that note, and the report made to me by General Stu- 
art. The latter information indicated that Longstreet's three 
divisions, unaided by the division Johnston pressed forward to 
his assistance, had succeeded in driving the enemy from their 
second line. 



128 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINE8. 

The Federal re-euforcements encountered by the division un- 
der W luting were in large numbers. How many more might be 
sent over the river during the night, or early next morning, we 
had no means of estimating. So far from its being then known 
to us that the bridges had been swept away,* and the Chickaho- 
minv rendered impassable, we had good reason to believe the con- 
trary. 

After my arrival at the headquarters, about 9 p. m.,I received 
the following from General McLaws, who commanded a division 
of four brigades, forming a part of the centre of the army under 
General Magruder. McLaws wrote : " I am at the position oppo- 
site the New Bridge. Tlie Colonel in command informs me that 
there is a heavy force opposite this point, and that this evening 
the pickets reported that the enemy had been throwing heavy 
objects in the river. As pontoon boats have been seen there, it 
is supposed they are making a pontoon bridge. The force to 
guard this point is two regiments. ... If this position is 
forced, your command will be in great danger, as you are 
aware." 

On receipt of the foregoing, I reqaested General McLaws to 
let me know the exact position of his troops. In his reply, dated 
11 p. M., May 31, he says: " The positions of the troops are as fol- 
lows: General Cobb, five regiments, from the Mechanicsville 
road to General Harvey's place; General Kei-shaw from Gen- 
eral Harvey's to Barker's; Generals Griffith and Semmes 
from General Kershaw's right to New Bridge, and on the line 
down New Bridge road and across the country to the railroad.'' 

The rest of Magruder's command — D. K. Jones's division, 
two brigades — were in position on the Meadow Bridge road and 
the Mechanicsville road. 

General A. P. Hill, temporarily commanding the left wing in 
the vicinity of Meadow Bridge, reported that all had been quiet, 
in his front, during the day, but the enemy's batteries at Mechan- 
icsville had been firing heavily without inflicting any material 
damage. A short time before midnight I received a note from 
General Stuart stating that, at 10.30 p. m., he had failed to find 

♦Both of Sumner's bridges were washed away soon after his corps had 
crossed. 



LONGSTKEET IN THE FIELD, JUNE 1. 129 

General Longstreet. At tliat time I was under the distinct im- 
pression that there was a gap, nearly a mile in extent, between 
Whiting's right and Longstreet's left. Whiting's left was in the 
air in the direction of New Bridge. 

At 12.40 A. M., June 1, no further information had been 
received in regard to the operations of the right wing. I had 
sevei-al hours previously heard from all other portions of the 
army. I then wrote to General Longstreet asking the position of 
his command, the condition of his men, and requesting his views 
in regard to future operations in his front. After that note was 
written, one of my staff officers, who had been sent to Longstreet, 
just after dark, came in, bringing General Longstreet with him. 
The note had not been received. He reported that only a por- 
tion of his own division had been seriously engaged — Huger's 
division had not been engaged at all — the principal fighting had 
been done by D. H. Hill's division — the enemy's second line of 
works had been carried late in the afternoon — tlieir forces pressed 
back about one mile — the fighting continued until dark — and his 
three divisions were all at last well up to the front. 

Longstreet showed no disposition to renew the attack with 
the right wing. When I indicated to him that this must be done, 
he insisted that the attack had better be made by the division 
under Whiting — supported b}' the right wing. I then gave him 
positive orders to send one brigade to the Nine-miles road, and 
attack with the remainder of the right wing as soon after day- 
break as possible ; and fight towards the north instead of attempt- 
ing to force his way any further toward Bottom's Bridge. He 
was assured that when the attack I ordered him to make was fully 
developed, it should be supported by the division under Whiting ; 
and, if necessary, by the forces then guarding the crossings of the 
Chickahominy. 

Between 2 and 3 a. m. he left me for the purpose, as I had 
reason to believe, of carrying into effect the orders he had 
received. I never doubted that this was his intention until I saw 
General D. H. Hill's official report, in the Records recently pub- 
lished by the United States War Department. 

After Longstreet left me, I notified Whiting, Magruder, and 
A. P. Hill, that the attack M'ould be renewed by the right wing 



130 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

verj soon after dayli^^ht, and directed them to be ready to make 
any movement that miglit be ordered. I then wrote to General 
Lee, who was stationed in Richmond, and had, under President 
Davis, general charge of all Confederate military operations, tell- 
ing him I had determined to renew the attack with the right 
wing, and asking him for all the assistance he could give. The 
following is a copy of General Lee's reply : 

* " Richmond, ) 
1st June, '62, 5 A. m. f 
General : 

" Your letter of this morning just received. Ripley will be 
ordered and such forces from General Holmes as can be got up will 
be sent. Your movements are judicious and determination to strike 
tlie enemy right. Try and ascertain his position and how he can 
best be hit. I will send such engineers as I can raise. But with 
Stevens, Whiting, Alexander, etc., what can I give you like 
them. You are right in calling upon me for what you want. I 
wish I could do more. It will be a glorious thing if you can gain 
a complete victory. Our success on the whole yesterday wag 
good, but not complete. 

"Truly, 

"R. E. Lee, 

" General. 
" General G. W. Smith, 

" Commander Army of JSTorthern Virginia.'' 

Magruder was directed to place Cobb's and Kershaw's brigades 
nearer to New Bridge, and hold them in readiness to replace the 
troops at that point, and along the New Bridge road, so the latter 
could promptly re-enforce Whiting, when the latter should 
advance to co-operate in the attack Longstreet was ordered to 
make. A. P. Hill was instructed to hold his division ready to 
march to the right. 

In my official report it is stated that : 

" Between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning of June 1, I had a 
conference with General Longstreet, and. learning that he had or- 
dered General Huger's division, which had not been engaged upon 

* A facsimile of this note is given on page 179. 



LOKGSTKEET IN THE FIELD, JUNE 1. 131 

May 31, to move from the Charles City to the Williamsburg stage 
road, one of the brigades of this division was directed to take posi- 
tion as soon as practicable upon the Nine-miles road ; and, together 
with that of General Eipley [then expected to arrive], form a re- 
serve for my division, which General Whiting commanded. The 
troops of the left wing [under A. P. Hill] and of the centre [under 
IVIagruder] remained substantially in the positions occupied the pre- 
vious day, protecting our rear and the City of Richmond from any 
movement of the enemy across the Chickahominy at or above New 
Bridge. General Longstreet was directed to push his successes 
of the previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement 
upon the position of General Whiting on his left. The latter was 
directed to make a diversion in favor of General Longstreet's real 
attack ; and, if pressed l)v the enemy, hold at all hazards the fork, 
or junction, of the New Bridge and Nine-miles roads. In the 
morning General Longstreet found the enemy in very large force 
in his front, pressing him so strongly that he considered it advis- 
al)le not to send the brigade from General Huger's division, and 
later I ordered three additional brigades to his support. JVIeantime 
the enemy threatened General Whiting's position, which was not 
favorable for defense, and were evidently largely re-enforced, and 
disposed to take the offensive. Reconnaissance made during the 
morning developed the fact that the enemy were strongly fortified 
in the position attacked by my division on the previous evening. 
This, coupled with the necessity of holding that portion of our 
line which was nearest the Chickahominy and covered Long- 
street's left flank, induced me to direct General Whiting to assume 
more favorable ground a little in rear. This also brought his 
line in better relations with the troops of the centre, under General 
IVIagruder, and better secured the angle made by our line in front 
of New Bridge. Such was the condition of affairs upon the field 
at the time General Lee took command. The next morning 
(June 2), I was compelled by illness to leave the field. No official 
reports have as yet been made to me by subordinate com- 
manders." 

After informing General Lee of my determination to renew 
the attack, I directed my Chief of Staff, Major Jasper Whiting, 
to go at dawn to the Chickahominy, in the vicinity of New Bridge, 



132 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

and observe the movements of the enemy on that side. Major W. 
H. Stevens, Chief Engineer of Johnston's army, was requested to 
examine the enemy's position in front of General Whiting. 
"Whatever may have been said by others at that time or since, in 
regard to the cutting of all communication between the Federals, 
on opposite sides of the river, because of the washing away of 
the bridges, I had reason that day to feel some anxiety in regard 
to the crossing of more troops from the north to the south side 
of the Chickahominy. 

In reference to the fighting, June 1, already described, it may 
be of interest to know how it appeared through observations 
made from the Kine-miles road, interpreted by battle-field notes 
written to me that day by General Longstreet. 

The first tiring described by General Richardson, which he mis- 
took for the beginning of a real attack, will be better understood in 
view of the orders given by me to Generals Longstreet and Whit- 
ing, and the description given by Captain Lemmon, of General 
Hood's staif. In his letter to me, already referred to. Captain 
Lemmon says : Hood's brigade was in tiie " front edge of the 
woods, with one regiment south of the railroad. Colonel Archer's 
Fifth Texas. Before daylight, on Jime 1, General Hood sent me 
to the left to find General Whiting and ask him for orders. I 
was with General Whiting and staff, in front of Hatton's brigade, 
when day broke, and the first gun of June 1 was fired, appar- 
ently at our group. . . . Beyond throwing our (Hood's) 
skirmishers well forward to the north side of the railroad, where 
they had lively firing for a time,* we did no fighting. I carried 
orders from General Hood to Colonel Archer to send men to his 
right and see how close he was to Hill and Longstreet, whom 
he reported about three-quarters of a mile from him." 

Yery early in the morning Major Jasper Whiting reported 
the movement of Federal troops and batteries passing down the 
north bank of the Chickahominy. About 6 a. m. General Whit- 
ing reported : " They are advancing a battery of six pieces beyond 
the wheat field of yesterday evening's fight — in front of where 
we stood last night. Hood is back in the woods, extending to the 
railroad in a swamp. My brigade partly in those woods and 

* Hood's losses were 13 wounded. 



LONGSTKEET IN THE FIELD, JUNE 1. 133 

partly in the large woods to the left. . . . You know that four 
of my brigades are without their commanders." At 6.30 a. m. he 
reported : " We will have to attack the position we tested last 
night, and that, I own, I don't like. Besides, it is just what the 
enemy wants. Heavy firing in advance of us and on the right." 
This from Whiting was in reply to instructions to be ready, when 
Longstreet's attack was fully developed, not only to make a diver- 
sion in his favor, but if necessary make a determined real attack 
in order to enable Longstreet to win. 

I then wrote to General Whiting : "I fully appreciate your 
want of regular commanders for your four brigades, and if your 
force is increased by fresh troops, will have to send with them 
an officer of rank wlio will relieve you of a portion of your oner- 
ous duties." The "officer of rank," here alluded to, was General 
McLaws. I then intended, as soon as the attack by the right 
wing was made in full force, to bring up Griffith's and Semmes's 
brigades from the New Bridge road — put them in front line with 
the brigades of Hood and Whiting — put both of the latter bri- 
gades under Whiting's general control ; give McLaws executive 
command of the four brigades in front line ; place the brigades 
of Hampton, Hatton and Pettigrew in second line ; take the 
executive control of the second line, and direct these seven bri- 
gades in action until A. P. Hill could reach the field with his 
division from the left wing of the army; leaving Magruder with 
four brigades to oppose any movement the Federals might make 
to cross the Chickahominy at or above New Bridge, in our rear 
and against Richmond. 

A little later, General Whiting reported : " The musketry 
firing in advance is tremendous." But, so far, nothing had been 
observed from the Nine-miles road which indicated that any large 
portion of the right wing had commenced, in earnest, the move- 
ment in which Whiting had orders to co-operate. Whilst the 
musketry firing in particular localities had been for some time 
very heavy, it covered only a narrow front, and had not been of 
a character to satisfy me that Longstreet had put in close action 
more than a small portion of the forces under his control. It 
was clear that this attacking party had receded three or four hun- 
dred yards. 



134 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

The first information I received from General Longstreet, 
was contained in the following note from him, dated, 8 o'clock, 
addressed to Major Whiting : 

* " Headquarters, ) 
June 1, 1862, 8 o'clock. \ 
''Major : 

" Yonrs of 6 is received. I have ordered a brigade of 
General Huger's, as agreed npon, to the support of General 
Whiting. Please send a guide for it. f(, 

" J. Longstreet, 

" Major-General. 
*' Major Whiting." 

The above note was received about 8.30 a. m. His delay in 
asking for a guide, even if one was really needed, annoyed me ; 
and I was not specially pleased with his saying: " as agreed 
upon ; " when, in point of fact, he was " ordered " to send a bri- 
gade. However, I merely said ; " send a guide." 

In the meantime Major Jasper Whiting's reports continued to 
show that some movement of the enemy was being made down 
the river on the north bank, and General Whiting had been 
ordered to throw back his right slightly, take position a little 
nearer the New Bridge fork of the Nine-miles road, and try to 
establish and keep up some sort of communication with Long- 
street's left. 

At 10.30 A. M., I wrote to General Longstreet : " The enemy 
are, from all accounts, crossing the river and concentrating 
below on this side. I have as yet heard nothing of Ripley's 
brigade or that from Huger's division. Ask Stuart if he cannot 
devise some means for keeping your left and Whiting's right 
in communication with each other. I have dirciited Whiting to 
take closer defensive relations with Magruder's troops. . . . 
That was absolutely necessary to enable a good defense to be 
made while you are pivoting on Whiting's position." 

The following note was received from General Longstreet^ 
before my note of 10.30 a. m., was dispatched : 

* A facsimile of this note is given on page 180. 



longsteeet in the field, june 1. 135 

* " Headquaktees, 
" June 1, 1862. 
*' General : 

" The brigade cannot be spared. Every man except a bri- 
gade is engaged in action. As you are not fighting I did not 
send it nor can I spare it. If I find myself at any time so that I 
spare it I will send it. But I am now not able to do without it. 

" Yours, respectfully, 
" General Smith." " J. Longsteeet. 

Almost at the same time the following, addressed to an officer 
of my staff, was received from General Longstreet : 

t " June 1. 
*' 3Iajor : 

" Yours of to-day is received. The entire army seems to be 
opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my 
favor during these successive attacks, else my troops cannot stand 
it. The ammunition gives out too readily. 

" Yours, respectfully, 

" J. Longsteeet, 
" Major JMelton." " Major-General. 

When the above two notes reached me I was about half a 
mile east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine-miles road in con- 
sultation with General McLaws, General Whiting and the Chief 
Engineer, Major Stevens. The latter had just returned from a 
reconnaissance in front of Whiting's command. Stevens reported 
that the position held by the enemy was a good one for defense, 
that it had been strengthened by fortifications, and was occupied 
by a strong force of infantry and artillery. 

A few minutes only after the two foregoing notes from Long- 
street had come to hand, 1 received from him the following : 

^ " Headquaetees, j 

10 A. M., June 1. f 
" General: 

" Can you re-enforce me, the entire army seems to be opposed 
to me ; we cannot hold out unless we get help. If we can fight 

* Afac-»ijnile is given on page 181. 

f A facsimile of tills note is given on page 182, 

X Facsimile given on page 183. 



136 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

together we can finish the w©rk to-day, and Mc's time will be up. 
If I can't get help I fear that I must fall back. 

" J. LONGSTBEET. 

" General Smith." 

That portion of his command which attacked the Federals at 
6.30 A. M. had fallen back about two hours before the note of ]0 
A. M. was written. When I received it the firing had diminished 
materially, and it seemed that Longstreet was withdrawing from 
the fight, if not from the field. His first falling back had, to all 
appearance on the Nine-miles road, increased the gap between 
the right wing and Whiting's co:nmand. 

The rapidly repeated appeals for help were so urgent that it 
seemed the engagement of the right wing that morning had been 
far more serious than was indicated by anything observed from 
the Nine-miles road. If that wing fell back much farther Whit- 
ing's right fiank would be turned and he would probably be com- 
pelled to retire. 

There were but two ways by which I could, at that time, pos- 
sibly aid Longstreet in, what appeared from his notes to be, 
his direful need. One was by putting Whiting in close action, 
the other was to strip the Chickahominy Bluffs and send troops 
from there direct to Longstreet's assistance. I chose the latter 
method, and ordered about 5,000 men, then between the 
Mechanicsville and New Bridge roads, to move as rapidly as pos- 
sible to the Williamsburg road, and report to General Long- 
street on the battle-field. I directed that Ripley's brigade, which 
was expected in Richmond about that time, should move to the 
front on the Williamsburg, instead of on the Nine-miles 
road ; and General McLaws was sent, in person, to General Long- 
street to inform him of the re-enforcements ordered, to assure him 
that the whole army of the enemy was not in his front, and tell 
him that he must not fall back any farther, but drive the enemy; 
and, if possible, regain the ground he had lost. 

In view of facts then existing, as already shown by both Fed- 
eral and Confederate official reports of the actual fighting, it will 
be seen that I was, by the character of Longstreet's notes, as com- 
pletely deceived in reference to the state of affairs in the right 
wing, on the morning of June 1, as General Johnston had been 



L0NG8TREET IN THE FIELD, JUNE 1. 137 

on the afternoon of May 31, by the note he received from Long- 
street at 4 p. M. that day. 

About 1 p. M., June 1, I received a note, from General Mc- 
Laws, of which the following is a copy : * 
" General Smith : 

" I send a courier to bring General Cobb's brigade. Long- 
street says he can hold his position with five thousand more men. 
He has now the same ground the enemy had yesterday. A 
drummer boy taken says that McClellan has gone to Washing- 
ton to see after a man called Jackson. 

" L. McL." 

About 1.30 p. M. President Davis rode up to the headquarters 
near Old Tavern and aked for General Lee. On being told that 
I had not seen General Lee during the day, the President ex- 
pressed so much surprise that I asked him if he had any special 
reason for supposing General Lee would then be there. To this 
he replied ; Yes ; and added that early in the morning he had 
ordered General Lee to take command of the army at once. This 
was the first intimation I received of tlie assignment of General 
Lee to the Army of Northern Virginia. I answered : In that 
case he will probably soon be here, and then invited the Presi- 
dent to dismount and take a seat in the headquarters' ofiice. He 
did so and chatted pleasantly upon a variety of common-place 
subjects ; but made no allusion to anything pertaining to the 
state of affairs upon the field. 

General Lee arrived about 2 p. m., and at once took command 
of the army. I commenced telling him what had occurred dur- 
ing the day. The President seemed to give some attention to 
what I said, especially to General Longstreet's notes asking for 
assistance. AVhilst I was still explaining to General Lee the 
various occurrences of the day, the following note, dated 1.30 p. m., 
was received by me, from General Longstreet : 

f " Headquaeteks, ) 

'■General: " June 1, 1862, li p. m. f 

" I have just received a note from Major Melton. I will 
give instructions to General Hill to extend his line of skirm- 

*Fac-simile on page 184. 

t Fac-aimile on pages 185-6-7. 



138 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

isliers to the railroad. The next attack will be from Sumner's 
division. I think that if we can whip it we shall be com- 
paratively safe from the advance of McClellan's army. I hope 
that those who were whipped yesterday will not appear again. 
The attack this morning was made at an unfortunate time. We 
had but little ammunition,* but we have since replenished our 
supply, and I sincerely hope that we may succeed against them 
in their next effort. 

" Oh, that I had ten thousand men more. 
" Yours, respectfully, 

"J. LONGSTREET, 

" Major-General Commanding. 
** General G. W. Smith, 

" Commanding. 
" Our line is already connected, General Stuart says, by cav- 
alry vedettes. 



." 



"J. L 

When I finished reading the above note I handed it to Gen- 
eral Lee. When he had read it, I asked him to hand it to Presi- 
dent Davis. I then told General Lee that Longstreet was mis- 
taken in supposing the whole Federal army was opposed to him. 
There was still a very large force in AVhiting's immediate front ; 
it was then certain that the great body of the two Federal corps 
on the north side of the river had made no important move- 
ment ; and the 5,000 men ordered, several hours before, to move 
from the Chickahominy to the Williamsburg road, were closely 
approaching Longstreet's position. The danger to Richmond, 
if any, was not on the Williamsburg road. 

After President Davis finished reading Longstreet's 1.30 p. m. 
note, he returned it to General Lee, and the latter handed it back 
to me. No comments were made upon it by either of them, but 
President Davis very soon rode away, leaving General Lee and 
myself in conference ; everything at the front was quiet ; no 
firing of any consequence had been heard since about 11 a. m., 

* Facts previously stated show that not one of the five Confederate brigades, 
engaged that day, had been in action the day before. It is, therefore, not at 
all probable that when " the attack this morning was made," these brigades 
could have " had but little ammunition." G. W. 8. 



D. H. hill's official eepokt. 139 

and no movements of tlie enemy had been observed after that 
time. 

General Lee made no adverse comment upon my manage- 
ment of the army, and gave me no orders then, or at any other 
time that day ; between 4 and 5 p. m. he and I, with one of my 
couriers, went over to the Williamsburg road. The troops I had 
ordered from the Chickahominy had arrived, and were resting, 
under arms, a little in rear of where we found General Long- 
street quietly talking with President Davis and several members 
of the Cabinet ; after the ordinary greetings. General Longstreet, 
addressing me, began to explain the situation in the right wing ; 
as soon as I caught the drift of his remarks, I said it would be 
better for him to address General Lee, who had relieved me as 
commander of the army. 

During the time that we remained with General Longstreet all 
was quiet ; no special information was obtained in regard to the 
events of that morning, or of the probable movements of the 
enemy ; so far as I then knew, no questions of immediate im- 
portance were discussed. About 6 p. m. General Lee and myself 
returned to our respective headquarters on the Nine-miles road ; 
with his approval I liad ordered the troops that had been sent to 
Longstreet's assistance to return to the Chickahominy Bkifis. 

General D. H. HiWs Official Beport of Operations on the 1st of 
June. — He says, " At daylight next morning [he means daylight 
June 1] I learned that heavy re-enforcements had come up to the 
support of Keyes ; Longstreet's, Huger's and my own divisions 
had opposed to us three Yankee corps — Keyes's, Sumner's, and 
Heintzelnian's. We also learned that General G. W. Smith had 
been checked upon the Nine-miles road, and that no help could 
be expected in that direction ; I therefore resolved to concentrate 
my troops around the captured works in the hope that the Yan- 
kees would attempt to retake them.'' 

The tenor of General Hill's report leads to the inference that 
he controlled the whole right wing that day without guidance 
from any quarter. When my attention was first called to Hill's 
report in the published " Official Records," I wrote to him, on the 
16th of June, 1885, and asked him to tell me what orders he 
received from General Longstreet at the battle of Seven Pines, 



140 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

on Sunday, June 1, 1862. In a letter to me, dated June 20^ 
1885, in reply to my question, lie states : " General Hill says that 
he got no orders from General Longstreet on Sunday whatever." 

In view of facts already established, these few and plain words, 
from Genei-al Hill, constitute the severest condemnation of 
General Longstreet's conduct as commander of the right wing 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, on the Ist of June, 1862. 

Continuing his report, General Hill says : " Orders were 
accordingly given to the advance brigades, commanded by Pickett, 
Pryor and Wilcox, to draw in their extended lines and form near 
the late headquarters of General Casey. Before these orders 
were received a furious attack was made upon Generals Armi- 
stead, Mahone, Pickett, Pryor and Wilcox and their brigades on 
the left of the road." 

Genei-al Hill omits to mention that Pickett's brigade came up 
that morning from its position far back on the railroad, and was 
almost immediately ordered, by Hill, to attack the enemy ; then 
mistakenly supposed to be approaching in ' the woods north of 
Casey's former headquarters. Hill also omits to mention that 
Mahone's brigade came up from the Charles City road very soon 
after the arrival of Pickett's brigade ; and Mahone was ordered,, 
by Hill, to move into the same wood and attack the enemy. The 
official records do not show that Armistead's brigade received 
orders from Hill to advance to the attack, but there is abundant 
official testimony which shows he moved forvrard on the left of 
Pickett's l)rigade, between the latter and the railroad, and made 
a very determined attack on the Federal front line, to the Con- 
federate right of the point where Mahone struck the same line. 
The accounts on both sides prove beyond question that the 
brigades of Pickett, Armistead and Mahone advanced to the 
attack. Two of them reached the Federal lines and made their 
blows felt ; Pickett was checked before he reached liichardson's 
front line. 

In omitting to state the fact that Pickett and Mahone were 
ordered to attack, and that Armistead went in with them ; 
General Hill conveys the impression that these three brigades 
were attacked whilst holding definite positions in the Confeder- 
ate lines. And, it seems that, misapprehension on the part of 



D. H. hill's official REPORT. 141 

General Hill in snpposing the attack was commenced by the 
Federals moving against the brigades of Armistead, Malione and 
Pickett resulted in Hill's doing grave injustice to Armistead's 
brigade, and in a less degree to Mahone's. 

He adds : " Armistead's men fled earlj in the action, with the 
exception of a few heroic companies, with which that gallant 
officer maintained his ground against an entire brigade. Mahone 
withdrew his brigade without any orders. I sent up Colston's to 
replace him, but he did not engage the Yankees as I expected him 
to do. Pickett, Pryor and Wilcox received their orders to fall 
back after the firing began, and wisely resolved not to do so until 
the assault was repulsed. As soon as that was done Wilcox and 
Pryor withdrew, but Pickett held his ground against the odds of 
ten* to one for several hours longer, and only retired when the 
Yankees had ceased to annoy him." 

As before stated, no otheial report or other account, from any 
one in that part of Armistead's brigade which advanced on 
Pickett's left can be found. But it is reasonable to infer — from 
the official reports and accounts of others, both on the Confed- 
erate and the Federal side — that Armistead's brigade, on the 
right of Mahone's, struck the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, of 
Howard's brigade, in Richardson's front line. That regiment 
was driven back in disorder. The action had then been kept up 
for an hour or more. Richardson's front line being thus broken, 
Armistead's brigade must have suffered heavy losses, because it 
was now met by fresh troops from Richardson's second line, by 
the fire of Birney's troops along the railroad, and by a charge 
from Birney's troops on the south side of the railroad. If 
General Hill had known these facts he certainly would not have 
so worded his official report as to give the impression that Armi- 
stead's brigade, in regular position, was attacked by the Federals, 
and "fled early in the action, with the exception of a few heroic 
companies, with which that gallant officer maintained his ground." 
No Confederates maintained their ground, for any length of time, 
in the position where Armistead's brigade met with disaster. 

Mahone with two of his regiments attacked the left wing of 

* But, see Federal " Official Eecords " already quoted. 



142 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

French's brigade. The other regnnent of Mahone's brigade had 
been at that time temporarily detached by General Hill. The 
latter reijiment entered the woods later and after beino; for a time 
hotly engaged withdrew under mistaken orders. Mahone then 
withdrew the other two regiments and reformed the three regi- 
ments in the position from which they had been ordered to 
advance to the attack. Pickett was attacked by four Federal 
regiments only, and he withdrew after Colston and Mahone re- 
enforced him. Wilcox withdrew his own brigade and Pryor's at 
once, on receipt of General Hill's positive written order. The 
enemy in their front had not been repulsed when tliese two 
brigades were withdrawn. 

General Hill adds : " The Yankees were too prudent to attack 
us in position, and contented themselves for the balance of the 
day in a desultory fire of artillery, which hurt no one, and was 
only attended with the gratifying result of stampeding the 
amateur fighters and the camp plunderers from Richmond. The 
batteries of Maurin, Stribling and Watson had been added to 
those of the preceding day by General Longstreet and an occa- 
sional shot was fired in response to the Yankee artillery. The 
day was spent in removing 6,Y00 muskets and rifles in fine con- 
dition, ordnance, commissary and medical stores. Ten captured 
guns had been removed the night before. . . . General 
Longstreet sent me an order after dark to withdraw my whole 
command. The thirteen brigades were not got together until 
near midnight." 

TVitJidraivcd. — By half an hour after sunrise, June 2, the whole 
of the thirteen brigades had quietly filed by, and the rear guard 
" moved off, not a Yankee in sight or even a puff of smoke." 
Hill's division returned to their intrenchments on the Williams- 
burg road. Huger's division remained well out on that road, 
far in advance of Hill's intrenchments. Longstreet's division was 
ordered back to its camps on and near the Nine-miles road. 

After the Federals discovered that the Confederates had with- 
drawn from the captured lines, that portion of Hooker's division 
which had been engaged the previous day took possession of 
Casey's earthworks during the morning ; and that afternoon Gen- 



WITHDRAWAL FROM CAPTURED WORKS, JUNE 2. 143 

eral Hooker made a reconnaissance a short distance in front of the 
line held by Casey's skirmisliers before the action commenced. 
Hooker reported that " the enemy appeared to have a regiment 
of cavalry and three of infantry." 

On the jS^ine-miles road, the division under "Whiting remained 
in position closely confronting Sumner's corps at Fair Oaks 
Station. In a letter, dated June 10, 1862, addressed to the chief 
of my staff. General Whiting says : " The attention of the general 
commanding the army should be called at once to the condition 
of this division. Its effective strength is daily decreasing. Since 
Yorktown, with the exception of some four days during which it 
was encamped near Richmond, it has been constantly in contact 
with the enemy. It has fought two battles, the last an engage- 
ment of great severity, in which it suffered heavy loss, especially 
in officers, followed by two da^'s of great hardship and privation. 
It now occupies an important position, where the service is exceed- 
ingly onerous, directly in the face of the enemy, with whom they 
are constantly engaged. They are in a swamp of an exceedingly 
nnhealthy character, and to properly defend our centre, the labor 
is exhausting. ... It is absolutely necessary that other 
troops relieve [this] the first division. If no other offers, the 
second division [that of A. P. Hill] might take its place. The 
Major- General, no doubt, is well aware of the condition of affairs, 
and although not now on duty, I appeal to his influence if it can 
be exerted. A copy of this is sent direct to the General com- 
manding the armv." 



144 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINFS. 



CHAPTER YII. 

Summary and Comments. 

When General J. E. Johnston, abont noon, May 30, determined 
to order an attack upon the Federals in the vicinity of Seven 
Pines, the plan of striking a blow against their two corps on the 
south side of the Chickahominy river — and destroying them be- 
fore they could be re-enforced by the three corps then on the 
north side of that stream — was not an inspiration of the moment ; 
nor was it in any way connected with a high stage of water in the 
Chickahominy. 

There was nothing in the mere locality of Seven Pines worth 
a contest on the part of the Confederates who had voluntarily 
yielded that position to the Federal advanced guard on the 24th 
of May. When the Federals, in force worth crushing, should 
come within easy striking distance of the Confederate army in 
front of "Richmond, General Johnston intended to overwhelm 
that force, if possible, before it could receive assistance. 

It is highly probable the attack would have been ordered 
earlier but for the fact that on the 27th the attention of the 
Confederate commander was suddenly called to the right flank of 
the Federals — on the north side of the Chickahominy — because 
of McDowell's movement, from Fredericksburg, to join Mc- 
Clellan. 

On the night of the 2Sth, when General Johnston counter- 
manded the order for attack upon Mechanicsville and Beaver 
Dam creek. General Longstreet urged that an attack should be made 
early next morning in the direction of Seven Pines. In reply 
General Johnston stated that the disposition of his forces, made 
when it was supposed McDowell was coming, was too strong on 
the extreme left to admit of immediate concentration against the 
Federal left wing — but, if McDowell did not promptly come on, 
a movement in full force would soon be made in the direction in- 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 145 

dicated. In all the discussions of tliis subject it was distinctly 
understood that promptness of action aud determined fighting, 
by superior numbers on our side, were essential to complete Con- 
federate success. 

There are two main roads from Richmond to Seven Pines. 
On one of these — the Nine-miles road — there were three brigades 
of Longstreet's division, three and onedialf miles from the city. 
The other three brigades of that division were not far from the 
point where that road leaves the suburbs. D. H. Hill's division 
was on the Williamsburg road two or three miles from Rich- 
mond ; one brigade, however, being in observation well out on 
the Charles City road. 

General Johnston intended that these two divisions should 
advance by the respective roads which they were already on and 
near. Hill was to mitiate the attack on the Williamsburg road 
early in the morning, May 31 ; and that attack was to be prompt- 
ly and closely supported by Longstreet's division moving into 
action on the Nine-miles road. 

My division, then commanded by General Whiting, was on 
and near the Meadow Bridge road. In the written order, dated 
9.15 p. M., May 30, sent by General Johnston, direct to General 
Whiting, the latter was instructed " to move by the Nine-miles 
road — coming as early as possible to the point at which the road 
to New Bridge turns off. Should there be cause of haste, General 
McLaws, on your approach, will be ordered to leave his ground 
for you that he may re-enforce General Longstreet." 

Of the four brigades in McLaws's disdsion, two were along the 
New Bridge road, and two were on the Chickahominy Bluffs, 
guarding the crossing of that stream between the New Bridge 
and Mechanicsville roads. 

Huger's division, three brigades, had just arrived from 
Norfolk, and was in camp on Gilliss creek, near the eastern 
suburb of Richmond, not far north of the point where the 
Williamsburg road leaves the city. At 8.-40 p. m., May 30, Huger 
was instructed to move his division, early next morning, on the 
Charles City road ; relieve the brigade of D. H. Hill's division 
then in observation on that road ; and " be ready " if an action 
should be begun on his left, to fall upon the enemy's left flank. 
10 



146 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

On May 31, General Johnston modified the above and gave 
Huger the following instructions : " It will be necessary for your 
progress to the front to conform at first to that of General Hill. 
If you find no strong body in your front, it will be well to aid 
General Hill ; but then a strong reserve should be retained to 
cover our right." 

At noon, May 30, when General Johnston determined to make 
the attack as early as possible next morning, it had not commenced 
to rain. He knew that two Federal corps were on the south side 
of the Chickahominy — extended from the vicinity of Seven Pines 
to Bottom's Bridge and White Oak Bridge. His information led 
him to believe that Sumner's corps had not yet crossed the river; 
but, on that point he was not well assured. It was, however, con- 
sidered certain that Sumner would cross to the assistance of Keyes, 
in the vicinity of Seven Fines, as soon as the latter was attacked. 
There were two other Federal corps on the north side of the 
Chickahominy, extending from the vicinity of New Bridge to 
Mechanicsville. They might follow Snmner; or else move 
against Richmond, whilst the bulk of Johnston's army was en- 
gaged in the swamps around Seven Pmes. 

General Johnston believed that an attack by D. H. Hill, early 
in the morning, against the Federals on the Williamsburg road 
— promptly supported by the six brigades of Longstreet's divi- 
sion, moving on the Nine-miles road — would crush the Federals 
in the vicinity of Seven Pines before re-enforcements could reach 
them either from the direction of Bottom's Bridge, or from the 
north side of the river. 

The attack which was to have been made by the six brigades 
of Longstreet's division, if successful, would have isolated the 
two Federal corps already on our side of the Chickahominy from 
the three corps believed to be on the north side of that stream — - 
and thus cut McClellan's army in two. 

To provide against Federal re-enforcements from the north 
side of the river, and other contingencies that might arise. General 
Johnston ordered my division, under Whiting, to move from the 
Meadow Bridge road, north of Richmond, and take position, as 
already stated ; and, if this division could not reach that position 
in time, McLaws's division, " should there be cause of haste,''^ 
would " re-enforce Longstreet." 



's 



STJMMAET AND COMMENTS. 147 

Wlien I reached General Jolinston's headquarters — about 
4.30 A. M. — I informed him that on the receipt of his order I 
had transmitted a copy of it to General Whiting, and directed 
him to move as soon as possible, and report to General Jolmston, 
That I had learned from Whiting he had previously received the 
order from the Army Headquarters, and preparations for an early 
start had already been made. Whiting reported that the head of 
the division would move at dawn, and would be at the designated 
point on time. 

General Johnston was then not only hopeful, but elated at 
the prospect of striking an effective blow early that morning 
against Kcyes's corps. He had some anxiety in reference to 
movements the Federals from the north side of the Chicka- 
hominy might make against Richmond ; but, with my division 
\ under Whiting, on the Nine-miles road, near its junction with the 
INew Bridge road, he felt that Federal re-enforcements from the 
north side of the river, crossing below New Bridge, could be held 
in check long enough to enable the divisions of Longstreet and 
D. H. Hill to crnsh Keyes. 

He informed me that he would, in person, be on the Nine-miles 
^ road, because the movements of the Federals on the north bank 

of the river could be better observed from that side ; and he 
told me that, in case they made an attempt to cross above New 
Bridge, he would intrust to me the protection of the city whilst 
the mass of his army was engaged in the direction of Seven 
Pines. 

Reasonable as were his expectations, at sunrise, May 31, they 
would have been much better founded if his orders had been 
given sooner. It was but little after midday, May 30, when he 
" resolved " to attack as early as possible next morning. There 
was ample time for Huger's division to move out on the Charles 
City road, relieve the brigade of D. H. Hill's division on that 
road, and for that brigade to unite with the three brigades of D. 
H. Hill's division on the Williamsburg road before, or very soon 
after, dark. There was nothing to prevent Longstreet's division 
from moving that afternoon, or early that night, to a point just 
within McLaws's line on the New Bridge road. And the division 
under AVhiting might easily have been moved from the Meadow 



148 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Bridge road and closed up on Longstreet's division, on the Nine 
miles road, before midnight, May 30. Although these disposi- 
tions of the four divisions were not ordered, the state of things 
at sunrise — say 4.30 a. m. — seemed more than sufficiently favor- 
able to justify General Johnston's elation at the prospect of 
crushing Keyes's corps very early that morning. 

But, an order had already been given by General Longstreet, 
which would necessarily delay the attack far beyond the time 
General Johnston then expected it would occur. General D. H. 
Hill, in his official report, says : " 1 was directed by General 
Longstreet to move with ray whole division at dawn on the 
Williamsburg road and to lead the attack on the Yankees. I 
was, however, directed not to move until relieved by Huger's 
division." 

With this condition appended it was worse than idle for 
Longstreet to order Hill to move " at dawn " with his " whole 
division." Lievitable delay was caused by that order. If Huger 
had moved " at dawn '' several hours would have elapsed before 
his division could reach the position held by one of Hill's brigades 
well out on the Charles City road ; and additional time would 
be required for that brigade to cross the almost impracticable 
White Oak Swamp and reach the other brigades on the Williams- 
burg road. 

But this delay, necessitated by the order now in question, 
was of but little moment compared with the delays which were 
caused by " Longstreet's misunderstanding " in regard to the 
direction in which his own division was to move into action ; and 
his " mismanagement " after that division had been transferred 
from the Nine-miles road to the Williamsburg road. 

Apparently unconscious of the pressing necessity for striking, 
in full force, a prompt and decisive blow against the Federals, 
isolated at Seven Pines, before they could be re-enforced ; Long- 
street very J^^liberately consumed much time in putting his own 
division in motion. One of his brigades, if not more, took their 
baggage wagons and camp equipage with them. When they did 
start, instead of moving towards the enemy, at Seven Pines, his 
division was directed to Huger's camp, on the banks of Gilliss 
creek, near the east suburb of Kichmond. Before leaving camp 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 149 

Longstreet's own troops delayed the division under Whiting ; at 
Gilliss creek they took precedence of, and delayed, Huger's 
division. 

Between 10 and 11 a. m. Longstreet had about 30,000 
men under his control, on the Williamsburg and Cliarles 
City roads, the great body of them being near the junction of 
those roads. At that time and place, by authority of General 
Johnston, he took command of Huger's division, in addition to 
his own and that of D. H. Hill. At 1 p. m. Hill's four brigades 
advanced to attack. After more than two hours' very hard 
fighting, these four brigades, unaided, captured Casey's earth- 
works. In the meantime Longstreet held six brigades on the 
Charles City road — south of the White Oak Swamp, where there 
was no enemy— five of those brigades being near the junction of 
that road with the Williamsburg road. He held Pickett's bri- 
gade far back on the Richmond and York Hiver Raih'oad ; and he 
ordered two brigades to move up on the Williamsburg road, "to 
support Hill if need be." 

Long before Hill's four brigades captured Casey's earthworks 
Sumner had crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy and 
was hurrying to the assistance of his friends ; and the head of 
Heintzelman's corps had come up from Bottom's Bridge to the 
Federal third line of defense — witliin supporting distance of 
Keyes — before Hill's attack commenced. 

General D. H. Hill, in his official report, says : " My division 
had beaten Casey's division and all the re-enforcements brought 
him. ... It was desirable, however, to press the Yankees 
as closely as possible. I therefore sent back to General Longstreet 
and asked for another brigade. In a few minutes the magnificent 
brigade of R. H. Anderson came to my support." This was 
about 3.30 p. m. The brigade Longstreet sent to Hill's assistance 
went into action at 4 p. m. At that time General Johnston 
received a note from General Longstreet asking for help and 
complaining of Johnston's " slowness." 

The wrong impression conveyed hj that note was the cause of 
trouble on the Nine-miles road, which need not be repeated here. 
It is enough now to say that one of the five brigades on that road 
was sent by General Johnston direct to Longstreet's assistance ; 



150 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

and tlie four other brigades of the division, under Whiting, not 
only held in check the re-enforcements, under Sumner, sent to 
assist Keyes and Heintzelman, but they held "cut off" — from the 
forces opposed to Longstreet — four regiments and a battery of 
Couch's division ; and incidentally prevented Birney's brigade, 
of Heintzelman's corps, from re-enforcing Keyes at a ^critical 
time. 

When Longstreet complained of Johnston's "slovt^ness" he 
started five brigades on the Charles City road marching and 
countermarching on that road, near its junction with the 
Williamsburg road, and kept them there so that they did not 
reach the Williamsburg road, at a point far in rear of the fight- 
ing, until 5 p. M. 

At that time the head of Sumner's column went into action 
north of Fair Oaks Station ; and Kearaey's troops had been for 
fully an hour pressing back the right of D. H. Hill's division 
from the second abatis. The five brigades from the Charles City 
road reached the front too late to be put in action that day. 

But General D. II. Hill says in his oflicial report : 
" Kemper's brigade was now sent me by General Longstreet, 
and directed by me to move directly to the support of 
E.odes. This brigade, however, did not engage the Yankees, and 
Rodes's men were badly cut up." The brigade that Longstreet 
placed far back on the railroad was held in that position until the 
next day. So, out of thirteen brigades in the right wing, under 
the control of General Longstreet, he succeeded in putting five 
brigades in close action, May 31 ; and of these only one was 
from his own division, in which there were six brigades. 

Yet, in his letter, June 7, 1862, to General Johnston, Long- 
street says : " The failure of complete success on Saturday [May 
31], I attribute to the slow movements of General Huger's com- 
mand. This tlirew perhaps the hardest part of the battle upon 
my own poor division.'' In commenting on that letter D. H. 
Hill says : '' Longstreet was not on the field at all on the 3l8t of 
May, and did not see any of the fighting. But he ought to have 
known that I got no assistance from him except the brigade of 
R. H. Anderson." 

In a letter addressed to me. May 18, 1885, General D. H. 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 151 

Hill says : " I cannot understand Lon^street's motive in coming 
over to the Williamsburg road, nor can I understand Johnston's 
motive in shielding him." 

Without entering upon questions of motive, attention is 
called to the fact that a portion of the only brigade of Longstreet's 
own division that was put in close action, May 31, was sent back 
from the Williamsburg road to the Nine-miles road, near Fair 
Oaks Station, after 3.30 p. m., by D. H. Hill. The service done 
by the two regiments under Colonel Jenkins, after 4 p. m., is 
sufficient evidence of what would have been the probable eifect 
had Longstreet's division gone promptly into action on the Nine- 
miles road, on D. H. Hill's left, as General Johnston certainly 
intended. Lougstreet himself sent one brigade back from the 
Williamsburg road to the railroad ; but he held it there to "repel 
any advance of the enemy up that road ; " instead of sending it 
forward into the fight. 

In a letter dated June 28, 1862, addressed to me. General 
Johnston says : " I received information of Longstreet's misun- 
derstanding (which may be my fault as I told you at the time) 
while his troops were moving to the Williamsburg road, and 
sent to Longstreet to send three brigades by the JSIine-miles road, 
if they had not marched so far as to make the change involve a 
serious loss of time." 

I have no recollection of his telling me that the " misunder- 
standing " may have been his own fault. I know that he was 
greatly surprised and annoyed by the information that Long- 
street's division was not on the Nine-miles road. And he was 
strongly inclined to the opinion that my aide must have been 
mistaken. 

But it may Ije that General Johnston felt it might be his 
*' fault '' that it did not occur to him — whilst placing Longstreet 
in control of the three divisions of the right wing — to order him 
not to bring back to Huger's camp near Richmond the three bri- 
gades of his own division, which were already three and a half 
miles out from that city, on one of the two main roads leading 
to Seven Pines; not to march his whole division to that camp; 
not to take precedence of Huger's division, at that point ; not 
to place two brigades of Huger's division and three brigades of 



152 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINE8. 

his own division near the junction of the Williamsburg and 
Charles City roads and keep them there until 3.30 p. m. ; not 
to march and countermarch these live brigades on the Charles 
Citj road, where there was no enemy ; and iinallj at 5 p. m. — 
by crossing the White Oak Swamp — bring the head of this column 
of five brigades to a point on the Williamsburg road far in rear 
of the fighting that had then been raging for four hours ; and not 
to place one of his brigades back on the railroad to " repel any 
advance of the enemy up that road " and keep it there whilst the 
contest against the Federal left wing was raging from 1 p. m. 
nntil dark. 

In short, it may have been General Johnston's " fault '' that 
it did not occur to him to order Longstreet to put more than 
one of the six brigades of his own division into close action, 
to support D. H. Hill's four brigades, in the effort to crush 
and, if possible, destroy Keyes's corps before it could be re- 
enforced. 

In this connection it is well to glance at some of General Long- 
street's statements in regard to his understanding of General 
Johnston's plan ; of whicli he claims to speak " from accurate 
knowledge." He says : " The plan was to turn 3'onr [the 
Federal] left at daylight by throwing Huger's division, by a pass- 
able route for infantry, to your left and rear. As the head of 
his column passed the swamp, D. H. Hill was to be ready, and I 
was to advise him to make the attack vigorously. Huger did not 
reach the field. At 1 o'clock D. II. Hill proposed to bring on 
the battle, and it was agreed to under the impression that Huger 
would be there surely by the time we were warmed up into actual 
battle." * 

" Our plan was, as you stated, to turn your left b}' moving 
Huger's command across the head of White Oak Swamp ; that to 
be followed by the attack of General D. H. Hill, on the Will- 
iamsburg road, which was to be suppoi'ted, if need be, by my 
command ; the command on the Nine-miles road following Hill's 
movements. As you say in your article, Johnston's plan was 



* General Lougstreet, in letter dated July 17, 1874, addressed to General 
G. W. Mindil. 



STJMMAEY AND COMMENTS. 153 

faultless, and, in my judgment at the time, was the only plan 
that could be approved by a military mind." * 

However "accurate" General Longstreet's knowledge of 
Johnston's plan may have been " at tlietime," he has now grossly 
misstated it. The written instructions given by General John- 
ston show that Huger's division was not ordered to turn the 
Federal left at daylight ; and the order given to Whiting shows 
that the command on the Nine-miles road was not to follow Hill's 
movements. Moreover, the records show conclusively that D. H. 
Hill was not to be held back until Huger's command had crossed 
the White Oak Swamp and had turned the Federal left. 

When Whiting found his march obstructed by Longstreet's 
troops, he became impatient at the delay and wrote to General 
Johnston. In reply he was informed by the latter, " Longstreet 
will precede you." The plain meaning of which is : Longstreet's 
division was to precede the division under Whiting, on the Nine- 
miles road. General McLaws was guarding the New Bridge 
crossing and. the Bluffs of the Chickahominy. Yet, General 
Longstreet would have it believed that, " Should there be cause 
of haste General McLaws " " will be ordered to leave his ground," 
" that he may re-enforce General Longstreet ; " the latter being 
on the Williamsburg road, and expected only to support D. H. 
Hill, "if need be ;'' and Hill to be held back imtil Huger's di- 
vision had crossed the White Oak Swamp and turned the Federal 
left flank ! 

No such preposterous " plan " as that attributed by Long- 
street to Johnston could ever have been evolved, out of the plain 
facts, if General Johnston had permitted it to be " generally 
known '' that Longstreet " misunderstood " the direction in 
which his own division was to move into action. 

In speaking of the results of the fighting. May 31, General 
Johnston says : "General Hill pursued the enemy toward Bot- 
tom's Bridge more than a mile ; then, night being near, he gath- 
ered his troops and reformed them, facing to the east, as they 
had been fighting. The line thus formed crossed the Williams- 
burg road at right angles. The left, however, was thrown back 

* General Longstreet to General G. W. Mindil, 1874. 



154 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

to face Sumner's corps at Fair Oaks. In an hour or two Long- 
street's and Hnger's division, whom it bad not been necessary to 
bi'ing into action, came into this line under General Longstreet's 
orders."'^-' 

" The troojDS in position to renew the battle on Sunday were, 
at Fair Oaks, on the Federal side, two divisions and a brigade ; 
one of the divisions, Richardson's, had not been engaged, having 
come upon the field about, or after, nightfall. On the Confed- 
erate side, ten brigades in Smith's and Magruder's divisions, six 
of which were fresh, not having fired a shot. On the Williams- 
burg road four Federal divisions, three of which had fought and 
been thoroughly beaten — one, Casey's, almost destroyed. On the 
Confederate side, thirteen brigades, but five of which had been 
engaged on Saturday — when they defeated the three Federal divi- 
sions that were brought against them successively. After night- 
fall, Saturday, the two bodies of Federal ti'ooj^s were completely 
separated from the two corps of their right, beyond the Cliick- 
ahominy, by the swollen stream, which had swept away their 
bridges, and Sumner's corps at Fair Oaks was six miles from those 
of Heintzelman and Keyes, which were near Bottom's Bridge ; 
but the Confederate forces were united on the front and left fiank 
of Sumner's corps. Such advantage of position and superiority 
of numbers w^ould have enabled them to defeat that corps had the 
engagement been renewed on Sunday morning, before any aid 
could have come from Heintzelman, after which his troops, in the 
condition to which the action of the day before had reduced them, 
could not have made effectual resistance." f 

"At half-past six o'clock [May 31] .... I announced to my 
staff officers that each regiment must sleep where it might be stand- 
ing when the contest ceased for tbe night, to be ready to renew it 
at dawn next morning. About seven o'clock I received a slight 
wound in the right shoulder from a musket shot, and a few 
moments after was unhorsed by a heavy fragment of shell which 
struck my breast." :}: 

* "Johnston's Narrative," page 136. 
f "Johnston's Narrative," page 141. 
X " Johnston's Narrative," page 138. 



8UMMAKY AND COMMENTS. 155 

In his official report, General Johnston says : " About sunset '' 
■*' I was carried from the field, and Major-General G. W. Smith 
succeeded to the command. He was prevented from renewing his 
attack on the enem^^'s position next morning by the discovery of 
strong intrenchmeuts not seen on the previous evening." 

It is not proposed to discuss at any length what he says 
*' prevented " me, as commander of the army, " from renewing '' 
the attack which he insists I made on Sumner, May 31. But, in 
this connection, it is well to notice that, in my official report it is 
stated : " General Longstreet was directed to push his successes of 
the previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement 
upon the position of General Whiting, on his left. The latter 
was directed to make a diversion in favor of General Longstreet's 
real attack,'' 

Utterly ignoring that statement of mine — made to him in 
an official report — he claims that such advantages were gained 
before he was disabled, as to make it certain that three Federal 
corps, on the south side of the Chickahominy, would have been 
destroyed, June 1, if he could have retained command of his 
army that day. 

Upon examination of the data on which he bases this claim, 
it is found from the official records — the detailed reports of the 
fighting commanders, made at the time — that General Johnston's 
statements, in reference to the positions occupied by the contend- 
ing forces are, to say the least, very inaccurate. D. II. Hill's 
division did not pursue the enemy from Seven Pines towards 
Bottom's Bridge. On the contrary, that division was checked at 
the second abatis ; and its right was forced back to Casey's earth- 
works — from which it was withdrawn before dark— and bivou- 
acked with the rest of that division, more than a mile west of 
Seven Pines, instead of being in line of battle more than a mile 
east of that point, as stated by General Johnston. 

The live brigades, from the Charles City road, that reached 
the front too late to be put in action that day, went into bivouac, 
with Kemper's brigade, in the open ground around the captured 
works. Pickett's brigade passed the night far back on the rail- 
road ; Mahone's brigade was in observation on the Charles City 
road ; and Colonel Jenkins's command remained, for a few hours 



156 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

only, at the point — about half a mile east of Seven Pines — - 
where it had ceased fio^hting at dark. During the night, the bri- 
gades of Wilcox and Pryor relieved Colonel Jenkins's command. 
The latter then retired to the Federal camps at Seven Pines ; 
and the two relieving brigades bivouacked on the Williamsburg 
road ; the head of the column being on the ground where Jen- 
kins ceased fighting. 

Yet General Johnston says D. H. Hill's division was in line 
of battle across the Williamsburg road, a mile east of Seven 
Pines ; and would have it believed that " Longstreet's and 
Huger's division " both passed the night in line of battle, facing 
north, on the immediate left flank, and overlapping the rear of 
Sumner's corps ; which, he says, was drawn up in line facing 
nearly west. And he places ten Confederate brigades, " six of 
which were fresh, not having fired a shot," " in position," in 
front of Sumner, "to renew the battle on Sunday." 

There were but five brigades in front of Sumner, in position 
to renew the battle. One of these brigades (Hood's) was " fresh, 
not having fired a shot ; '' because it had been sent, by General 
Johnston, direct to Longstreet's assistance — reached Longstreet's 
troops after D. H. Hill's division had ceased fighting at the second 
abatis, and being recalled, arrived at Fair Oaks a little after the 
fighting north of that point ended. 

Of the five hrigades, in Magrnder's command, which General 
Johnston says were confronting Sumner : one was near the 
Mechanicsville road, guarding the crossing of the Chickahom- 
iny ; two were on the bluffs between that road and the vicinity 
of New Bridge ; and two were at the latter point and along the 
New Bridge road. The only other brigade of Magruder's 
command was on the Meadow Bridge road. Magruder's troops 
were the only forces guarding tlie line of the Chickahominy. 

Whilst General Johnston insists that " the Confederates were 
united on the front and left flank of Sumner's cor])8 ; " he says 
that the latter " was six miles from those of Heintzelman and 
Keyes." But, in point of fact, early on the morning of June 1, 
the right of Kearney's division, of Heintzelman's corps, over- 
lapped the left of Sumner's corps in line of battle along the rail- 
road ; two brigades of Kearney's division were in the rifle-pits of 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 157 

the third line of defense, on the north side of the Williamsburg 
road, within supporting distance of the leading brigade ; Kejes's 
corps was in the third line of defense south of the Williamsburg 
road ; and half of Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, was 
a few hundred yards in rear of Keyes. The other half of 
Hooker's division occupied the fortifications at Bottom's Bridge 
and at White Oak Bridge. 

With the exception of these guards at the bridges, the three 
Federal corps, on the south side of the Cliickahominy, were prac- 
tically united early on the morning of June 1, and were not so 
thoroughly cut off from the two corps on the north side of that 
stream as General Johnston seems to suppose. General J. G. 
Barnard, Chief Engineer of McClellan's army, in his official 
report, says : " At 8.15 a.m. (June 1), the yjontoon bridge at the 
site of New Bridge was complete and passable to infantry, cavalry 
and artillery,'' The railroad bridge was intact, throughout 
the freshet, and had been arranged for the prompt passage of 
all arms of the service. " About noon the upper trestle bridge 
was practicable for infantry. It was not till night that a practi- 
cable bridge for infantry was obtained at the lower trestle bridge.'' 

It is true that eight regiments of raw troops in Casey's divi- 
sion, after more than two hours of very hard fighting, were 
thrown into great confusion whilst moving in retreat, under 
deadly fire, across the abatis in their rear. Finding the eartliworks 
of the second line occupied, a large portion of these raw troops 
continued to retreat ; some of them as far as the Chickahominy. 
But tliey were rallied, and placed in the third line of defense 
eai-ly next morning. Five regiments of Casey's division re- 
mained on the field during the contest for Couch's line, and 
there is no reason to believe they were demoralized — much less 
" almost destroyed." Two brigades of Kearney's division were 
elated at their success ; and the other brigade of that division 
was not in action May 31. Couch's division was in fairly good 
condition ; and Hooker's division had not yet been in the fight. 

General Johnston assumes a good deal when he says the left 
wing of McClellan's army, " in the condition to which the action 
of the day before had reduced them, could not have made effec- 
tual resistance ; " and he is far beyond the record when he says 



158 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

there was a gap of six miles between the left wing of the Federal 
army and Sumner's corps ! 

His claim that the three Federal corps on the south side of 
the Chickahominy would have been destroyed on the 1st of 
June, if he had not been disabled on the 31st of May, will be 
judged in connection with what he had succeeded in doing 
against one corps, isolated at Seven Pines, during more than 
twenty-four hours from the time he " resolved " to make the attack. 

In his "Narrative " he says : " An hour or two later [than 
noon, May 30], orders were given for the concentration of twen- 
ty-three of our twenty-seven brigades against McClellan's left 
wing."* When he was wounded a little before sunset May 31, 
he had pnt only five brigades in action against that wang ! 

In reference to the actual fighting on the 1st of June, the 
oificial reports of Generals Sumner and Richardson and their 
brigade and regimental commanders, show, beyond question, 
that Richardson's division was very rudely assaulted about 
6.30 A. M. His front line was severely shaken, one regiment 
was driven back, and did not again come into close action. The 
contest continued an hour or more before the front line was 
broken. That line was not only restored by the advance of fresh 
troops, but these, together with Birney's brigade, of Kearney's 
division, of Heintzelraan's corps, assailed the attacking Confed- 
erates in front and flank, and repulsed them. Advancing through 
the dense and tangled wood, four Federal regiments, three of 
Richardson's division and one of Birney's brigade, ran against a 
Confederate force, in an abatis, in front of the left wing of 
French's brigade, about 300 yards south of the railroad. The 
contest continued at this point for two hours or more ; and 
the four Federal regiments were withdrawn to the positions from 
which they had advanced. The losses in Richardson's division 
in killed and wounded were 751 ; in Birney's brigade 197. Total 
Federal killed and wounded, on that part of the field, 918. 

The Confederate accounts, although far less explicit than 
those of the Federals, show, beyond reasonable doubt, that Rich- 
ardson's division was attacked by two Confederate brigades only. 
The position, in front of the left wing of French's brigade, 300 

* Johnston's Narrative, page 132. 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 159 

yards south of the raih'oad, was held by a Confederate brigade 
which was not engaged in the attack on Richardson's line. 
The losses in that brigade were 350 killed and wounded. 

One of the brigades that attacked Richardson lost 338 ; the 
losses in the other brigade (Armistead's) are not stated ; but, 
judging from its position on the field- — and the flank as well as 
front attack to which it was subjected by fresh troops, after 
it had broken Richardson's front line — it is probable that the 
losses in this brigade were very great. It is, therefore, safe 
to assume that the Confederate losses in Richardson's front 
were equal to, if not greater than, those of the Federals — and 
that the killed and wounded on the two sides, in this affair, were 
about 2,000, not including losses on other parts of the field that 
day. 

In his " History of the Army of the Potomac," Swinton says : 
" General Johnston has frequently expressed to the writer his 
amazement at the swelling bulk assumed by the ' skirmish ' of 
the 1st, . . . and asserts that nothing more severe than an 
affair of the rear guard took place '' ! 

, Between 7 and 8 a. m., June 1, the five regiments of Sickles's 
brigade and two New Jersey regiments— all under the command 
of General Hooker — were sent forward on, and on the north side 
of, the Williamsburg road, to aid Richardson. The Confed- 
erates that were struck by Hooker had taken no part in the fight- 
ing against, or near, Richardson's lines. They were the brigades 
of Wilcox and Pryor, both under control of General Wilcox. 

When the firing commenced against Richardson, General Wil- 
cox, whilst awaiting orders, arranged his trooj^s, ready for any 
emergency. 

General Hooker, in his ofiicial report, after describing his first 
movements, and the initial firing, says : " Directions were given 
to advance with the bayonet, when the enemy were thrown into 
wild confusion, throwing away their arms, hats and coats, and 
broke through the forest in the direction of Richmond." 

In his ofiicial report, General Wilcox, after describing the 
commencement of the action, says : " The Nineteenth Mississippi 
had already repulsed the enemy in its front, the other troops doing 
well, and the engagement now raging furiously was going on as well 



160 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

as could be desired ; but just Jit this time an order in writing was 
sent to me to witlidraw my command, which was instantly done." 

He adds: " Pryor's brigade was not engaged on the Slst, but 
acted well on the second day, and yielded reluctantly to the order 
to withdraw." In the light furnished by Wilcox's report, it is 
clearly seen that the picture given by General Hooker, illustrating 
the effect of his " bayonet charge," is too highly colored. 

General D. H. Hill, in his official report, says that he resolved 
to concentrate the thirteen brigades of the right wing of the 
Confederate army " around the captured works, in the hope that 
the Yankees would attempt to retake them,'' and adds, they " were 
too prudent to attack us in position, and contented themselves for 
the balance of the day in a desultory fire of artillery, which hurt 
no one, and was only attended with the gratifying result of 
stampeding the amateur fighters and the camp plunderers from 
Richmond.'' 

There was another Federal so-called " bayonet charge " 
before the fighting ended. In his ofijcial report General French, 
commanding brigade, says : " The second and third lines of the 
division [Richardson's] having interposed in front of my left 
wing, I moved the right wing, consisting of the Sixty-sixth New 
York and Fifty-seventh New York, . . . in a direction at 
riffht anffles to the first line of battle, to feel the left and rear of 
the enemy's flank. After penetrating the swamps and thicket 
about three-fourths of a mile the skirmishers of the Sixty-sixth 
encountered the Forty-first Virginia. A heavy fire being opened 
upon them, followed by a charge with the bayonet, the enemy 
broke and precipitately fled, when my brigade, occupying the 
ground, thus conquered, notwithstanding its losses in the battle, 
remained upon the field unbroken and exultant.'' 

The Sixty-sixth New York formed the right of French's line, 
and it was the only regiment of his brigade which was on the 
north side of the railroad. The Fifty-seventh New York, on the 
left of the Sixty-sixth, does not seem to have participated in this 
'' bayonet charge." The losses in the Fifty-seventh were, three 
killed and fifteen wounded. The casualties in the latter regiment 
probably occurred before it advanced from the original front line 
of Richardson's division. In that line it was contiguous to the 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 161 

left wing of French's brigade where the Confederate attack was 
made. The credit of the bayonet charge, " before which the 
enemy broke and precipitately fled," must be awarded exclusively 
to the Sixty-sixth New York. 

The Fifty-third Virginia, Colonel Tomlin, of Armistead's 
brigade, Ilnger's division, was detained, during the night, May 
31, by General Longstreet, as a guard to his headquarters. On 
being relieved from that duty, Colonel Tomlin, under instruc- 
tions from General Armistead, moved his regiment into the 
woods, north of Casey's redoubt, in search of the left of the 
jS^inth Yirginia. In that search. Colonel Tomlin says his regi- 
ment " came up with the P'orty-flrst Virginia, marching directly 
toward us. From this direction we received a constant fire, 
which we returned until some of our officers, recognizing some 
of the ofiicers of the Forty-first Virginia," " an order was given 
by the Major of the regiment for the left wing to retreat." 
" Friends and enemies were so indiscriminately mixed up to- 
gether that it was most advisable to return to the o])en field. We 
returned slowly to the field, appi-ehending more danger from 
friends than the enemy. We again reformed and reported for 
duty to Major-General Hill." The latter assigned the regiment 
to position in the open ground around the redoubt. 

It thus appears that, whilst the Fifty-third Virginia was 
moving in the densely tangled wood under General Armistead's 
orders, to form line on the left of the Ninth Virginia ; the Forty- 
first Virginia, which had been repulsed in the attack on Richard- 
son's line, was moving back, under General Mahone's order, to 
reform in the open field. These two Virginia regiments com- 
menced firing into each other ; and, whilst thus engaged, before 
the mistake was rectified, the Sixty-sixth New York, from the 
north side of the railroad, came upon the ground, "conquered'' 
it " by a charge with the bayonet," and " remained upon the 
field [in the dense and tangled wood] unbroken and exultant," 
" notwithstanding its losses in the battle ; " which w^ere 1 man 
killed and 5 wounded ! 

A little later. General D. H. Hill sent Mahone and Colston 
to Pickett's assistance in the defensive position held by the 
latter in the abatis in front of French's left wing, about 300 
11 



162 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

yards south of tlie railroad. At that time Pickett's brigade was 
being attacked by the Fifth New Hampshire regiment only. On 
the approach of Mahone and Colston the Fifth New Ilampshire 
withdrew from Pickett's front, and resumed its place, in Rich- 
ardson's second line, north of the railroad. 

After sending back his wounded, Pickett, by General Hill's 
order, quietly withdrew his own brigade and those of Mahone and 
Colston ; all three brigades taking position in the open ground 
around Casey's earthworks, where no one was molested during 
the remainder of the day. 

Although Pickett's brigade was attacked by but four Federal 
regiments in all, he made frantic appeals for help, which was 
finally sent to him by General Hill. In his official report, after 
detailing these appeals, Pickett says, " the last message [to Hill] 
being that if he would send more troops and some ammunition 
to me we would drive the enemy across the Chickahominy ; and 
I have always believed this would have been done but for the 
misfortune which happened to our General [J. E. Johnston] on 
the previous evening. Had he not been wounded, and been on the 
field with us, the result would have been entirely different. I do 
not mean to cast any blame on the brave and heroic Hill, for after 
the fall of the master spirit [Johnston] there seemed to be no 
head, and Hill, I know, was bothered and amazed with counter- 
manding orders. J^To assistance, no demonstration was given or 
made from the other side of the railroad. A most perfect apathy 
seemed to prevail ; not a gun was fired, and I subsequently 
learned from Brigadier-General Hood that he saw the enemy 
pouring his forces across the railroad not more than 600 or 800 
yards in his front and concentrating their attack on me ; that 
one piece of artillery placed in the railroad cut would have 
stopped this and drawn their attention to his front, but he said he 
had orders to make no movement, but to wait for orders. A for- 
ward movement then by the left wing of our army [he means the 
division under Whiting] would have struck the enemy in flank — 
at any rate, have stopped their concentration.'' 

Without dwelling upon what General Pickett says would have 
been the result if General Johnston had been in command that 
day, or commenting here on what he says he knows about Hill's 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 1G3 

liaving been " bothered and amazed with countermanding orders," 
or discussing at present his statement that " a most perfect apathy- 
seemed to prevail" on " the other side of the railroad" ; it may 
be well to call attention to the fact that the only enemy Hood 
saw, " pouring his forces across the railroad ", was the Sixty-sixth 
J^ew York. So far from " concentrating " on Pickett, whose de- 
fensive position was in front of French's left wing, the regiment 
Hood saw constituted the right of French's right wing ; and Gen- 
eral French says he moved that regiment " in a direction at right 
angles to the first line of battle." Moving in that direction the 
Sixty-sixth New York could not "concentrate" on Pickett. 

If the latter really needed help when the Fifth JSTew Hamp- 
shire was the only force " concentrating " against him, there 
were at least eight brigades of the Confederate right wing then 
in position around Casey's captured earthworks ; and all of them, 
if necessary, could easily and quickly have been sent to Pickett's 
assistance. 

In a letter to General G. W. Mindil, 1874, General Long- 
street says : " I do not remember to have heard of any fighting on 
the second day except a sharp skirmish reported by General 
Pickett as he was retiring under the orders of General Lee, to 
resume our former position." 

Between 2 and 3 a. m., June 1, General Longstreet was or- 
dered to renew the attack as early as possible that morning ; and 
fight toward the north, rather than attempt to drive the enemy 
any farther east. About 11a. m., I received, in rapid succession, 
three notes from him. In the first he said : " The brigade cannot 
be spared. Every man except a brigade is in action. As you are 
not fighting, I did not send it." In the second : " I trust that 
some diversion may be made in my favor during these successive 
attacks else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition gives 
out too readily." In the third : " We cannot hold out unless we 
get help. If we can fight together we can finish the work to-dav, 
and Mc.'s time will be up. If I can't get help I fear I must fall 
back." 

These, rapidly repeated, urgent appeals for help indicated that 
the engagement of the right wing had been far more serious than 
I had reason to believe from observations made on the Nine-miles 



164 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

road during the morning ; and I inferred from tlnose notes tliat 
tlie right wing under Longstreet was in pressing need of prompt 
and effective assistance. 

In giving due weight to his complaints that I was not fighting, 

1 knew there was still a large Federal force on the north side of the 
river, and there was a strong body of infantry and five batteries 
in front of Whiting, which had not disturbed Longstreet. If 
Whiting attacked the forces in his front he would have to pass over 
800 or 1,000 yards of open ground, in deep mud. If he succeeded 
in carrying their position, this would not necessarily diminish 
the pressure already brought against Longstreet. Moreover there 
was a wide gap between Whiting's right and Longstreet's left. In 
ordering Longstreet to fight towards the north, and pivot his 
movement on Whiting's position ; it was intended that the right 
wing should close that gap. This had not been done. On the 
contrary, when the Confederate firing receded from the railroad, 
about 8 A. M., the gap seemed to be increased. Whiting's left 
flank was in the air, with no support nearer than the force 
guarding the crossing at New Bridge and along the New Bridge 
road. 

In view of Longstreet's peril, as depicted in his three notes, 
just received, I ordered 5,000 men, who were then guarding 
the Chickahominy between the New Bridge and Mechanics- 
ville roads, to move at once to the Williamsburg road. Ripley's 
brigade, which was just arriving in Richmond, was ordered to 
move out on that road, instead of coming on the Nine-miles road ; 
and General McLaws was sent to Longstreet to inform him of 
the re-enforcements ordered ; assure him that the whole array of 
the enemy was not in his front ; and tell him that he must not fall 
back any farther, but drive the enemy ; and, if possible, regain 
the ground he had lost. 

About 1 p. M. I received a note from McLaws stating : " Long- 
street says he can hold his position -with 5,000 more men. 
He has now the same ground the enemy held yesterday.'' About 

2 p. M. General Lee reached the headquarters of the army, and 
at once took command. Within a few minutes after General Lee 
arrived I received the following from General Longstreet, dated 
1.30 p. M. : " The next attack will be from Sumner's division. I 



8UM1VIARY AND COMMENTS. 165 

think that if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe from 
the advance of McClellan's army. I hope that those who were 
whipped yesterday will not appear again. ... I sincerely 
hope that we may succeed against them in their next effort. Oh, 
that I had 10,000 men more." 

The originals of General Longstreet's battle-field notes, June 1, 
1862, in his own handwriting, are now in my possession. They 
must stand, in all their significance, as a part of the record he then 
made; even, if he does say, in 1874: : " I do not remember to have 
heard of any fighting on the second day except a sharp skirmish 
reported by General Pickett as he was retiring, under the orders 
of General Lee, to resume our former position." 

In his letter to General Mindil, General Longstreet adds : 
" About 10 A. M. General Lee was assigned to command and rode 
out on the I^ine-miles road, saw General Smith, took command, 
and came with General Smith to the Williamsburg road. There 
we discussed the matter of renewed attack. I favored another 
effort to turn your [the Federal] left. Smith opposed it, and gave 
as his reason the strength of your lines, which he claimed to have 
examined, and I was forced to yield my opinions, in consequence 
of his knowledge of superior position on your side.'' 

General Lee took command after 2 p. m. Between 4 and 5 p. m. 
he and 1 crossed over to the Williamsburg road. The troops 
that had been ordered from the Chickahominy Bluffs had arrived, 
and were in line, a little in rear of where we found General Long- 
street. All was quiet, and had been since about 11 a. m., except 
occasional firing of cannon. I have no recollection of General 
Longstreet's having proposed to turn the Federal left, or make any 
other offensive movement. Such a suggestion from him, in view 
of the tenor of his notes to me that day — more especially the one 
dated 1.30 p. m. — would certainly have made an impression on my 
mind. It would clearly have indicated in him a wonderful and 
sudden change of heart. I had no knowledge of " the strength of 
the enemy's lines '' in Longstreet's front ; or on the Federal left ; 
which he says he proposed to make "another effort to turn;" 
neither did I claim to have such knowledge. 

General Longstreet says farther : " Attack was not renewed 
on the 1st of June, because Johnston had been wounded and had 



166 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

been obliged to leave the field. Smith, the next in rank, had 
been taken quite sick, but would not give up. He was therefore 
slow in organizing for renewed attack, and before he did so 
arrange General Lee was announced as commander of the array. 
As he had not been with the army the previous day, he was not 
prepared to conduct the continuance of the battle ; so the troops 
were withdrawn to their original positions in the afternoon and 
evening." 

The troops were not withdrawn during the afternoon and 
evening. I was not " taken quite sick " until eighteen hours 
after General Lee assumed command of the army. When I 
succeeded in communicating with General Longstreet, about 2 
A. M., June 1, the "organizing" necessary " for renewed attack " 
had been " arranged ; '' except in the right wing under Long- 
street. It is not proposed to I'ecapitulate here the events of that 
day, or to dwell again upon the notes Longstreet addressed to me, 
or to discuss now what might have occurred if Johnston had not 
been wounded. It may, however, be well to state that, with full 
knowledge of the contents of Long-street's battle-field notes, 
General Lee might well feel " he was not prepared to conduct 
the continuance of the battle " after 5 p. m. ; even if Longstreet 
had proposed to make " another effort " to turn the Federal 
left. 

To me the most astounding revelation connected with these 
events is the fact that Longstreet, after ordering every brigade 
in the right wing of the army to report to D. H. Hill ; gave 
Hill no orders whatever that day, until after dark. As the regu- 
lar commander of the three divisions in that wing, General Long- 
street Avas given positive orders to renew the fight, and general 
instructions in regard to the direction of the fighting. He vir- 
tually abdicated command ; failed to transmit the orders he had 
received ; kept these facts from me ; wrote the battle-field notes 
of -which facsimiles are given; and would now have it believed 
that be was anxious to renew the fighting, but was overruled " in 
consequence " of my opposition ! 

General D. H. Hill, in his official report, says : " General 
Longstreet sent me an order after dark to withdraw my whole 
command. The thirteen brigades were not got together until 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 167 

near midnight. . . . We regained our own intrencliments 
by sunrise." 

In the latter sentence General Hill refers only to his own 
division. Longstreet's division had no intrencliments. On the 
30th of May three brigades of his division were on the Nine- 
miles road about three miles in rear of McLaws's line on the New 
Bridge road ; and his three other brigades — near the point at 
which the Nine-miles road leaves the city — were several miles in 
rear of Magruder's line on the Chickahominy. 

On the morning of June 2 Longstreet's division returned to 
their camps, on and near the Nine-miles road, from which, on the 
31st of May, they should not have been transferred to the Will- 
iamsburg and Charles City roads. 

General Pickett, in his official report, says : " General Hill 
sent for me about 1 o'clock at night, or rather, morning of June 
2, and I went to the redoubt in search of him and still farther on 
toward our picket line. General Hill gave me special orders to 
cover [the] withdrawal of the troops with my brigade. ... I 
had formed my line of battle, two regiments on each side of |the] 
road, some little distance in our rear of the redoubt. The whole of 
our force filed past by half an hour after sunrise. I then leisurely 
moved off, not a Yankee in sight or even a puff of smoke." 

Huger's division was not withdrawn to their camps, which 
were on Gilliss creek, close to the east suburb of Richmond. 
This division was left well out on the Williamsburg road, in 
advance of D. H. Hill's intrencliments. On June 3 General 
Longstreet, for the information of General Lee, wrote : " The 
entire division of General Huger was left in advance upon retir- 
ing with the forces from the late battle-field. He was absent 
yesterday and not coming to report after being sent for, I ordered 
General Stuart to take the command of the division."^ 

The camps of the division under Whiting were on the Meadow 
Bridge road, north of Uichmond. So far from returning to their 
camps, in the evening of June 1, as stated by Generals Johnston 
and Longstreet, this division remained closely confronting 
Simmer's corps at Fair Oaks Station for days after the battle 
ended. 

* " Official Records," Vol. XI., Part III., p. 570. 



168 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

At 3 A. M., June 2, the chief of General McClellan's stafE 
wrote to General Heintzelraan : " As General Sumner thinks he 
may be attacked at daylight, you will please hold your command 
ready to support him, if necessary," And at the same hour, the 
following was sent to General Sumner : " The general com- 
manding says in reply to your dispatch that you must do the best 
you can to hold your own if attacked. General Heintzelman 
will support you." 

At 11.50 p. M., June 3, General Sumner wrote to General 
Kearney : " I have reason to expect a formidable attack to- mor- 
row morning. Please advance with your division at '2 a. m. in 
order to attack the flank of the enemy if he assails me in large 
force. Everything may depend upon this movement of yours. 
Come directly up the railroad so as to arrive at Fair Oaks Sta- 
tion by daylight." 

At 2.30 A. M., June 4, General Kearnej^ ordered Colonel Ward, 
commanding Birney's brigade: "In compliance with within 
notice be ready to attack the enemy cautiously in flank toward 
Fair Oaks Station. Keep your own flank secure by a regiment 
thrown back at right angle to your advance." And at the same 
hour General Kearney ordered General Jameson : " In compliance 
with within be ready to move up the railroad, to cross and attack 
the enemy in flank if he does not attack you in front. Combine 
with Hobart Ward. Only commit two regiments." 

The Federal advance on the Williamsburg road, June 2, is 
described by Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Potter, Seventy-first New 
York. He says that with five companies he proceeded soon after 
dawn to re-occupy the position in the woods on the south side of 
the open ground around Casey's redoubt, from which he had, on 
the 1st, observed the Confederates until dark. He adds : " As 
we filed through the swamp the lines occupied bj^ the enemy of 
the previous evening seemed to be abandoned. . . . From 
the wounded we learned that the enemy had fallen back that 
morning, commencing the retreat about midnight, and that their 
rear had not been an hour gone. ... I continued to advance 
cautiously to the front . . . nearly one mile in front of the 
earthworks. . . . Halting in the edge of the wood looking 
out upon an open field for nearly half a mile in extent, we could 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 169 

see in the far front of the field some persons moving in the skirt 
of the wood. ... I speedily returned to the line of earth- 
works, and sent ... to report to General Sickles. Soon, 
after General Hooker, commanding division, and General Sickles, 
with the Excelsior brigade, arrived in advance. . . . General 
Hooker desired me to accompany him to the front of the swamp 
to point out where the rebel cavalry had been seen. Just as we 
were returning a party of rebel skirmishers, who were concealed 
in the swamp, fired upon the general, killing one of the horses of 
his escort.'' 

General Heintzelman says, that on the morning of the 2d of 
June, he " sent forward General Hooker with the portion of his 
division engaged the day before, to make a reconnaissance. . . . 
Our pickets got to within five miles of Eichmond." Casey's 
skirmish line across the "Williamsburg road, was but little more 
than five miles from Tlichmond when the Confederates advanced, 
May 31. 

On the 2d of June, General Hooker reported to General 
Heintzelman : " I returned from my reconnaissance about 5 o'clock 
this p. M. . . . The enemy appeared to have a regiment of 
cavalry and three of infantry, but as the latter were most con- 
cealed in the forest, it was not prudent to determine their number ; 
it may have been much greater. Our picket exchanged a few 
shots. On my return my command encamped in rear of Casey's 
camp.'' 

The infantry posted "in the forest '' were the three brigades 
of Huffer's division. Under the circumstances General Hooker 
was right : " it was not prudent to determine their number." 

On the Federal side there seems to have been a concurrence 
of views in favor of a " theory," which finds expression in the 
following quotations from " high authorities : " 

General Barnard says : " The repulse of the rebels at Fair 
Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those 
occasions which, if not seized, do not repeat themselves. We 
now know tlie state of disorganization and dismay in which the 
rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been 
followed into Kichmond," 

General Webb says : " The attempt of the rebels to drive the 



ITO BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

[Federal] left wing into the Chickahominy, and cut McClellan's 
line of supply from White House, which opened with every 
prospect of success, was turned first into failure and then into 
disaster, which sent them to Richmond in a panic on the night 
of June 1." 

General J. Watts De Peyster says : " At Fair Oaks or Seven 
Pines Kearney and Hooker could have gone into Richmond, 
supported by the bull-dog Sumner, if they had been permitted.'' 

In short, the generally accepted "theory,'' on the Federal 
side, is : The Confederates, in full force, made a determined 
attack, June 1 ; were repulsed, retreated " to Richmond in a 
panic ; " in " disorganization and dismay ; '' and might easily have 
been followed into that city. 

The facts do not sustain this " theory " in a single particular. 
The Federals, in position, were attacked on the 1st of June by 
but two Confederate brigades ; that attack was repulsed. Four 
Federal regiments then advanced and attacked a position held 
by one Confederate brigade ; these four regiments were with- 
drawn from the front of that brigade. It is not necessary to 
refer again to the so-called "bayonet charges" described by 
Generals Hooker and French. 

On the 2d of June two Confederate divisions were quietly 
withdrawn to their former positions in front of Richmond. One 
division was left well out on the Williamsburg road, far in 
advance of the position held on that road by the Confederates 
previous to the attack ; and one division, on the Nine-miles road, 
remained in position, closely confronting Sumner's corps, at Fair 
Oaks Station. 

The official records show very clearly what Generals Sumner, 
KesLrney and Hooker thought of the situation on the 2d, 3d and 
4th of June. 

The favored " theory," on the Confederate side, finds expres- 
sion in the following quotation from the writings of General 
Richard Taylor. He says : " Johnston's plan was well con- 
sidered and singularly favored of fortune. Some two corps of 
McClellan's army were posted on the southwest or Richmond 
side of the Chickahominy, and a sudden rise of that stream 
swept away the bridges and overflowed the adjacent low lands, 



SUMMARY AND COMMENTS. 171 

cutting off those corps from their supports. They ought to have 
Iteen crushed, but Johnston fell severely wounded, upon which 
confusion ensued, and no results of importance were attained." 

This is an echo of General Johnston's claim, setting forth 
what would have been accomplished if he had not been disabled. 
That claim has already been referred to ; and it is not proposed 
to discuss what General Taylor says on the subject. 

The Chickahominy constituted an inherent disadvantage to the 
Federals in approaching Richmond from a base of operations on 
the Pamunkey river. This made it the more incumbent on Gen- 
eral McClellan not to risk a corps unsupported, for several days, 
within easy reach of the Confederate army. But Keyes's corps 
was at Seven Pines, Heintzelman's at Bottom's Bridge and White 
Oak Bridge, whilst three Federal corps were on the north side of 
the Chickahominy. If Heintzelman's corps had been at the 
third line of defense, and Sumner's had crossed the river a day 
or two sooner, been placed on the x^ine-miles road, west of Fair 
Oaks Station, and its position strengthened by fortifications, the 
Federals on the south side of the Chickahominy, May 31, would 
have been reasonably secure against attack. But, in the existing 
state of affairs, Keyes's corps was in imminent danger of destruction. 

General Longstreet misunderstood the direction in which his 
own division was to have moved into action. Instead of striking 
Keyes's exposed, weak and easily accessible right flank, when D. 
H. Hill commenced the attack in front, Longstreet transferred 
his division to the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, allowed 
Hill to fight for three hours without any assistance, and then gave 
him one brigade. Hill sent that brigade to the point at which 
Longstreet's whole division should have been put in close action 
when the attack commenced. That brigade beat Keyes, whilst 
D. H. Hill's division was checked at the second abatis, and his 
right was forced back to the earthworks of Keyes's front line. 

Five of the six brigades of Longstreet's division were not put 
in close action that day. Yet, General Longstreet attributed "the 
failure of complete success " to the " slow movements of General 
Huger's command " ! General Johnston united with Longstreet in 
severely censuring Huger, and says : " The skill, vigor and de- 
cision with which these operations were conducted by General 



172 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 

Longstreet are worthy of tlie liigliest praise " ! And he carefully- 
suppressed the fact of Longstreet's " misunderstanding " and the 
failure of the attempt to have that misunderstanding corrected. 

General Johnston's intention to concentrate a large portion 
of his army against the Federal force, isolated at Seven Pines, 
ivas well considered. But his written orders were unneces- 
sarily delayed, and when issued were not of that clear and posi- 
tive character called for by the occasion. His verbal instructions 
to General Longstreet were " misunderstood " by the latter ; and 
the attempt to have that " misunderstanding " corrected failed, 
because of the capture of the Aide-de-Camp who bore the order. 
There is but little to commend in General Johnston's practical 
management of the army, May 31 ; and the same may be said in 
regard to the accounts he has given of these events. 

General Longstreet, in command of the three divisions which, 
were to have crushed Keyes's corps before it could be re-enforced, 
blundered badly from the beginning to tlie end of the battle ; 
and, to say the least, his writings in reference to Seven Pines 
are no more creditable than his conduct of operations on the field. 

It is not deemed necessary to dwell at more length upon what 
Generals Johnston and Longstreet say in regard to the causes 
which saved Keyes's corps from annihilation — and McClellan 
from decisive disaster — in the tirst great contest between the 
Federal Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of 
Northern Virginia. 

Strength of the Opposing Armies. 

McClellan's forces numbered 98,008 "^ on the 31st of May, 1862, 
of which about 5,000 were on detatched service. " Present for 
duty" — Sumner's corps, 17,412 ; Heintzelman's corps, 16,999; 
Keyes' corps, 17,132 ; Porter's corps, 17,546 ; Franklin's corps, 
19,580 ; engineers, cavalry and j)rovost guard, 4,767. Each corps 
was composed of two divisions of nearly equal strength. 

General Johnston estimates the strength of liis army at 
73,928t. Other authorities place it at 62,696. The records show 
that on the 21st of May, 1862, ten days before the battle, John- 
ston's army numbered 53,688:t — Smith's division, 10,592; Long- 

* " Official Records." Vol. XL, Part III., page 204. 

f Century Magazine, May, 1885, page 114. 

X " Official Records," Vol. XI., Part III., page 580. 



r^--- 



SUMMART AND COMMENTS. 1^3 

street's division, 13,816 ; Magruder's forces — composed of 
McLaws' division and D. E.. Jones' division, 15,920; D. H. Hill's 
division, 11,151 ; cavalry and reserve artillery, 2,209. 

Before May 31 JoLiiston's force was increased by the arrival 
of A. P. Hill's division (estimated) 4,000, and Hnger's division 
(estimated) 5,008. One of the five brigades of D. H. Hill's 
division was detached before May 31. 

In the three Union corps, that were engaged, tlie aggregate 
present for duty was 51,513. 

In the four Confederate divisions, engaged, the aggregate 
present for duty was about 39,000. 

Losses. 

The total Union loss* was 790 killed, 3,591 wounded, and 647 
captured or missing. Aggregate, 5,031. 

The total Confederate lossf was 980 killed, 4,749 wounded, and 
405 captured or missing. Aggregate, 6,134. 

* " Official Records," Vol. XI., Part I., page 763. 

f General Long.street's report, " Official Records," Vol. XI., Part I., page 
942, shows that the losses in the three divisions, which composed the " right 
wing" of General Johnston's array, were, 816 killed ; 3,739 wounded ; and 296 
missing. The official report of the Chief Surgeon of the division under 
Whiting shows that the losses in that division, were, 164 killed ; 1,010 wounded ; 
and 109 missing. G. W. S. 



174 



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* The foregoing two pages are facsimiles of the first two pages of a letter 
addressed to me by General J. E. Johnston. The portions of that letter which 
are omitted make no mention of anything connected with the battle of Seven 
Pines. G. W. S. 



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188 battle of seven pines. 

Maps. 

I am indebted to the Century Magazine Company for permis 
sion to use duplicates of the plates of the two maps which were 
first published in " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." These 
are believed to be, by far, the most accurate maps of this battle. 
But there are a few unimportant errors in minor details; caused, 
no doubt, by the fact that too much was attempted to be shown. 
The pentangular redoubt is placed too far south of the road — 
the first abatis was wider than indicated, and extended' south so 
as to cover the whole front of Casey's main line — the ground on 
the south and east of Seven Pines was open for 300 or 400 
yards from that point — the ground near the positions marked 
for Pickett's and Armistead's brigades, going into action, 
was not open — the regiments that supported Spratt's battery 
were not all in Naglee's brigade. Hood's brigade, at 5 p. m., was 
very near Fair Oaks Station. 

But, these minor matters detract but little from the general 
correctness of the maps. In all cases of discrepancy between the 
maps and the text, the latter should control, because it is based 
on the official reports of those subordinate commanders whose 
troops did the actual fighting. 



189 



Copyright in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, i88;, by The Century Co. 




Map sJiowmg-Fositiom preliTmnaiy to Seven Tines orFatr Oaks^May 31 S June 1, 786. 



nissten o/^ THR CENTURY CO. 

VIAP SHOWING POSITIONS PRELIMINARY TO THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



lyi 




INDEX 



PAGE. 



Abatis, or felled timber 28-9 188 

Abercrombie, Brigadier-General J. J 39, 46, 85-8 

Accounts given by ' ' historians, " conflicting ; see Preface.aud ' ' Theories " 169-70 

Adams's house 115 120 

Anderson, Colonel G. B 47-9, 52-5 

Anderson, Colonel G. T 10 15 

Anderson, Brigadier-General R. 11 52-9 

Anderson, Major William •. 61 

Archer, Colonel J. J 98^ 132 

Armistead, Brigadier-General L. A 79, l'20-l-2-3, 140, 141, 159 

Army of Northern Virginia, organization of 7, 8 

Position of 12 

Strength of 7, 16, 172 

Losses of 173 

Army of the Potomac, organization of 28, 172 

Position of 28, 171 

Strength of 7 172 

Losses of 173 

Attack, May 31, signal given and movement described 47 

June 1, described 119^ 123 140 

Baird, Major W. H., extracts from official report of, Thirty-eighth New 

York \ 110 

Barlow, Colonel F. C, extracts from official report of, Sixty-first New 

York 113 

Barnard, Brigadier-General J. G 157, 169 

Bayonet-charges ; " so-called " ; French 114-15, 160-61 

Hooker 116-17-18, 159-60 

Beauregard, General G. T 70 

Beaverdam Creek 10 n 14 

Beckham, Captain R. F., Aide 21, 24, 25 

Berry, Brigadier-General H. G 41_o_4_6 

Biruey, Brigadier-General D. B 41-4, S4-G, 105-6-7, 110-11-12-15 

Blanchard, Biigadier-General A . G 79 

Bondurant's battery 49 

Bottom's Bridge 12, 28, 41-2-7, 157, 171 

Brady's battery 84-5-7, 105 

Bratton, Colonel John 59, 60-8 

Briggs, Colonel H. S 4O-1 

Brooke, Colonel J. R 109, 112-13 

13 



194 INDEX. 

PAGB. 

Burns, Brigadier-General W. W 86-8, 93, 110 

Cameron, Governor W. E 31, 120 

Carpenter, Captain J. Q 69 

Carter's battery 49, 50-2 

Casey, Brigadier-General Silas 28 

Extracts from official report of 84-5 

Cruel injustice to 36 

Cliickaliominy, described 9 

Cobb, Brigadier-General Howell 10, 138, 137 

Cochrane, Colonel John, extracts from official report of. Sixty-fifth 

New York 88 

Colston, Brigadier-General R. E 31, 56, 79 

Correspondence, with General Johnston, in reference to his " original 

plan" 16, 17, 18 

With General D. H. Hill, in reference to Longstreet's letter of 

June 7, 1862 06-67 

With Long-street on the field, June 1 134-5-7-8 

Couch, Brigadier-General D. N 28-39 

Extracts from official report of 40-84 

Court, applied for by General Huger 74 

Not granted 76 

Cross, Colonel E. E., extracts from official report of, Fifth New 

Hampshire 114 

Dana, Bridgadier-General N. J. T 86, 91 

Extracts from official report of 92 

Davis, President Jefferson, dissatisfied 9 

Rides out to see the action commence 10 

Practical refusal to grant Huger's request for a court 76 

Makes " some explanation " 77 

Efforts to send a brigade "to attack the enemy in flank and 

reverse " 101-2 

Asks for plans 103 

Ordered General R. E. Lee to take command 137 

Davis, Colonel W. W. H. , extracts from official report of. One Hundred 

and Fourth Pennsylvania 36-7 

Dearing's battery 52 

De Peyster, General J. Watts 170 

D(?vens, Brigadier-General Charles, extracts from official report of 40 

Egan, Lieutenant-Colonel T. W., extracts from official report of, 

Fortieth New York Ill, 115 

Fac-similes, notes and letters 174 to 187 

Frank, Colonel Paul 109 

Frank's battery 106 

French, Brigadier- General W. H 105-6 

Extracts from official report of 108-9, 160 

French, Major S. B 24-5-6 

Frobel, Colonel B. W 26-7, 97-8 



INDEX. 195 

PAGE. 

Gap between Longstrcet's left and Whiting's right 129, 132, 164 

Garland, Brigadier-General Samuel 47-8-9, 55 

Gordon, Colonel J. B., extracts from official report of 54-5 

Gorman, Brigadier-General W. A., extracts from ofHcial report of 89, 90 

Griffith, Brigadier-General Richard 99, 102 

Hampton, Brigadier-General Wade 7, 22, 98-9, 100-1, 133 

Ilatton, Brigadier-General Robert 7, 22, 98-9, 100-1, 133 

Hazzard, Captain G. W., batteries ; extracts from official report of. . . .106, 110 
Hcintzelmnn, Brigadier-General S. P. .28, 41-2-3-6-47, 63-4, 139, 168-9, 171-2 

Hill, Major-Gencral A. P 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 23, 128-9, 130-3, 172 

Hill, Major-General D. H 7, 8 

Directed by Longstrect to move at dawn, but " not to move until 

relieved by Huger's division " 148 

Inevitable delay caused by that order 148 

Moved at 1 p. m 47 

Fighting for possession of the Federal first line of defense 47-52 

Asked Longstreet for an additional brigade 52 

Fighting for possession of the Federal second line of defense. .52 to 63 

Position of the division, night of May 31 55-6 

Thirteen brigades under his orders, June 1 139, 140 

Official report of operations on the 1st of June 139 to 142 

Received no orders from Longstreet the second day 140 

Ordered, after dark, to withdraw 142 

Comments on Longstreet's letter of June 7, 1863 66-7 

Hood, Brigadier-General J. B. . .7, 10, 22, 94-5-6-7-8-9, 123, 127, 133-3, 162-3 

Hooker, Brigadier-General Joseph 20, 46 

Extracts from official report of 115, 116 

Additional mention 117-8, 157-9, 160, 169, 170 

Howard, Aide, C. H 114 

Howard, Brigadier-General 0.0 105 

Extracts from official report of 106-9 

Additional mention 112-14-15 

Hudson, Lieutenant-Colonel H. W., extracts from official report of, 

Eighty-seventh New York 90 

Huger, Captain Benjamin 118 

Ilugcr, IVfajor-General Benjamin, in camp on Gilliss Creek 16 

Ordered to move out on Charles City road 67-8 

Delayed at the crossing of Gilliss Creek by Longstreet's division. 31-2, 73 

Under Longstreet's orders after 10 or 11 a. m 32, 74 

Two brigades of Huger's division placed in rear of three brigades 

of Longstreet's division, by Longstreet's order 79 

Charged with slowness by Generals Longstreet and Johnston. .64-5-9, 70 

Objects to Longstreet's report 72 

Objects to Johnston's indorsement of Longstreet's "erroneous 

statements " 73 

Applies for a court 74 

Court not granted 76 



196 INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Huger, Major-General Benjamin — 

Johnston's letter on the subject 75 

General Johnston sided with Longstreet against Huger 68 

Longstreet ordered General Stuart to take command of Huger's 

division 167 

Hunt, Captain L. C. , Aide 41 

Jameson, Brigadier-General CD 42-4-5-6 

Jenkins, Colonel Micah 52-8 

Extracts from official report of 59 to 63 

Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel C. F., extracts from official report of. 

Eighty-first Pennsylvania 109 

Johnston, General J. E , commanded the Army of Northern Virginia. . . 7 

Awaited the closer approach of the Federals, east of Richmond ... 12, 15» 

144-5 

Attention suddenly called to the right of the Federal army 12, 13 

Preparations for attack in that direction 13, 14 

Movement suspended 14, 15 

Letter to General Whiting, commanding G, W. Smith's division. . 8, 9 
When attack was determined upon it had not commenced to rain. 146 

Written order for movement of division under Wliiting 18 

Written order for movement of Huger's div ision 67-8 

Longstreet " was instructed verbally " 28 

Correspondence in regard to " original plan " , 16, 17, 18 

Intention at sunrise on the 31st of May 20-1-3, 145-6 

Elated at the prospect of striking an effective blow 147 

Expectations would have been better founded if his orders had 

been given sooner 147-8 

Letter in reference to Longstreet's " misunderstanding " 19, 20 

Aide captured 25, 34 

Anxiety because of Longstreet's delay 22-6 

Received a note from Longstreet complaining of " slowness " on 

the Nine-miles road 19 

Directed the division under Whiting "against the right flank of 

Longstreet's adversaries " 94 

Censured Whiting for hesitating to move the division across the 

railroad 97 

" Obstinately thought " there was only one Federal brigade in posi- 
tion north of Fair Oaks Station 95 

Disabled by wounds and removed from the field 154 

Sided with Longstreet against Huger 68 

Letter to Confederate Secretary of War, in reference to Huger. . . 75 

Praises Longstreet 171 

Statement of the positions of the contending forces on the night of 

May 31 and morning of June 1 153-4-5 

Amazed " at the swelling bulk assumed by the ' skirmish ' of 

'.he 1st " 159 



INDEX. 197 

TAOE. 

Johnston, General J. E. — 

Says General Smith " was prevented from renewing his attack ". . 155 
Claims that three Federal corps would have been destroj'ed on the 

1st of June if he had not been disabled on the 31st of May . 155 to 158 
Longstreet's "misunderstanding," May 31, "may have been" 

Johnston's " fault " 151, 153 

Jones, Brigadier-General D. R 8, 13, 128 

Kearney, Brigadier-General Philip 28 

Extracts from official report of 44-5 

Additional mention 4(i, 107, 168, 170 

Kemper, Brigadier-General J. L 24, 52-3 -6-7 

Kershaw, Brigadier-General J. B 128 

Keyes, Brigadier-General E. D 28 

Reported his condition 29 

Speaks more in detail 29 

Extracts from official report of 37, 39, 40, 43, 43, 45, 46 

Additional mention 47, 83-4-5, 101, 139, 146, 147, 154, 157, 171 

Kimball, Colonel J. W., extracts from official report of. Fifteenth 

Massachusetts 91 

Kirby, Lieutenant Edmund, battery ir6 

Extracts fron> official report of 87 

Langley, Lieutenant-Colonel S. G 114 

Law, Colonel E. M 95 

Lee, General R. E 9, 10, 101-2-4 

Letter to General G. W. Smith ] 30 

Additional mention i;51_7_8-9, 165-6-7 

Lee, Colonel S. D 100 

Lee, Colonel W. R. , extracts from official report of, Twentieth ]\Iassachu- 

setts 92 

Lemmon, Captain George, Aide 95-6, 132 

Lightfoot, Colonel C. E 100 

Lomax, Colonel Tennent 119-20-21 

Longstreet, Major-General James 7, 8 

Proposed that an attack be made, May 29tli . . 15 

Was to precede Whiting 19 

' ' Misunderstanding " 19,20 

May have been Johnston's " fault " 151, 152 

Delayed Whiting 19, 21, 24, 25 

Delayed Huger 31, 72 

Order he gave D. H. Hill caused delay 148 

Additional delay caused by "mismanagement " 148-9,150 

Claimed to rank and to command Huger 32, 76 

Held three brigades of his own division and two brigades of 

Huger's division on Charles City road 79, 80 

Five brigades of his own division were not in close action the 

first day 32, 33, 63, 66, 71, 81, 154 

Complained of General Johnston's " slowness " 19 



198 INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Longstrect, Major-Gencral James — 

Effect of that complaint 22, 149 

Complained of Huger's " slow movements " 65 

Was ordered to renew the attack June 1st 131 

Failed to obey that order 140, 166 

Battle-field notes 134, 135, 137, 138 

Recollection of the fighting the second day 163 

Description of what occurred after General Lee took command. 165, 1G6 
Ordered General Stuart to take command of Huger's division. . . . 167 

Losses, May 31, Confederate : D. H. Hill's division 63 

Longslreet's division 56, 63 

G. W. Smith's division, imder Whiting 101 

Losses, ]\ray 31, Federal : Casey's division 46 

Couch's division 46 

Kearney's division 46 

Sedgwick's division and Couch's " cut off " forces 93 

Losses, June 1. Confederate : Mahone's brigade 121 

Pickett's brigade 126 

Wilcox's brigade 118 

Hood's brigade 132 

Tomlin's regiment 122 

Armistead's brigade referred to 141 

Pryor's brigade referred to 118 

Losses, June 1, Federal : Richardson's division 115 

Hooker's division 116 

Birney's brigade 115 

Losses, aggregate, in the two days: Army of Northci'u Virginia 173 

Army of the Potomac 173 

McClellan, Major-General G. B. , commanded the army of the Potomac. . 7 

Positions occupied on the 80th of May 28 

Telegram to Secretary Stanton, June 1 35, 36 

Ordered General Sumner to cross the Chickahominy 83 

Risked an isolated corps in vicinity of Seven Pines 171 

Ordered Heintzelman to hold his command ready to assist Sumner 168 

McDowell, Major-General Irvin, moved from Fredericksburg toward 

Richmond 12, 13 

Returned 14 

Moved north '. 14 

Additional mention 8, 144 

McLaws, Major-General Lafayette 8 

Reported advance of Federal skirmishers 12 

To " re-enforce Longstreet " 18 

Reported the Federals were constructing a pontoon bridge 128 

The location of each brigade of his division 128 

Bearer of message and orders to General Longstreet 136 

His note in reference to General Longstreet 137 



TNDEX. 199 

PAGE. 

Magruder, Major-General J. B., commanded tlie "centre " of the army 

of Northern Virginia 8 

Additional mention 13, 95, 99, 101, 102 

Mahone, Brigadier-General William, moved on the Charles City road. . 31 

Ordered to Seven Pines 119 

Ordered to attack 118 

Two of his regiments were on detached service 119 

Describes the fighting done by the three other regiments 119, 130 

Maps ; memoranda in reference to 188 

Maurin's battery 142 

Meagher, Brigadier-General T. F 105, 110 

Mindil, Brigadier-General G. W 152, 163 

Miller, Colonel James 109 

Moore, Colonel Sydenham 56 

Naglee, Brigadier-General H. M., position and strength of brigade 36 

Extracts from official report of 37-8-9. 42-3 

Neill, Colonel T. H 39, 40 

Nevin, Lieutenant-Colonel D. J., extracts from official report of, Sixty- 
second New York 80 

Organization 7, 8, 28, 172-8 

Palmer, Brigadier-General I. N., extracts from official report of 36 

Parker, Colonel T. T , extracts from official report of. Sixty-fourth New 

York ". 113 

Peck, Brigadier-General J. J. , position 39 

Mention 43-5-6 

Pender, Colonel W. D 98 

Pettigrew, Brigadier-General J. J 7, 12, 22, 94-8-9, 100, 101 

Pettifs battery 106-7, 110 

Pickett, Captain Charles 125 

Pickett, Brigadier-General G. E., extracts from official report of 82 

Ordered to attack 123 

Descriljes his movement 123 

"From having been the attacking party," "had to act on the 

defensive" 124 

Describes the fighting 125 

Re-enforced by Colston and Mahone 125 

Complained that he was not aided by "the left wing of our 

army " 162 

Covered the withdrawal of the right wing on the morning of the 

2d of June 167 

Pitcher, Captain W. L 112 

Positions of the contending forces — 

On the night of May 30 : Confederates 16, 145 

Federals 28, 146 



200 INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Positions of the contending forces — 

On the night of May 31 and morning of June 1 : Confederates . . . 

55-6-7, 63, 127, 136, 155-6 

Federals 46-7, 105-6, 156-7 

On the night of June 1 and morning of June 2 — Confederates. ... 167 

Federals 168-9 

Potter, Lieutenant-Colonel H. L., describes Federal movements when it 
was discovered the Confederates had withdrawn from the 

captured works 168-9 

Pryor, Brigadier-General R. A 79, 117, 118 

Rains, Brigadier-General G. T 47 

Declined to come up 49 

Ordered by General Hill " to make a wide flank movement " 50 

Report of 51 

Failed to support Rodes's right 53 

Position night of May 31 56 

Richardson, Brigadier-General I. B 28 

Extracts from official report of 105 

Position of his lines 105-6 

First firing about 5 A. m 107 

Heavy attack 6.30 a. ir 108 

Ordered General Howard to re-enforce the first line 108 

Riker, Colonel J. L 86 

Ripley, Brigadier-General R. S 130-6 

Rippey, Colonel O. H 39, 40 

Rodes, Brigadier-General R. E 30, 47 

Ordered to Williams))urg road 71 

Extracts from official report of 49, 53 

Ordered to dislodge the enemy in the woods soulh of the Williams- 
burg road 53 

The right of his brigade repulsed 53 

Position night of 31st of May 55 

Russell. Colonel D. A 39, 85-6, 107, 110 

Sands, Captain R. M 121 

Sedgwick, Brigadier-General John 28 

Extracts from official report of 84, 85-6 

Mention 92, lOS 

Semmes, Brigadier-General P. J 20, 128 

Seven Pines, description of the ground and the defen-ses 28, 29 

Sickles, Brigadier-General D. E 116, 169 

Sloan, Captain Benjamin, on Ihiger's stall 32 

Smith, Major-General G. W 7, 8 

The division which bore his name was commanded by General 

Whiting 8, 20 

Turned over the command of the left wing temporarily to A. P. 

Hill 23 



INDEX. 201 

PAGE. 

Smith, Major-General G. "W- — 

Repaired to General Johnston's headquarters 20 

Official report of what occurred there 20-1-2 

Report of the fighting in the woods north of Fair Oaks Station.. 98, 99, 100 

Circumstances under which that report was written 27-8 

General Johnston requested certain portions of that report should 

be omitted 19 

Correspondence in reference to General Johnston's " original 

plan " 17, 18 

Ordered General Longstreet to renew the attack on the 1st of June . 131 
Con'espondence with General Longstreet on the 1st of June. . .134-5-7-8 

Gave up the command of the army to General Lee 137 

Correspondence with General D. H. Hill 66, 139 

Interview with President Davis, at dark, on the 31st of May 103 

Extracts from official report of operations on the 1st of June. . . . 130 

Bpratt's battery 34-5-6 

Staples, Colonel H. A., extracts from official report of. Third Maine. ... Ill 

Stevens, Major W. H 13Q-.5 

Strength of the oppo,sing armies 172-3 

Stribling's battery 142 

Stuart, Brigadier-General J. E. B 127-8, 134-8, 167 

Suiter, Colonel J. A., extracts from official report of, Thirty-fourth New 

York 90 

Sully, Colonel Alfred, extracts from official report of, First Minnesota. . 88 

Sumner, Brigadier-General E. V 28 

Ordered to cross the Chickahominy 83 

Extracts from official report of 83-4 

Found Couch's troops " in line near Adams's house " 84 

Sedgwick's division, four regiments of Couch's division, and two 

batteries resist attack 84 to 89 

Ordered five regiments to charge against Whiting's right 124-7 

Placed Richardson's division along the railroad 105 

Fighting on Richardson's line 105 to 115 

Expected " a formidable attack " on the 4th of June 168 

Suydam, Captain C. C. , Aide 85 

Swinton's History 17, 18, 23, 26, 27, 159 

Taylor, General Richard 170, 171 

" Theories," Confederate 170 

Federal 169, 170 

Tomlin, Colonel H. B., extracts from official report of. Fifty -third 

Virginia 121, 122 

Trophies, Confederate 142 

Van Ness, Captain W. W 84 

Waddill, Major G. M 121, 122 

Walker, Colonel Elijah, extracts from official report of. Fourth Maine. . 112 
Walker, Brigadier-General J. G 8 



202 INDEX. 

PAGE. 

Ward, Colonel J. H. H., extracts from official report of 107 

Ordered three regiments to charge 110 

Washington, Lieutenant J. B., Aide to General Johnston 21, 25, 34 

Watson's battery 142 

Webb. Major-General A. 8 Ifi9, 170 

Wessells, Brigadier General H. W., extracts from official report of 36 

Whiting, Major Jasper 20, 131-2-4 

Whiting, Brigadier-General W. H. C, assigned to command G. W. 

Smith's division 7 

Instructions from General Johnston 8, 9 

Ordered by General Johnston to move to a point on the Nine-miles 

road 18 

Delayed by Longstreet's division 19, 21, 24, 25 

Attacks Federal re-enforcements 83, 93-101 

Position just after dark on the 31st of May 127 

Ordered to make a diversion in favor of the real attack Longstreet 

was ordered to make on the 1st of June 131, 133 

Ordered to throw back his right 134 

Closely confronted Sumner's corps ... 143, 167 

Wilcox, Brigadier-General C. M., position and command on the 30th of 

May 30 

Moved to the junction of the Williamsburg and Charles City 

roads 31 

Marched and countermarched on the Charles City road under 

Longstreet's orders 79 

Three companies of these three brigades in close action on the 

31st of May 56-7 

Operations of his brigade and Pryor's on the 1st of June 117, 118 

Williams, Colonel D. H., extracts from official report of, Thirty-first 

Pennsylvania 89 

Withdrawal, from the captured works 142-3, 166-7 

Discovered by the Federals 168-9 



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